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. 2024 Aug 26;24(1):866.
doi: 10.1186/s12879-024-09731-0.

Monitoring the VDPV2 outbreak in Egypt during 2020-2021 highlights the crucial role of environmental surveillance and boosting immunization in combating Poliovirus

Affiliations

Monitoring the VDPV2 outbreak in Egypt during 2020-2021 highlights the crucial role of environmental surveillance and boosting immunization in combating Poliovirus

Menna R Shabana et al. BMC Infect Dis. .

Abstract

Background: Poliovirus is a highly infectious enterovirus (EV) that primarily affects children and can lead to lifelong paralysis or even death. Vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPVs) are a great threat since they are derived from the attenuated virus in the Oral Poliovirus Vaccine (OPV) and can mutate to a more virulent form. The purpose of this study was to identify VDPV serotype 2 through the year 2020-2021 via surveillance of sewage samples collected from different localities and governorates in Egypt and stool specimens from Acute Flaccid Paralysis (AFP) cases. Both were collected through the national poliovirus surveillance system and according to the guidelines recommended by the WHO.

Methods: A total of 1266 sewage samples and 3241 stool samples from January 2020 to December 2021 were investigated in the lab according to World Health Organization (WHO) protocol for the presence of Polioviruses by cell culture, molecular identification of positive isolates on L20B cell line was carried out using real-time polymerase chain reactions (RT-PCR). Any positive isolates for Poliovirus type 2 and isolates suspected of Vaccine Derived Poliovirus Type 1 and type 3 screened by (VDPV1) or Vaccine Poliovirus Type 3 (VDPV3) assay in RT-PCR were referred for VP1 genetic sequencing.

Results: The outbreak was caused by circulating VDPV2 (cVDPV2) strains started in January 2021. By the end of February 2021, a total of 11 cVDPV2s were detected in sewage samples from six governorates confirming the outbreak situation. One additional cVDPV2 was detected later in the sewage sample from Qena (June 2021). The first and only re-emergence of VDPV2 in stool samples during the outbreak was in contact with Luxor in June 2021. By November 2021, a total of 80 VDPVs were detected. The Egyptian Ministry of Health and Population (MOHP), in collaboration with the WHO, responded quickly by launching two massive vaccination campaigns targeting children under the age of five. Additionally, surveillance systems were strengthened to detect new cases and prevent further spread of the virus.

Conclusion: The continued threat of poliovirus and VDPVs requires ongoing efforts to prevent their emergence and spread. Strategies such as improving immunization coverage, using genetically stable vaccines, and establishing surveillance systems are critical to achieving global eradication of poliovirus and efficient monitoring of VDPVs outbreaks.

Keywords: Environmental surveillance; Oral poliovirus vaccine; Sewage; Stool; Vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPVs); World Health Organization.

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Conflict of interest statement

The authors declare no competing interests.

Figures

Fig. 1
Fig. 1
Distribution of detected viral isolates from sewage samples in the years 2020 (a) and 2021 (b). SLPV-1, Sabin-like poliovirus type 1; SLPV-2, Sabin-like poliovirus type 2; SLPV-3, Sabin-like poliovirus type 3; NPEV, Non-polio Enterovirus; VDPV2, Vaccine derived poliovirus type 2, VDPV1; Vaccine Derived Poliovirus type 1, VDPV3; Vaccine Derived Poliovirus type 3
Fig. 2
Fig. 2
Distribution of detected viral Isolates from stool samples in the years 2020 (a) and 2021 (b). SLPV-1, Sabin-like poliovirus type 1; SLPV-2, Sabin-like poliovirus type 2; SLPV-3, Sabin-like poliovirus type 3; NPEV, Non-polio Enterovirus; VDPV2, Vaccine derived poliovirus type 2, VDPV1; Vaccine Derived Poliovirus type 1, VDPV3; Vaccine Derived Poliovirus type 3
Fig. 3
Fig. 3
Distribution of detected viral Isolates from sewage samples on months of year 2020 (a) and 2021 (b). SLPV-1, Sabin-like poliovirus type 1; SLPV-2, Sabin-like poliovirus type 2; SLPV-3, Sabin-like poliovirus type 3; NPEV, Non-polio Enterovirus; VDPV2, Vaccine derived poliovirus type 2, VDPV1; Vaccine Derived Poliovirus type 1, VDPV3; Vaccine Derived Poliovirus type 3
Fig. 4
Fig. 4
Distribution of detected viral Isolates from stool samples on months of year 2020 (a) and 2021 (b). SLPV-1, Sabin-like poliovirus type 1; SLPV-2, Sabin-like poliovirus type 2; SLPV-3, Sabin-like poliovirus type 3; NPEV, Non-polio Enterovirus; VDPV2, Vaccine derived poliovirus type 2, VDPV1; Vaccine Derived Poliovirus type 1, VDPV3; Vaccine Derived Poliovirus type 3
Fig. 5
Fig. 5
Distribution of detected viral Isolates from stool samples in different governorates of year 2020 (a) and 2021 (b). SLPV-1, Sabin-like poliovirus type 1; SLPV-2, Sabin-like poliovirus type 2; SLPV-3, Sabin-like poliovirus type 3; NPEV, Non-polio Enterovirus; VDPV2, Vaccine derived poliovirus type 2, VDPV1; Vaccine Derived Poliovirus type 1, VDPV3; Vaccine Derived Poliovirus type 3
Fig. 6
Fig. 6
Distribution of detected viral Isolates from sewage samples in different governorates of year 2020 (a) and 2021 (b). SLPV-1, Sabin-like poliovirus type 1; SLPV-2, Sabin-like poliovirus type 2; SLPV-3, Sabin-like poliovirus type 3; NPEV, Non-polio Enterovirus; VDPV2, Vaccine derived poliovirus type 2, VDPV1; Vaccine Derived Poliovirus type 1, VDPV3; Vaccine Derived Poliovirus type 3
Fig. 7
Fig. 7
Phylogenetic analysis of VDPV-2 obtained in 2021 and Emergency groups (a) Phylogenetic analysis of Alex sample and Sudan emergencu group (b) cVDPVs and their relativity to emergency group SUD (b) Giza samples and relativity to YEM emergency group

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