Over the past 15 years, China has expanded its once-minimal military presence in the South China Sea into a significant one.

過去15年裡，中國已經將其在南海的軍事存在從微不足道擴大到舉足輕重的地步。

Beijing has laid claim to nearly all of the strategic waterway, a vital shipping lifeline for the global economy that is rich in energy and fishery resources. China has used nonmilitary assets such as its Coast Guard, fishing vessels and maritime militia to bully its neighbors, blockade their ships and build Chinese military bases on disputed islands.

北京對這條戰略水道的絕大部分提出了主權要求。這條水道是全球經濟至關重要的航運生命線，有豐富的能源和漁業資源。中國利用其海警、漁船和海上民兵等非軍事資產霸凌鄰國，封鎖其船隻，在有爭議的島嶼上建立軍事基地。

America is partly to blame. It has condemned China’s behavior, but, eager to avoid escalation, has consistently refrained from standing up militarily, which has only further emboldened Beijing. A new approach is needed. The United States must take real action to strengthen alliances and confront China before it eventually takes control of this hugely important body of water without firing a shot.

美國對此負有部分責任。儘管譴責了中國的行為，美國急於避免事態升級，一直沒有採取軍事行動，這只會讓北京更加大膽。需要一種新的方法。美國必須採取實際行動，加強聯盟，對抗中國，否則中國最終將不費一槍一彈控制這片極其重要的水域。

Like any unchallenged bully, China has become increasingly aggressive. Last month, Chinese Coast Guard personnel attacked a Philippine supply vessel with axes and other crude weapons — Manila says a Filipino sailor and several others were injured — in one of the worst acts of violence between China and its rivals in the South China Sea in years. The incident took place near the Sierra Madre, a rusting World War II-era ship that the Philippines had beached 25 years ago at Second Thomas Shoal to assert its territorial claim. The shoal lies about 120 miles off the Philippine island of Palawan and is well within the nation’s exclusive economic zone.

就像任何不受挑戰的惡霸一樣，中國變得越來越咄咄逼人。上個月，中國海警人員用斧頭和其他簡易武器襲擊了一艘菲律賓補給船。馬尼拉方面說，一名菲律賓水手和其他幾人受傷。這是中國及其對手多年來在南海發生的最嚴重的暴力事件之一。事件發生在馬德雷山號附近，這是一艘銹跡斑斑的二戰時期船隻，菲律賓25年前將其擱淺在仁愛礁，以宣示其領土主張。仁愛礁位於菲律賓巴拉望島外約190公里處，完全在菲律賓的專屬經濟區內。

China also had past territorial confrontations in the South China Sea or other waters on its periphery with Vietnam, the United States, Australia, Japan and Taiwan. In 2012, China took control of the disputed Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines, and run-ins between China and the Philippines have grown in number and intensity in recent years. In late May, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. of the Philippines warned that any Filipino deaths caused by a “willful act” by a foreign force in the South China Sea would be “very close to what we define as an act of war.”

中國過去也同越南、美國、澳洲、日本和台灣在南海或其他周邊水域發生過領土衝突。2012年，中國從菲律賓手中奪取了有爭議的黃岩島的控制權。近年來中菲之間的衝突越來越多，也越來越激烈。5月底，菲律賓總統小費迪南德·馬科斯警告稱，外國軍隊在南海的「蓄意行為」造成的任何菲律賓人死亡，都「非常接近我們所定義的戰爭行為」。

Concern has grown in Manila, Beijing and Washington that tensions in the South China Sea — perhaps even more than Taiwan — could trigger a conflict with China.

馬尼拉、北京和華盛頓都越來越擔心，南海的緊張局勢甚至可能超過台灣，會觸發一場與中國的衝突。

These fears are overblown. I study Chinese military strength and strategy, and I’m convinced that if the United States were to take a more assertive stance in the South China Sea, Beijing would be likely to back down to avoid a war it knows it would lose.

這樣的擔憂被誇大了。我研究中國的軍事實力和戰略，我相信，如果美國在南海採取更強硬的立場，北京可能會退縮，從而避免一場他們明知會輸的戰爭。

China may enjoy military advantages in a potential conflict with Taiwan, which is just off the mainland. But its position is less secure in the South China Sea. Over the past 15 years China has built more than two dozen military outposts on disputed islands. Among the largest — at Mischief Reef, Fiery Cross Reef and Subi Reef — there are air strips, fighter jets, radar systems, and laser and jamming equipment. But so far China lacks sufficient antiaircraft and anti-ship missile systems in the region to deny U.S. forces the ability to operate, which leaves the Chinese bases vulnerable to air and naval bombardment.

在與緊鄰大陸的台灣發生潛在衝突時，中國可能享有軍事優勢。但它在南海的地位並不那麼穩固。過去15年裡，中國在有爭議的島嶼上建立了20多個軍事前哨。其中最大的幾個位於美濟礁、永暑礁和渚碧礁，配備了跑道、戰鬥機、雷達系統、雷射和干擾設備。但到目前為止，中國在該地區缺乏足夠的防空和反艦導彈系統來限制美軍的行動能力，這使得中國的基地容易受到海空轟炸。

And the South China Sea is vast — about half the size of the continental United States. The Sierra Madre is around 800 miles from the Chinese mainland. A conflict there would require the People’s Liberation Army to mount joint air and naval resupply operations and to refuel its fighters across great distances — something it has never done and is not equipped for.

