chore: fix spelling errors #2352
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Signed-off-by: Josh Soref <jsoref@users.noreply.github.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Soref <jsoref@users.noreply.github.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Soref <jsoref@users.noreply.github.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Soref <jsoref@users.noreply.github.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Soref <jsoref@users.noreply.github.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Soref <jsoref@users.noreply.github.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Soref <jsoref@users.noreply.github.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Soref <jsoref@users.noreply.github.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Soref <jsoref@users.noreply.github.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Soref <jsoref@users.noreply.github.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Soref <jsoref@users.noreply.github.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Soref <jsoref@users.noreply.github.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Soref <jsoref@users.noreply.github.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Soref <jsoref@users.noreply.github.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Soref <jsoref@users.noreply.github.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Soref <jsoref@users.noreply.github.com>
jsoref
requested review from
josedonizetti,
chen-keinan,
krol3 and
knqyf263
as code owners
|
|
jsoref
commented
Jun 19, 2022
| We have specific [guidelines](/docs/docs/advanced/contribd/contrib/help-wanted.md) | ||
| We have specific [guidelines](/docs/community/maintainer/help-wanted.md) |
| - Here is the [Trivy Github Action][action] | ||
| - Here is the [Trivy GitHub Action][action] |
| ### Gitlab CI alternative template | ||
| ### GitLab CI alternative template |
| <figure style="text-aligh: center"> | ||
| <figure style="text-align: center"> |
| ## Installing from the the Aqua Chart Repository | ||
| ## Installing from the Aqua Chart Repository |
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This is a fairly recent heuristic, I'm reasonably confident it's correct.
| "Description": "ASN.1 strings are represented internally within OpenSSL as an ASN1_STRING structure which contains a buffer holding the string data and a field holding the buffer length. This contrasts with normal C strings which are repesented as a buffer for the string data which is terminated with a NUL (0) byte. Although not a strict requirement, ASN.1 strings that are parsed using OpenSSL's own \"d2i\" functions (and other similar parsing functions) as well as any string whose value has been set with the ASN1_STRING_set() function will additionally NUL terminate the byte array in the ASN1_STRING structure. However, it is possible for applications to directly construct valid ASN1_STRING structures which do not NUL terminate the byte array by directly setting the \"data\" and \"length\" fields in the ASN1_STRING array. This can also happen by using the ASN1_STRING_set0() function. Numerous OpenSSL functions that print ASN.1 data have been found to assume that the ASN1_STRING byte array will be NUL terminated, even though this is not guaranteed for strings that have been directly constructed. Where an application requests an ASN.1 structure to be printed, and where that ASN.1 structure contains ASN1_STRINGs that have been directly constructed by the application without NUL terminating the \"data\" field, then a read buffer overrun can occur. The same thing can also occur during name constraints processing of certificates (for example if a certificate has been directly constructed by the application instead of loading it via the OpenSSL parsing functions, and the certificate contains non NUL terminated ASN1_STRING structures). It can also occur in the X509_get1_email(), X509_REQ_get1_email() and X509_get1_ocsp() functions. If a malicious actor can cause an application to directly construct an ASN1_STRING and then process it through one of the affected OpenSSL functions then this issue could be hit. This might result in a crash (causing a Denial of Service attack). It could also result in the disclosure of private memory contents (such as private keys, or sensitive plaintext). Fixed in OpenSSL 1.1.1l (Affected 1.1.1-1.1.1k). Fixed in OpenSSL 1.0.2za (Affected 1.0.2-1.0.2y).", | ||
| "Description": "ASN.1 strings are represented internally within OpenSSL as an ASN1_STRING structure which contains a buffer holding the string data and a field holding the buffer length. This contrasts with normal C strings which are represented as a buffer for the string data which is terminated with a NUL (0) byte. Although not a strict requirement, ASN.1 strings that are parsed using OpenSSL's own \"d2i\" functions (and other similar parsing functions) as well as any string whose value has been set with the ASN1_STRING_set() function will additionally NUL terminate the byte array in the ASN1_STRING structure. However, it is possible for applications to directly construct valid ASN1_STRING structures which do not NUL terminate the byte array by directly setting the \"data\" and \"length\" fields in the ASN1_STRING array. This can also happen by using the ASN1_STRING_set0() function. Numerous OpenSSL functions that print ASN.1 data have been found to assume that the ASN1_STRING byte array will be NUL terminated, even though this is not guaranteed for strings that have been directly constructed. Where an application requests an ASN.1 structure to be printed, and where that ASN.1 structure contains ASN1_STRINGs that have been directly constructed by the application without NUL terminating the \"data\" field, then a read buffer overrun can occur. The same thing can also occur during name constraints processing of certificates (for example if a certificate has been directly constructed by the application instead of loading it via the OpenSSL parsing functions, and the certificate contains non NUL terminated ASN1_STRING structures). It can also occur in the X509_get1_email(), X509_REQ_get1_email() and X509_get1_ocsp() functions. If a malicious actor can cause an application to directly construct an ASN1_STRING and then process it through one of the affected OpenSSL functions then this issue could be hit. This might result in a crash (causing a Denial of Service attack). It could also result in the disclosure of private memory contents (such as private keys, or sensitive plaintext). Fixed in OpenSSL 1.1.1l (Affected 1.1.1-1.1.1k). Fixed in OpenSSL 1.0.2za (Affected 1.0.2-1.0.2y).", |
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These CVEs have errors in them. I'm happy to drop the files. If someone knows offhand how to get the CVEs fixed, that'd probably be better for the community overall.
