(79) Waste, by definition, has no benefit. It should be viewed as one aspect of the beneficial practice that gave rise to it. Furthermore, radioactive waste management should be placed in the context of the management of society's waste in general. (80) A major issue in evaluating the acceptability of a disposal system for long-lived solid radioactive waste is that doses or risks may arise from exposures in the distant future. There is uncertainty surrounding any estimate of these doses or risks due to lack of knowledge about future conditions. Such exposures are treated as potential exposures as their magnitude depends on future processes and conditions that have probabilities associated with them. (81) Nevertheless, the Commission recognises a basic principle that individuals and populations in the future should be afforded at least the same level of protection from the action of disposing of radioactive waste today as is the current generation. This implies use of the current quantitative dose and risk criteria derived from considering associated health detriment. Therefore, protection of future generations should be achieved by applying these dose or risk criteria to the estimated future doses or risks in appropriately defined critical groups. These estimates should not be regarded as measures of health detriment beyond times of around several hundreds of years into the future. In the case of these longer time periods, they represent indicators of the protection afforded by the disposal system. (82 Constrained optimisation is the central approach to evaluating the radiological acceptability of a waste disposal system; dose or risk constraints are used rather than dose or risk limits. By this transition from limitation to optimisation, the needs of practical application of the radiological protection system to the disposal of long-lived solid waste disposal are met: determination of acceptability now for exposures that may occur in the distant future. Optimisation should be applied in an iterative manner during the disposal system development process and should particularly cover both site selection and repository design. (83) Two broad categories of exposure situations should be considered: natural processes and human intrusion. The latter only refers to intrusion that is inadvertent. The radiological implications of deliberate intrusion into a repository are the responsibility of the intruder. Assessed doses or risks arising from natural processes should be compared with a dose constraint of 0.3 mSv per year or its risk equivalent of around 10(-5) per year. With regard to human intrusion, the consequences from one or more plausible stylized scenarios should be considered in order to evaluate the resilience of the repository to such events. (84) The Commission considers that in circumstances where human intrusion could lead to doses to those living around the site sufficiently high that intervention on current criteria would almost always be justified, reasonable efforts should be made at the repository development stage to reduce the probability of human intrusion or to limit its consequences. In this respect, the Commission has previously advised that an existing annual dose of around 10 mSv per year may be used as a generic reference level below which intervention is not likely to be justifiable. Conversely, an existing annual dose of around 100 mSv per year may be used as a generic reference level above which intervention should be considered almost always justifiable. Similar considerations apply in situations where the thresholds for deterministic effects in relevant organs are exceeded. (85) Compliance with the constraints can be assessed by utilising either an aggregated risk-oriented approach, with a risk constraint, or a disaggregated dose/probability approach, with a dose constraint, or a combination of both. A similar level of protection can be achieved by any of these approaches; however, more information may