This is a collection of thoughts on securing a modern Mac running OS X Yosemite and some steps on how to improve privacy.

It is targeted to “power users” who wish to adopt enterprise-standard security, but is also suitable for novice users with an interest in improving their privacy and security on a Mac.

There is no security silver bullet. A system is only as secure as its administrator is capable of making it.

I am not responsible if you break a Mac by following any of these steps.

If you wish to make a correction or improvement, please send a pull request.

• Preparing Yosemite
• Installing Yosemite
  • Recovery partition
• First boot
• Full disk encryption
• Firmware Password
• Firewall
  • Application layer firewall
  • Third party solutions
  • Kernel level packet filtering
• Services
• Spotlight Suggestions
• Homebrew
• DNS
  • Hosts file
  • dnsmasq
  • dnscrypt
  • Multicast advertisement
• Captive portal
• Certificate authorities
• OpenSSL
• Curl
• HTTP
• Web browsing
• Plugins
• PGP/GPG
• OTR
• Tor
• VPN
• Viruses and malware
• Gatekeeper and Xprotect
• Passwords
• Wi-Fi
• Physical access
• System monitoring
  • Audit
  • DTrace
  • Network
• Miscellaneous
• Additional resources

There are several ways to install a fresh copy of OS X Yosemite.

The simplest way is to boot into Recovery Mode by holding Command and R keys at boot. One can then download and apply an image right from Apple. However, this way exposes the computer's serial number and other identifying information to Apple over plain HTTP.

An alternative way is to download Yosemite build 14A389 or newer from the App Store or some other place and create an installable system image which you can customize and reuse.

OS X installers can be made with the createinstallmedia utility included in /Applications/Install OS X Yosemite.app. See Create a bootable installer for OS X Yosemite or run the utility without arguments to see how it works.

If you'd like to do it the manual way, you will need to find the file InstallESD.dmg, which is inside /Applications/Install OS X Yosemite.app.

Just right click, select Show Package Contents and navigate to Contents > SharedSupport to find the dmg.

You can verify the following cryptographic hashes to ensure you have the same, authentic copy by using a command like shasum -a256 InstallESD.dmg and so on. You can also Google these hashes to ensure your copy is genuine and hasn't been tampered with.

InstallESD.dmg (Build 14A389)

SHA-256: af244af020424d803ea8fc143bdd2c067db19f663484d735d6b6733a0feeeb4d
SHA-1:   eebf02a20ac27665a966957eec6f5e6fe3228a19
MD5:     8d3187fa7699366e1723c28abd78acc8

Next, mount and install the OS to a temporary image, or use the GUI app MagerValp/AutoDMG.

hdiutil attach -noverify -mountpoint /tmp/installesd /Applications/Install\ OS\ X\ Mavericks.app/Contents/SharedSupport/InstallESD.dmg
hdiutil create -size 32g -type SPARSE -fs HFS+J -volname "OS X" -uid 0 -gid 80 -mode 1775 /tmp/output.sparseimage
hdiutil attach -noverify -mountpoint /tmp/os -owners on /tmp/output.sparseimage
sudo installer -pkg /tmp/installesd/Packages/OSInstall.mpkg -tgt /tmp/os

This part will take a while, so just be patient. You can tail -F /var/log/install.log to check progress.

Download and install the 10.10.4 Combo Update

osxupdcombo10.10.4.dmg

SHA-256: eccebbfcda10ac6f1dc63c389421c73007b44fa836da563e0830de47543890a2
SHA-1:   301087ef9ac268c61ebd9d79d001419539dea8ff
MD5:     50023d1cf9567bffc0723ef0a49266e2

Then

hdiutil mount osxupdcombo10.10.4.dmg
sudo installer -pkg /Volumes/OS\ X\ 10.10.4\ Update\ Combo/OSXUpdCombo10.10.4.pkg -tgt /tmp/os
hdiutil unmount /Volumes/OS\ X\ 10.10.4\ Update\ Combo

Download and install the 10.10.5 Combo Update

osxupdcombo10.10.5.dmg

SHA-256: 40865b9021f4e0534181af100f48be1150b3e8ba80bfabe42cb0c7623717ae27
SHA-1:   ddc31ba75b4b67e9aa450a9ab66232e30c718bed
MD5:     c2df0cc14d39e6f3a232d2cc524d6d83

Then

hdiutil mount osxupdcombo10.10.5.dmg
sudo installer -pkg /Volumes/OS\ X\ 10.10.5\ Update/OSXUpd10.10.5.pkg -tgt /tmp/os
hdiutil unmount /Volumes/OS\ X\ 10.10.5\ Update

Optionally, install any other packages to the image, such as Wireshark.

hdiutil mount Wireshark\ 1.99.5\ Intel\ 64.dmg
sudo installer -pkg /Volumes/Wireshark/Wireshark\ 1.99.5\ Intel\ 64.pkg -tgt /tmp/os
hdiutil unmount /Volumes/Wireshark

See MagerValp/AutoDMG/wiki/Packages-Suitable-for-Deployment for caveats and check out chilcote/outset to instead processes packages and scripts at first boot.