| Description: A deserialization of untrusted data vulnernerability exists in rails < 5.2.4.3, rails < 6.0.3.1 that can allow an attacker to unmarshal user-provided objects in MemCacheStore and RedisCacheStore potentially resulting in an RCE. | ||
| Description: A deserialization of untrusted data vulnerability exists in rails < 5.2.4.3, rails < 6.0.3.1 that can allow an attacker to unmarshal user-provided objects in MemCacheStore and RedisCacheStore potentially resulting in an RCE. |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
These CVEs have errors in them. I'm happy to drop the files. If someone knows offhand how to get the CVEs fixed, that'd probably be better for the community overall.
| Description: ASN.1 strings are represented internally within OpenSSL as an ASN1_STRING structure which contains a buffer holding the string data and a field holding the buffer length. This contrasts with normal C strings which are repesented as a buffer for the string data which is terminated with a NUL (0) byte. Although not a strict requirement, ASN.1 strings that are parsed using OpenSSL's own "d2i" functions (and other similar parsing functions) as well as any string whose value has been set with the ASN1_STRING_set() function will additionally NUL terminate the byte array in the ASN1_STRING structure. However, it is possible for applications to directly construct valid ASN1_STRING structures which do not NUL terminate the byte array by directly setting the "data" and "length" fields in the ASN1_STRING array. This can also happen by using the ASN1_STRING_set0() function. Numerous OpenSSL functions that print ASN.1 data have been found to assume that the ASN1_STRING byte array will be NUL terminated, even though this is not guaranteed for strings that have been directly constructed. Where an application requests an ASN.1 structure to be printed, and where that ASN.1 structure contains ASN1_STRINGs that have been directly constructed by the application without NUL terminating the "data" field, then a read buffer overrun can occur. The same thing can also occur during name constraints processing of certificates (for example if a certificate has been directly constructed by the application instead of loading it via the OpenSSL parsing functions, and the certificate contains non NUL terminated ASN1_STRING structures). It can also occur in the X509_get1_email(), X509_REQ_get1_email() and X509_get1_ocsp() functions. If a malicious actor can cause an application to directly construct an ASN1_STRING and then process it through one of the affected OpenSSL functions then this issue could be hit. This might result in a crash (causing a Denial of Service attack). It could also result in the disclosure of private memory contents (such as private keys, or sensitive plaintext). Fixed in OpenSSL 1.1.1l (Affected 1.1.1-1.1.1k). Fixed in OpenSSL 1.0.2za (Affected 1.0.2-1.0.2y). | ||
| Description: ASN.1 strings are represented internally within OpenSSL as an ASN1_STRING structure which contains a buffer holding the string data and a field holding the buffer length. This contrasts with normal C strings which are represented as a buffer for the string data which is terminated with a NUL (0) byte. Although not a strict requirement, ASN.1 strings that are parsed using OpenSSL's own "d2i" functions (and other similar parsing functions) as well as any string whose value has been set with the ASN1_STRING_set() function will additionally NUL terminate the byte array in the ASN1_STRING structure. However, it is possible for applications to directly construct valid ASN1_STRING structures which do not NUL terminate the byte array by directly setting the "data" and "length" fields in the ASN1_STRING array. This can also happen by using the ASN1_STRING_set0() function. Numerous OpenSSL functions that print ASN.1 data have been found to assume that the ASN1_STRING byte array will be NUL terminated, even though this is not guaranteed for strings that have been directly constructed. Where an application requests an ASN.1 structure to be printed, and where that ASN.1 structure contains ASN1_STRINGs that have been directly constructed by the application without NUL terminating the "data" field, then a read buffer overrun can occur. The same thing can also occur during name constraints processing of certificates (for example if a certificate has been directly constructed by the application instead of loading it via the OpenSSL parsing functions, and the certificate contains non NUL terminated ASN1_STRING structures). It can also occur in the X509_get1_email(), X509_REQ_get1_email() and X509_get1_ocsp() functions. If a malicious actor can cause an application to directly construct an ASN1_STRING and then process it through one of the affected OpenSSL functions then this issue could be hit. This might result in a crash (causing a Denial of Service attack). It could also result in the disclosure of private memory contents (such as private keys, or sensitive plaintext). Fixed in OpenSSL 1.1.1l (Affected 1.1.1-1.1.1k). Fixed in OpenSSL 1.0.2za (Affected 1.0.2-1.0.2y). |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
These CVEs have errors in them. I'm happy to drop the files. If someone knows offhand how to get the CVEs fixed, that'd probably be better for the community overall.
| References: []string{"http://exammple.com"}, | ||
| References: []string{"http://example.com"}, |
| @@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ func TestScanner_Scan(t *testing.T) { | |||
| Title: "DoS", | |||
| Description: "Denial os Service", | |||
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I suspect this should be:
Suggested change
| Description: "Denial os Service", | |
| Description: "Denial of Service", |
My tooling only looks at 3+ letter words by default (2 letter words had too much noise).
chen-keinan
approved these changes
Jun 20, 2022
knqyf263
approved these changes
Jun 20, 2022
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Description
This PR corrects misspellings identified by the check-spelling action.
The misspellings have been reported at jsoref@a47f1f5#commitcomment-76469490
The action reports that the changes in this PR would make it happy: jsoref@59d72f5
Note: this PR does not include the action. If you're interested in running a spell check on every PR and push, that can be offered separately.
I will be annotating this PR, and I fully expect to be asked to drop certain files.
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