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Review
. 2017 Apr;64(2):344-353.
doi: 10.1111/tbed.12401. Epub 2015 Aug 10.

Dromedary Camels and the Transmission of Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV)

M G Hemida  1   2 , A Elmoslemany  3   4 , F Al-Hizab  5 , A Alnaeem  3 , F Almathen  6 , B Faye  7 , D K W Chu  8 , R A P M Perera  8 , M Peiris  8
Affiliations
Review

Dromedary Camels and the Transmission of Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV)

M G Hemida et al. Transbound Emerg Dis. 2017 Apr.

Abstract

Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) is an existential threat to global public health. The virus has been repeatedly detected in dromedary camels (Camelus dromedarius). Adult animals in many countries in the Middle East as well as in North and East Africa showed high (>90%) seroprevalence to the virus. Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus isolated from dromedaries is genetically and phenotypically similar to viruses from humans. We summarize current understanding of the ecology of MERS-CoV in animals and transmission at the animal-human interface. We review aspects of husbandry, animal movements and trade and the use and consumption of camel dairy and meat products in the Middle East that may be relevant to the epidemiology of MERS. We also highlight the gaps in understanding the transmission of this virus in animals and from animals to humans.

Keywords: MERS-CoV; coronavirus; dromedary camels; human; transmission; zoonosis.

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Conflict of interest statement

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

Figures

Figure 1
Figure 1
Epidemic curve of MERS‐CoV human infection in Saudi Arabia from June 2012 to December 2014 (Data used for generating epidemic curve were retrieved from the official Saudi Ministry of health quarterly reports).
Figure 2
Figure 2
Monthly human patients with MERS‐CoV distributed by history of animal exposure (dark grey = not exposed, light grey = exposed) after exclusion of patients with hospital, community or healthcare personnel contact. Animal exposure (camels and other species) data were available from (September 2014 to January 2015), Saudi Ministry of Health.
Figure 3
Figure 3
Hypothesis of MERS‐CoV transmission to humans. Green arrows represent confirmed transmission pathways. Red arrows represent potential transmission pathways, which may be confirmed in a few instances (for example, camel‐to‐human transmission in specific case reports) but not confirmed as main transmission pathways as yet. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com].
Figure 4
Figure 4
Map showing the active camel movement across Arabian Peninsula. Camel movements across the Arabian Peninsula and through Saudi Arabia are mainly for many pur‐purposes, importation, grazing, show, race and business. Arrows are showing the camel movement for the above indicated activities. Stickpins are showing the dry ports (Salwa, Albatha and Khafji) where animals cross the borders of Gulf countries including Qatar, UAE and Kuwait, respectively, as well as from Oman. Pushpins are showing the wet ports (Jeddah and Jizan), and dotted lines are showing the routes of camel importation from the African horn through Port Sudan and Barbara from Sudan and Somalia, respectively. We inserted blue circles, the size of these circles is proportional to the number of reported human cases per each geographical location. The number of human cases reported from 2 March 2012 to 23 July 2014. This data are obtained from Fig. 4 in the review by Gossner et al., 2016. This map was produced by Esri, ArcGIS ® and ArcMap™ software. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com].
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