When you're done, detach, convert and verify the image.

hdiutil detach /tmp/os
hdiutil detach /tmp/installesd
hdiutil convert -format UDZO /tmp/output.sparseimage -o yosemite.dmg
asr imagescan --source yosemite.dmg

Now, yosemite.dmg is ready to be applied to one or many Macs. You can further customize the image to have premade users, applications and preferences to your liking.

I prefer to install this image using another Mac and Target Disk Mode.

If you don't have another Mac, create a bootable USB drive from the Yosemite app bundle you already have, and boot the Mac you wish to image to it by holding the Option key at boot.

If you don't have an external drive or USB stick to use, it's possible to create a small partition with Disk Utility and use that. There are several guides online on how to do this.

To use Target Disk Mode, boot up the Mac you wish to image while holding T and connect it to another using Firewire, Thunderbolt or USB-C.

Run diskutil list to identify the connected disk, usually /dev/disk2

Erase the disk to Journaled HFS+

diskutil unmountDisk /dev/disk2
diskutil partitionDisk /dev/disk2 1 JHFS+ OSX 100%

Restore the image to the new volume

sudo asr restore \
  --source yosemite.dmg \
  --target /Volumes/OSX \
  --erase --noverify \
  --buffersize 4m

Alternatively, open the Disk Utility application, erase the connected Mac's disk, then drag yosemite.dmg in to restore it to the new partition.

If you've followed these steps correctly, the target Mac should now have a fresh install of OS X Yosemite.

If you want to transfer any files, copy them to a folder like /Users/Shared on the mounted disk image, e.g. cp xcode_6.1.1.dmg /Volumes/OS\ X/Users/Shared

We're not done yet! Unless you have built the image with AutoDMG, you will need to create a recovery partition in order to use Filevault full disk encryption. You can do so using MagerValp/Create-Recovery-Partition-Installer or with the following manual steps.

Download RecoveryHDUpdate.dmg

RecoveryHDUpdate.dmg

SHA-256: f6a4f8ac25eaa6163aa33ac46d40f223f40e58ec0b6b9bf6ad96bdbfc771e12c
SHA-1:   1ac3b7059ae0fcb2877d22375121d4e6920ae5ba
MD5:     b669cdb341b2253a843bf0d402b9675a

Attach and expand the installation, then run it

hdiutil attach RecoveryHDUpdate.dmg

pkgutil --expand /Volumes/Mac\ OS\ X\ Lion\ Recovery\ HD\ Update/RecoveryHDUpdate.pkg /tmp/recovery

hdiutil attach /tmp/recovery/RecoveryHDUpdate.pkg/RecoveryHDMeta.dmg

/tmp/recovery/RecoveryHDUpdate.pkg/Scripts/Tools/dmtest ensureRecoveryPartition /Volumes/OS\ X/ /Volumes/Recovery\ HD\ Update/BaseSystem.dmg 0 0 /Volumes/Recovery\ HD\ Update/BaseSystem.chunklist

Where /Volumes/OS\ X is the path to the target disk mode booted Mac.

This will take several minutes.

Run diskutil list again to make sure Recovery HD now exists.

Once you're done, eject the disk with hdiutil unmount /Volumes/OS\ X and power down the connected Mac.

On first boot, hold Command Option P and R keys to clear NVRAM.

Wait for the loud, obnoxious gong and keep holding while the Mac reboots once.

When OS X first starts, you'll be greeted by Setup Assistant.

Do not connect to networking yet; skip that part of the setup for now.

When creating your account, use a strong password without a hint.

Don't use your real name for your account as it'll show up as So-and-so's Macbook through sharing services to local networks.

Filevault 2 provides full disk (technically, full volume) encryption on OS X.

Filevault encryption will protect data at rest and prevent someone with physical access from stealing data or tampering with your Mac.

With much crypto happening in hardware, the performance penalty for OS X FDE is not noticeable.

Enable Filevault with sudo fdesetup enable or using System Preferences. Reboot.

The security of Filevault 2 greatly depends on the security of the pseudo random number generator (PRNG).

The PRNG can be manually seeded with entropy by writing to /dev/random before enabling Filevault 2. If possible, activate Filevault 2 after using the Mac for a while.

If you can remember your password, there's no reason to save the recovery key. However, your encrypted data will be lost forever if you can't remember the password or recovery key.

If you want to know more about how Filevault 2 works, see the paper Infiltrate the Vault: Security Analysis and Decryption of Lion Full Disk Encryption [pdf]

and IEEE Std 1619-2007 “The XTS-AES Tweakable Block Cipher” [pdf]

You may wish to enforce hibernation and evict Filevault keys from memory instead of traditional "sleep" to memory.

sudo pmset -a destroyfvkeyonstandby 1 hibernatemode 25

For more information, see https://derflounder.wordpress.com/2012/02/05/protecting-yourself-against-firewire-dma-attacks-on-10-7-x/

and paper Lest We Remember: Cold Boot Attacks on Encryption Keys [pdf]

Setting a firmware password in OS X prevents your Mac from starting up from any device other than your startup disk. It can also be helpful if your laptop is stolen, as the only way to reset the firmware password is through an Apple Store (or is it?).

1. Shut down your Mac.

2. Start up your Mac again and immediately hold the Command and R keys after you hear the startup sound to start from OS X Recovery.