南海面積巨大，大約是美國大陸面積的一半。馬德雷山號距離中國大陸約1300公里。如果在那裡發生衝突，中國人民解放軍需要開展海空聯合補給行動，並跨越很遠的距離為戰機加油——這是中國從來沒有做過的事情，它也沒有相應的裝備。

If the Philippines is in the fight, treaty obligations would trigger the participation of the United States, which would have access to nine Philippine air and naval bases, greatly enhancing its already considerable ability to project military power in the region. China does have “carrier-killer” ballistic missiles based on its mainland. But U.S. carriers could still send fighters into parts of the South China Sea from outside the range of those missiles. In conjunction with land-based fighters operating from the Philippines, the United States could gain crucial air superiority over a Chinese surface fleet.

如果菲律賓參與戰鬥，條約義務將引發美國的參與，美國將可以使用菲律賓的九個空軍和海軍基地，大大增強美國在該地區投射軍事力量的能力。中國確實擁有「航母殺手」彈道導彈。但美國航母仍然可以從這些導彈的射程之外派遣戰鬥機進入南海部分地區，配合從菲律賓地面起飛的戰鬥機，美國可以獲得對中國水面艦隊至關重要的空中優勢。

China has spent huge sums on its aircraft carrier program and has two in operation, with two more in development. But those still cannot rival the number or capabilities of nuclear-powered U.S. carriers, which are larger, support more aircraft and need to refuel only about every 20 years. China’s carriers need to be refueled about every six days. And learning how to effectively conduct carrier operations takes time; the Chinese have only just begun.

中國在航母項目上投入了巨額資金，目前有兩艘航母在役，還有兩艘正在研發中。但它們在數量和能力方面仍無法與美國的核動力航母相比。後者更大，可搭載更多飛機，大約每20年才需要補充一次燃料。中國的航母大約每六天就需要補充燃料。學習如何有效開展航母行動需要時間；中國的發展才剛剛開始。

It’s telling that China has been careful to use Coast Guard and civilian vessels in its encounters with neighbors rather than hard military assets — the latter would signal an escalation that Beijing is not yet willing to embark on.

中國在與鄰國的衝突中一直小心翼翼地使用海警和民用船隻，而不是直接的軍事資產，這一點很說明問題——後者意味著局勢升級，而北京還不願意這樣。

But there is another very good reason China is unlikely to risk war with the United States: It doesn’t need to. Its brinkmanship and use of nonmilitary assets to intimidate its Asian neighbors has been more than enough to take China from almost no military presence in the South China Sea in the late 2000s to a significant force today.

但中國不太可能冒險與美國開戰還有另一個很好的理由：它不需要這樣做。它使用邊緣政策、利用非軍事資產來恐嚇其亞洲鄰國，這些做法已經足以讓中國從本世紀頭十年末在南海幾乎沒有軍事存在，發展成今天這樣的一股重要力量。

America should call China’s bluff and press its military advantage. This could include escorting Philippine resupply vessels headed to Second Thomas Shoal or even conducting some supply missions itself or with allies like Australia and Japan. This would send China the powerful message that its intimidation will no longer go unchallenged, while allowing Manila to remain visibly in the lead but part of a more enduring coalition. To save face for China, Washington could present operations like these as exercises or training to minimize pressure on Beijing to respond.

美國應該揭穿中國的虛張聲勢，並施展它的軍事優勢。這可能包括護送前往仁愛礁的菲律賓補給船，甚至自己或與澳洲和日本等盟友一起執行一些補給任務。這將向中國發出一個強有力的信息——中國的恫嚇將不再是不受挑戰的，同時讓馬尼拉在保持明顯的主導地位的同時，處在更持久的聯盟之中。為了給中國留面子，華盛頓的此類行動可以採取演習或訓練的形式，盡量減少北京做出回應的壓力。

Manila is a strategically vital player in America’s regional competition with China. The United States and the Philippines should strengthen their alliance to allow for more U.S. bases in the Philippines and a stronger U.S. commitment to help defend against Chinese incursions into Philippine waters. Closer relations could also make it easier for the United States to resupply Taiwan from Philippine bases during a conflict with China and open the door for enhanced military cooperation with other South China Sea nations, whose fear of an unrestrained Beijing may be deterring them from taking that step. If China determines that its provocations are likely to draw in the United States, it might begin to moderate its behavior.

在美國與中國的地區競爭中，馬尼拉是一個至關重要的戰略角色。美國和菲律賓應該加強聯盟，令美國在菲律賓擁有更多基地，美國應加強承諾，幫助菲律賓抵禦中國對其水域的侵犯。更緊密的關係還可以令美國在與中國發生衝突時，更容易從菲律賓基地向台灣提供補給，並為與其他南海國家加強軍事合作打開大門——對中國的肆意妄為的畏懼導致它們不願意走出這一步。如果中國確定其挑釁行為可能會引來美國，它可能會開始緩和自己的行為。

Of course, anything is possible — Beijing may respond with a full-on military escalation, a daunting prospect that should not be taken lightly. But that risk is low for a Chinese military whose own doctrine is to avoid any war in which victory is not ensured.

當然，一切皆有可能——北京可能會以全面的軍事升級作為回應，這種令人生畏的前景不容輕視。但是這種風險並不高，因為中國軍隊的準則是避免任何無法確保勝利的戰爭。

Neither U.S. option — standing up to China or backing down — is attractive. But unless the United States asserts itself, China will continue chipping away with its tactics of bluster and intimidation until its military presence in the South China Sea becomes so dominant that it no longer fears war.

對美國來說，無論對抗中國還是做出退讓都並非理想的選擇。但是，除非美國堅持自己的立場，中國將繼續採取虛張聲勢和恐嚇的策略，直到其在南海的軍事存在變得極為強大，達到不再害怕戰爭的程度。

The United States can re-establish a favorable balance of power, but it must act now.

美國可以重新建立一種有利的力量平衡，但它必須現在就採取行動。