This is the home page for developing hibernation encryption and authentication in Linux kernel: LKML mail loop

TODO:

• Hibernation snapshot encryption:
  • Using AES to encrypt data pages in snapshot image. [WIP]
    • draft patch for snapshot encryption
• Adapt to key retention service: Using the KMK (Kernel Master Key) in keyring to create encrypted key for encryption and authentication.
  • Kernel: Using KMK and Encrypted-key in kernel, put the encrypted key to snapshot header [WIP]
• Support different KMK types:
  • Trusted Key and User Key: Modify systemd and dracut, enroll KMK to kernel before S4 resume.
  • EFI KMK: Using EFI boot variable to keep/reload 64 bytes KMK
    • Rescue mechanism: EFI KMK may lost when firmware update or firmware recovery.
  • The rescue mechanism of EFI Root Key:
    • Using the public key in kernel strusted keyring (e.g. embedded key or MOK) to encrypt the EFI Root Key for user backup.
      • The "5.1 Encryption and decryption primitives" in PKCS#1 must be implemented in RSA in kernel.
    • Kernel expose a symmetric key as a session key to encrypt ERK as a envelope.
      • The session key will be exposed by a RO sysfs interface.
      • The session key will be changed every time after user space read the sysfs interface.
    • Export: Using one of kernel trusted public keys to encrypt the ERK envelope to user space.
    • Import: User space uses the session key to AES encrypts ERK as a ERK envelope, then sign by private key with PKCS#7 format.
      • The backup ERK envelope can only be used for rescue mode.

Current Result:

Hibernation snapshot verification HMAC edition 20171221

Signature verification of hibernate snapshot v3 2013