3. When the Recovery window appears, choose Firmware Password Utility from the Utilities menu.

4. In the Firmware Utility window that appears, select Turn On Firmware Password.

5. Enter a new password, then enter the same password in the Verify field.

6. Select Set Password.

7. Select Quit Firmware Utility to close the Firmware Password Utility.

8. Select the Apple menu and choose Restart or Shutdown.

The firmware password will activate at next boot.

Before connecting to the Internet, it's a good idea to first configure a firewall.

There are three basic types of firewall for OS X.

Built-in, basic firewall which blocks incoming connections only.

Controlled by the Firewall tab of Security & Privacy in System Preferences.

Enable ALF, logging and "stealth mode" with the following commands, or through System Preferences:

sudo defaults write /Library/Preferences/com.apple.alf \
  globalstate -int 1
sudo defaults write /Library/Preferences/com.apple.alf \
  allowsignedenabled -bool false
sudo defaults write /Library/Preferences/com.apple.alf \
  loggingenabled -bool true
sudo defaults write /Library/Preferences/com.apple.alf \
  stealthenabled -bool true

Computer hackers scan networks so they can attempt to identify computers to attack. You can prevent your computer from responding to some of these scans by using stealth mode. When stealth mode is enabled, your computer does not respond to ICMP ping requests, and does not answer to connection attempts from a closed TCP or UDP port. This makes it more difficult for attackers to find your computer.

Note, ALF does not offer the ability to monitor or block outgoing connections.

Programs such as Little Snitch, Hands Off and Radio Silence provide a good balance of usability and security.

They are capable of monitoring and blocking incoming and outgoing network connections. However, they may require the use of a (closed source) third party kernel extension.

If the number of choices of allowing/blocking network connections is overwhelming, I recommend using Silent Mode with connections allowed, then periodically check your settings to gain understanding of what various applications are doing.

It is worth noting that these firewalls can be bypassed by programs running as root or in kernel space, but they are still worth having - just don't expect absolute protection.

A highly customizable, powerful, but also most complicated firewall exists in the kernel. It can be controlled with pfctl and various configuration files.

Can also be controlled with a GUI application such as IceFloor.

There are many books and articles on the subject of pf firewall. Here's is just one example of blocking traffic by IP address.

Put the following into a file called pf.rules

set block-policy drop
set fingerprints "/etc/pf.os"
set ruleset-optimization basic
set skip on lo0
scrub in all no-df
table <blocklist> persist
block in log
block in log quick from no-route to any
pass out proto tcp from any to any keep state
pass out proto udp from any to any keep state
block log on en0 from {<blocklist>} to any

And use the following commands

• sudo pfctl -e -f pf.rules to enable the firewall
• sudo pfctl -d to disable the firewall
• sudo pfctl -t blocklist -T add 1.2.3.4 to add hosts to a blocklist
• sudo pfctl -t blocklist -T show to view the blocklist
• sudo ifconfig pflog0 create to create an interface for logging
• sudo tcpdump -ni pflog0 to dump the packets

Unless you're already familiar with pf, I don't suggest worrying too much about configuring it on OS X.

Before you connect to the Internet, you may wish to disable some Apple services which phone home to Apple.

Also see fix-macosx/yosemite-phone-home and l1k/osxparanoia

Services on OS X are managed by launchd. See http://launchd.info/, as well as Apple's Daemons and Services Programming Guide and Technical Note TN2083

You can also run KnockKnock that shows more information about startup items.

Here are the basics:

• Use launchctl list to view loaded user agents
• Use sudo launchctl list to view loaded system daemons
• Specify the service name to examine it, e.g. launchctl list com.apple.Maps.mapspushd
• Use defaults read to examine job plists in /System/Library/LaunchDaemons and /System/Library/LaunchAgents
• Use man, strings and Google to learn about what the agent/daemon runs

For example, to learn what a system launch daemon or agent does, start with

defaults read /System/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.apsd.plist

Look at the ProgramArguments section to see which binary is run, in this case apsd. To find more information about that, look at the man page with man apsd

If you're not interested in Apple Push Notifications, disable the service

sudo launchctl unload -w /System/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.apsd.plist

Here's an example of disabling a bunch of user launch agents,

function disable_agent {
  echo "Disabling ${1}"
  launchctl unload -w /System/Library/LaunchAgents/${1}.plist
}

disable_agent com.apple.AddressBook.SourceSync
disable_agent com.apple.AirPlayUIAgent
disable_agent com.apple.AOSHeartbeat
disable_agent com.apple.AOSPushRelay
disable_agent com.apple.bird
disable_agent com.apple.CalendarAgent
disable_agent com.apple.CallHistoryPluginHelper
disable_agent com.apple.CallHistorySyncHelper
disable_agent com.apple.cloudd
disable_agent com.apple.cloudfamilyrestrictionsd-mac
disable_agent com.apple.cloudpaird
disable_agent com.apple.cloudphotosd
disable_agent com.apple.CoreLocationAgent
disable_agent com.apple.coreservices.appleid.authentication
disable_agent com.apple.EscrowSecurityAlert
disable_agent com.apple.findmymacmessenger
disable_agent com.apple.gamed
disable_agent com.apple.helpd
disable_agent com.apple.icloud.fmfd
disable_agent com.apple.idsremoteurlconnectionagent
disable_agent com.apple.imagent
disable_agent com.apple.IMLoggingAgent
disable_agent com.apple.locationmenu
disable_agent com.apple.notificationcenterui
disable_agent com.apple.pbs
disable_agent com.apple.rtcreportingd
disable_agent com.apple.SafariCloudHistoryPushAgent
disable_agent com.apple.safaridavclient
disable_agent com.apple.SafariNotificationAgent
disable_agent com.apple.security.cloudkeychainproxy
disable_agent com.apple.SocialPushAgent
disable_agent com.apple.syncdefaultsd
disable_agent com.apple.telephonyutilities.callservicesd

And the same for system launch daemons,

function disable_daemon {
  echo "Disabling ${1}"
  sudo launchctl unload -w /System/Library/LaunchDaemons/${1}.plist
}

disable_daemon com.apple.apsd
disable_daemon com.apple.AssetCacheLocatorService
disable_daemon com.apple.awacsd
disable_daemon com.apple.awdd
disable_daemon com.apple.CrashReporterSupportHelper
disable_daemon com.apple.GameController.gamecontrollerd
disable_daemon com.apple.SubmitDiagInfo
disable_daemon com.apple.TMCacheDelete

Be careful about disabling any services you don't understand, as it may render your system unbootable.

Disable “Spotlight Suggestions” in both the Spotlight preferences and Safari's Search preferences to avoid your search queries being sent to Apple. Also disable "Bing Web Searches" in the Spotlight preferences to avoid your search queries being sent to Microsoft.

See https://fix-macosx.com/

If you've upgraded to Mac OS X Yosemite (10.10) and you're using the default settings, each time you start typing in Spotlight (to open an application or search for a file on your computer), your local search terms and location are sent to Apple and third parties (including Microsoft).

I recommend installing Homebrew to make installing many software easier.

If you have not already installed Xcode or Command Line Tools, run xcode-select --install and a prompt should appear to download and install CLI Tools.

Homebrew can be easily installed with

ruby -e "$(curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Homebrew/install/master/install)"

or have a look at homebrew/Installation.md for other installation options.

Homebrew uses SSL/TLS to talk with github and verifies checksums of downloaded packages, so I would consider it to be pretty safe. There is discussion in homebrew/issues/18036.

Here are a few ways to improve your security and privacy with DNS.

Use the hosts file to block known malware, advertising or otherwise unwanted domains.

Edit the hosts file as root with sudo vi /etc/hosts. The hosts file can also be managed with the GUI app 2ndalpha/gasmask.

To block a domain, just add 0 facebook.com (0 means 0.0.0.0, a null route)

There are many lists of "bad" domains available online which you can paste in, just make sure each line starts with 0 or 127.0.0.1, and the line 127.0.0.1 localhost is included.

For examples, see http://someonewhocares.org/hosts/zero/hosts, l1k/osxparanoia/blob/master/hosts and gorhill/uMatrix/blob/master/assets/umatrix/hosts-files.json.

Install and use dnsmasq to cache replies, prevent upstreaming queries for unqualified names, and even block entire TLDs.

Use it in combination with dnscrypt to also encrypt outgoing DNS traffic.

Install with brew install dnsmasq

Edit the example configuration

mkdir -p /usr/local/etc
cp /usr/local/opt/dnsmasq/dnsmasq.conf.example /usr/local/etc/dnsmasq.conf
vim !$

Have a look through the commented-out options. Here are a few recommended settings to enable,

  # Never forward plain names
  domain-needed
  
  # Never forward addresses in the non-routed address spaces
  bogus-priv
  
  # Forward queries to dnscrypt on localhost
  server=127.0.0.1#5355

Install and start the program

sudo cp -fv /usr/local/opt/dnsmasq/*.plist /Library/LaunchDaemons
sudo chown root /Library/LaunchDaemons/homebrew.mxcl.dnsmasq.plist
sudo launchctl load /Library/LaunchDaemons/homebrew.mxcl.dnsmasq.plist

Open System Preferences > Network and select your interface, then the DNS tab.

Select the + and add 127.0.0.1 as a DNS server.

Make sure dnsmasq is running with sudo lsof -ni UDP:53 or ps -ef | grep '[d]nsmasq'

Use dnscrypt to encrypt all going DNS traffic to your provider of choice.

Install with brew install dnscrypt-proxy, or if you prefer a GUI, see alterstep/dnscrypt-osxclient

Install the program

sudo cp -fv /usr/local/opt/dnscrypt-proxy/*.plist /Library/LaunchDaemons
sudo chown root /Library/LaunchDaemons/homebrew.mxcl.dnscrypt-proxy.plist

If using in combination with dnsmasq, edit /Library/LaunchDaemons/homebrew.mxcl.dnscrypt-proxy.plist to have this line

<string>--local-address=127.0.0.1:5355</string>    

Below the line

<string>/usr/local/opt/dnscrypt-proxy/sbin/dnscrypt-proxy</string>

Finally, start the program

sudo launchctl load /Library/LaunchDaemons/homebrew.mxcl.dnscrypt-proxy.plist

Make sure dnscrypt is running with sudo lsof -ni UDP:5355 or ps -ef | grep '[d]nscrypt'

By default, dnscrypt-proxy runs on localhost (127.0.0.1), port 53, and under the "nobody" user using the dnscrypt.eu-dk DNSCrypt-enabled resolver. If you would like to change these settings, you will have to edit the plist file (e.g., --resolver-address, --provider-name, --provider-key, etc.)

This can be accomplished by editing /Library/LaunchDaemons/homebrew.mxcl.dnscrypt-proxy.plist.

You can run your own dnscrypt server from a trusted location or use one of many public servers instead.

Make sure it's working with tcpdump or tshark

$ sudo tcpdump -qtni en0
IP 10.8.8.8.59636 > 77.66.84.233.443: UDP, length 512
IP 77.66.84.233.443 > 10.8.8.8.59636: UDP, length 368

$ dig +short -x 77.66.84.233
resolver2.dnscrypt.eu

Or by visiting https://dnsleaktest.com/what-is-a-dns-leak.html

Turn off multicast DNS if you don't need it. It spams information about your machine and its services to the local network.

Edit com.apple.mDNSResponder.plist

sudo -E vim /System/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.mDNSResponder.plist

Copy the line <string>/usr/sbin/mDNSResponder</string> and paste it twice (yy and pp in vim)

Replace the argument with -launchd and -NoMulticastAdvertisements

sudo killall -9 mDNSResponder to restart mDNSResponder

You can also use this script to accomplish this.

When OS X connects to new networks, it probes the network and launches a Captive Portal assistant utility if connectivity can't be determined.

An attacker could trigger the utility and direct a Mac to a site with malware without user interaction, so it's best to disable this feature.

See https://web.archive.org/web/20130407200745/http://www.divertednetworks.net/apple-captiveportal.html

and https://grpugh.wordpress.com/2014/10/29/an-undocumented-change-to-captive-network-assistant-settings-in-os-x-10-10-yosemite/

Yosemite comes with over 200 root certificate authorities from for-profit corporations like Apple, Verisign, Thawte, Digicert and government agencies from China, Japan, Netherlands, U.S., and more! These CAs are capable of issuing SSL certificates for any domain or code signing certificates as well.

For more information, see Certification Authority Trust Tracker,

and papers Analysis of the HTTPS certificate ecosystem [pdf]

and You Won’t Be Needing These Any More: On Removing Unused Certificates From Trust Stores [pdf]

You can inspect system root certificates in Keychain Access, under the System Roots tab or by using the security command line tool and /System/Library/Keychains/SystemRootCertificates.keychain file.

The risk of a man in the middle attack in which a coerced or compromised certificate authority trusted by your system issues a fake/rogue SSL certificate is quite low, but still possible.

To remove an unwanted certificate, copy its SHA1 sum, then delete it

echo "4F 99 AA 93 FB 2B D1 37 26 A1 99 4A CE 7F F0 05 F2 93 5D 1E" | tr -d ' '
4F99AA93FB2BD13726A1994ACE7FF005F2935D1E

sudo security delete-certificate -t -Z 4F99AA93FB2BD13726A1994ACE7FF005F2935D1E /System/Library/Keychains/SystemRootCertificates.keychain

Here's an example of removing a list of roots

function remove {
echo "Removing ${2}"
sudo /usr/bin/security delete-certificate \
  -t -Z $1 \
  /System/Library/Keychains/SystemRootCertificates.keychain
}

remove "D1EB23A46D17D68FD92564C2F1F1601764D8E349" "AAA Certificate Services"
remove "4F99AA93FB2BD13726A1994ACE7FF005F2935D1E" "China Internet Network Information Center Root CA"
remove "8BAF4C9B1DF02A92F7DA128EB91BACF498604B6F" "CNNIC"
remove "8C941B34EA1EA6ED9AE2BC54CF687252B4C9B561" "DoD Root CA 2"
remove "10F193F340AC91D6DE5F1EDC006247C4F25D9671" "DoD CLASS 3 Root CA"
remove "8C96BAEBDD2B070748EE303266A0F3986E7CAE58" "EBG"
remove "51C6E70849066EF392D45CA00D6DA3628FC35239" "E-Tugra Certification Authority"
remove "905F942FD9F28F679B378180FD4F846347F645C1" "Federal Common Policy CA"
remove "FE45659B79035B98A161B5512EACDA580948224D" "Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions RootCA 2011"
remove "D6DAA8208D09D2154D24B52FCB346EB258B28A58" "Hongkong Post Root CA 1"
remove "D2441AA8C203AECAA96E501F124D52B68FE4C375" "I.CA"
remove "270C500CC6C86ECB1980BC1305439ED282480BE3" "MPHPT Certification Authority"
remove "06083F593F15A104A069A46BA903D006B7970991" "NetLock Arany"
remove "E392512F0ACFF505DFF6DE067F7537E165EA574B" "NetLock Expressz"
remove "016897E1A0B8F2C3B134665C20A727B7A158E28F" "NetLock Minositett Kozjegyzoi"
remove "ACED5F6553FD25CE015F1F7A483B6A749F6178C6" "NetLock Kozjegyzoi"
remove "2DFF6336E33A4829AA009F01A1801EE7EBA582BB" "Prefectural Association For JPKI"
remove "8782C6C304353BCFD29692D2593E7D44D934FF11" "SecureTrust CA"
remove "E19FE30E8B84609E809B170D72A8C5BA6E1409BD" "Trusted Certificate Services"
remove "3BC0380B33C3F6A60C86152293D9DFF54B81C005" "Trustis FPS Root CA"
remove "B091AA913847F313D727BCEFC8179F086F3A8C0F" "TW Government Root Certification Authority"
remove "1B4B396126276B6491A2686DD70243212D1F1D96" "TurkTrust 1"
remove "7998A308E14D6585E6C21E153A719FBA5AD34AD9" "TurkTrust 2"
remove "B435D4E1119D1C6690A749EBB394BD637BA782B7" "TurkTrust 3"
remove "F17F6FB631DC99E3A3C87FFE1CF1811088D96033" "TurkTrust 4"
remove "0B972C9EA6E7CC58D93B20BF71EC412E7209FABF" "UCA Global Root"
remove "8250BED5A214433A66377CBC10EF83F669DA3A67" "UCA Root"
remove "CB44A097857C45FA187ED952086CB9841F2D51B5" "US Govt Common Policy"
remove "FAA7D9FB31B746F200A85E65797613D816E063B5" "VRK Gov. Root CA"
remove "E7B4F69D61EC9069DB7E90A7401A3CF47D4FE8EE" "WellsSecure Public Root Certificate Authority"

These may be updated or re-added during system updates, though.

A cool idea is to write a custom proxy which monitors and logs certificate chains seen on the wire.

The version of OpenSSL which comes with Yosemite is quite dated. It doesn't support TLS 1.1 or higher, nor does it support Elliptic Curve ciphers.

Apple claims OpenSSL is deprecated in their Cryptographic Services Guide document. Their version also has patches which may surprise you.

Grab a recent version of OpenSSL with brew install openssl && brew link --force openssl

The version of curl which comes with OS X uses Secure Transport for SSL verification. If you prefer to use OpenSSL, install curl with brew install curl --with-openssl

Here are a few recommended self explanatory options to add to ~/.curlrc

user-agent = "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; rv:31.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/31.0"
referer = ";auto"
connect-timeout = 10
progress-bar
max-time = 90
verbose
show-error
remote-time
ipv4

I recommend using privoxy as a local proxy to sanitize and customize web browsing traffic.

Install and start privoxy

brew install privoxy
ln -sfv /usr/local/opt/privoxy/*.plist ~/Library/LaunchAgents
launchctl load ~/Library/LaunchAgents/homebrew.mxcl.privoxy.plist

By default, privoxy listens on local TCP port 8118.

Set the HTTP proxy for your active network interface in System Preferences to 127.0.0.1 and port 8118.

Confirm it's working by visiting http://p.p/ and with the command scutil --proxy

Privoxy already comes with many good rules, however you can also write your own.

For example, edit /usr/local/etc/privoxy/user.action to block elements by domain or with regular expressions,

{ +block{unwanted stuff} }
www.facebook.com/(extern|plugins)/(login_status|like(box)?|activity|fan)\.php
.foxnews.com
/cleardot.gif
/.*linkedin.*

{ +block{ad images} +handle-as-image }
/.*1x1.gif
/.*fb-icon.*
/assets/social-.*
/img/social.*

Write simple or complex rules for redirection, such as to HTTPS,

{ +redirect{s@http://@https://@} }
code.jquery.com

{ +redirect{s@http://imgur.com/@https://imgur.com/@}}
imgur.com

You can even replace all ad images with pictures of kittens by running a local web server.

I recommend logging all privoxy requests so you can be inspired to write custom rules.

The web browser is probably the biggest security and privacy risk, as its fundamental job is to download and execute untrusted code from the Internet.

I recommend using Google Chrome for most of your browsing. It offers separate profiles, good sandboxing, frequent updates (including Flash) and has many useful extensions.

If you don't want to use Chrome, Firefox is an excellent browser as well. See discussion in issue #2.

I recommend creating at least three profiles, one for trusted web sites (email, banking), another for untrusted (link aggregators, news sites), and a third for a script-free experience.

• One profile without cookies or Javascript enabled which should be the preferred profile to visiting new web sites.

• One profile with uMatrix installed. If uMatrix looks too complicated, uBlock is a fine alternative. Use this profile for visiting mostly trusted sites with customized uMatrix/uBlock rules. Take the time to learn how these firewall extensions work. Other recommended extensions are Privacy Badger and HTTPSEverywhere.

• One or more profile(s) for your real name, signed-in browsing needs such as banking and email.

The idea is to separate cookie stores and compartmentalize your data.

In each profile, visit chrome://plugins/ and disable Adobe Flash plugin.

Also visit chrome://settings/contents and select Let me choose when to run plugin content under the Plugins section.

Take some time to read https://www.chromium.org/Home/chromium-privacy, then disable any Chrome settings you don't want, for example DNS prefetching.

Don't use any of those Chromium-derived browsers. They are usually closed source, poorly maintained and make dubious claims to protect your privacy.

Don't use Safari. The code is a mess and security vulnerabilities are frequent, but slow to patch.

Don't download or install Internet plugins like Silverlight unless you really need them. Netflix works with HTML5 on Yosemite.

Java, Flash, Adobe Reader and others plugins are a big security risk because they are poorly written, and should not be installed.

Really, only use them in a disposable VM.

See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trojan_BackDoor.Flashback,

http://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerability-list/vendor_id-53/product_id-497/Adobe-Acrobat-Reader.html, and

https://blogs.cisco.com/security/angling-for-silverlight-exploits

PGP is a standard for encrypting email end to end. That means only the chosen recepients can decrypt a message, unlike regular email which is read and forever archived by providers.

GPG, or GNU Privacy Guard, is a GPL licensed program compliant with the standard.

GPG is also used to verify signatures of software you download and install.

Install it with brew install gnupg, or if you prefer to install the newer, more feature-rich stable version, install with brew install homebrew/versions/gnupg21

If you prefer a GUI, check out GPG Suite

Here are recommended options to add to ~/.gnupg/gpg.conf

auto-key-locate keyserver
keyserver hkps://hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net
keyserver-options no-honor-keyserver-url
keyserver-options ca-cert-file=/etc/sks-keyservers.netCA.pem
keyserver-options no-honor-keyserver-url
keyserver-options debug
keyserver-options verbose
personal-cipher-preferences AES256 AES192 AES CAST5
personal-digest-preferences SHA512 SHA384 SHA256 SHA224
default-preference-list SHA512 SHA384 SHA256 SHA224 AES256 AES192 AES CAST5 ZLIB BZIP2 ZIP Uncompressed
cert-digest-algo SHA512
charset utf-8
fixed-list-mode
no-comments
no-emit-version
keyid-format 0xlong
list-options show-uid-validity
verify-options show-uid-validity
with-fingerprint

Install the keyservers CA certificate

curl -O https://sks-keyservers.net/sks-keyservers.netCA.pem
sudo mv sks-keyservers.netCA.pem /etc

These settings will configure GnuPG to use SSL when fetching new keys and prefer strong cryptographic primitives.

You should also read OpenPGP Best Practices

If you don't already have a gpg keypair, create one now with gpg --gen-key

Read online guides and practice encrypting and decrypting email to yourself and your friends. Get them interested in this stuff!

OTR stands for Off-the-Record and is a cryptographic protocol for encrypting and authenticating conversations over instant messaging.

You can use OTR on top of any existing XMPP chat service, even Google Hangouts (which only encrypts conversations between users and the server).

The first time you start a conversation with someone new, you'll be asked to verify their public key fingerprint. Make sure to do this in person or by some other secure means (e.g. GPG encrypted mail).

A popular OS X GUI client for XMPP and other chat protocol is Adium

Remember to turn off logging if you're going to use OTR with Adium.

A good console based XMPP client is profanity which can be installed with brew install profanity

If you want to know how OTR works, read the paper Off-the-Record Communication, or, Why Not To Use PGP [pdf]

Tor is an anynomizing proxy which can be used for browsing the web.

Download Tor Browser from https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser.html.en. Don't configure other browsers to use Tor as you are likely make a mistake which compromises your anonymity.

After downloading the dmg and asc files, use gpg to verify the disk image has been signed by Tor developers with gpg TorBrowser*asc.

If this is your first time using gpg, you will get a warning that the public key was not found. You can fetch it from the keyserver with gpg --recv-keys 0x2E1AC68ED40814E0 and verify again.

Make sure Good signature from "Tor Browser Developers (signing key) <torbrowser@torproject.org>" appears in the output.

See https://www.torproject.org/docs/verifying-signatures.html.en for more information.

Tor traffic can be identified on a network. It is recommended to additionally obfuscate it using a pluggable transport such as obfs4proxy.

This can be done by running your own Tor relay or private bridge which will serve as your obfuscating guard node. Set one up and share it with your friends!

For extra security, use VirtualBox or VMware to run a virtualized GNU/Linux or BSD machine to do your private browsing on.

For more on browser privacy, see https://www.browserleaks.com/ and https://panopticlick.eff.org/.

If you use your Mac on untrusted networks - airports, cafes, etc. - your network traffic is being monitored and possibly tampered with.

It is a good idea to use a VPN which encrypts all outgoing network traffic (i.e., not split tunnel) with a provider you trust. Ideally, that provider is a server in your house or a trustworthy "cloud".

Don't just blindly sign up for a VPN service without understanding the full implications and how your traffic will be routed. If you don't understand how the VPN works or are not familiar with the software used, you are probably better off without it.

There is an increasing amount of Mac malware in the wild; Macs aren't immune from viruses and malicious software.

Some of the malware comes bundled with both legitimate software, such as the Java bundling Ask Toolbar, and some with illegitimate software, such as Mac.BackDoor.iWorm bundled with pirated programs.

See Methods of malware persistence on Mac OS X [pdf] and Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite to learn about how garden-variety malware functions.

You can periodically run a tool like Knock Knock to examine persistent binaries (e.g. scripts, binaries). But by then, it is probably too late. Maybe Block Block will help.

Anti-virus programs are not useful for advanced users and will increase your attack surface against sophisticated threats. See Sophail: Applied attacks against Sophos Antivirus [pdf] and Analysis and Exploitation of an ESET Vulnerability. The best anti-virus is Common Sense 2015.

Local privilege escalation bugs are plenty on OS X, so always be careful when downloading and running untrusted programs or trusted programs from third party websites or downloaded over HTTP (example).

Have a look at The Safe Mac for past and current Mac security news.

Check out Hacking Team malware for Mac OS: root installation for MacOS, Support driver for Mac Agent and RCS Agent for Mac. Good example of malware which hides from userland (ps, ls, etc). and is very difficult to detect.

Gatekeeper and the quarantine system try to prevent unsigned or "bad" programs and files from running and opening.

Xprotect prevents the execution of known bad files and outdated plugin versions, but does nothing to cleanup or stop existing malware.

Both offer trivial protection against common risks and are fine at default settings.

See http://www.thesafemac.com/mmg-builtin/

and http://ilostmynotes.blogspot.com/2012/06/gatekeeper-xprotect-and-quarantine.html

and also be aware of http://www.zoharbabin.com/hey-mac-i-dont-appreciate-you-spying-on-me-hidden-downloads-log-in-os-x/

You can generate passwords with gpg, openssl or just get creative with /dev/urandom output.

openssl rand -base64 30

gpg --gen-random -a 0 30

dd if=/dev/urandom bs=1 count=30 2>/dev/null | base64

You can also generate passwords from Keychain Access password assistant, or a command line equivalent like https://github.com/anders/pwgen.

Keychains are encrypted with a PBKDF2 derived key and are a pretty safe place to store credentials. See http://juusosalonen.com/post/30923743427/breaking-into-the-os-x-keychain.

Alternatively, you can manage an encrypted passwords file yourself with gpg (shameless plug for my pwd.sh script).

OS X remembers access points it has connected to. Like all wireless devices, your Mac will broadcast all of these access point names it remembers (e.g. So-and-so's Router) each time it looks for a network (e.g. wake from sleep).

This is a privacy risk, so I recommend removing networks from the list in System Preferences when they're no longer needed.

Keep your Mac physically secure at all times. Don't leave it unattended in hotels and such.

For example, a skilled attacker with unsupervised physical access to your computer can infect the boot ROM to install a keylogger and steal your password - see https://trmm.net/Thunderstrike.

etsy/MIDAS and facebook/osquery are two open source "IDS" frameworks worth checking out.

OS X has a powerful OpenBSM auditing capability. You can use it to log all process executions and network connections, for example.

Use praudit -l /dev/auditpipe to tail audit logs.

See the manual pages for audit, praudit, audit_control and other files in /etc/security

More on this later ...

Use iosnoop and execsnoop to monitor I/O and process execution.

More on this later ...

Here's a few examples of networking monitoring commands

lsof -ni -P
netstat -atln

You can also use Wireshark from the command line.

Monitor DNS queries and replies

tshark -Y "dns.flags.response == 1" -Tfields \
  -e frame.time_delta \
  -e dns.qry.name \
  -e dns.a \
  -Eseparator=,

Monitor HTTP requests and responses

tshark -Y "http.request or http.response" -Tfields \
  -e ip.dst \
  -e http.request.full_uri \
  -e http.request.method \
  -e http.response.code \
  -e http.response.phrase \
  -Eseparator=/s

Monitor x509 certificates on the wire

tshark -Y "ssl.handshake.certificate" -Tfields \
  -e ip.src \
  -e x509sat.uTF8String \
  -e x509sat.printableString \
  -e x509sat.universalString \
  -e x509sat.IA5String \
  -e x509sat.teletexString \
  -Eseparator=/s -Equote=d

Also check out the GUI "simple network activity monitor" BonzaiThePenguin/Loading

If you want to play music or watch videos, use VLC media player which is free and open source.

If you want to torrent, use Transmission which is free and open source.

Watch the system log with Console or the syslog -w command.

Enable tty_tickets in the sudoers file.

Hash your known ssh hosts. To ssh_config, add

Host *
  HashKnownHosts yes

Set your screen to lock as soon as the screensaver starts

defaults write com.apple.screensaver askForPassword -int 1
defaults write com.apple.screensaver askForPasswordDelay -int 0

Expose hidden files and Library folder in Finder

defaults write com.apple.finder AppleShowAllFiles -bool true
chflags nohidden ~/Library

Don't default to saving documents to iCloud

defaults write NSGlobalDomain NSDocumentSaveNewDocumentsToCloud -bool false

Did you know Apple has not shipped a computer with TPM since 2006?

Apple's security-announce mailing list

OS X Yosemite Core Technologies Overview White Paper

Reversing Engineering Mac OS X blog

Reverse Engineering Resources

Patrick Wardle's Objective-See blog

Dylib Hijack Scanner

Managing Macs at Google Scale (LISA '13)

OS X Hardening: Securing a Large Global Mac Fleet (LISA '13)

Yelp's forensic evidence collection & analysis toolkit for OS X

DoD Security Technical Implementation Guides for Mac OS

The EFI boot process

Userland Persistence on Mac OS X

Developing Mac OSX kernel rootkits

IOKit kernel code execution exploit

Hidden backdoor API to root privileges in Apple OS X

Santa: A binary whitelisting/blacklisting system for Mac OS X

IPv6 Hardening Guide for OS X

Preventing OS X from phoning home to Cupertino

Yosemite net-monitor

Hacker News discussion