Reports News from the GAO https://www.gao.gov/rss/topic Tue, 05 Nov 2024 04:32:33 -0500 GAO https://www.gao.gov/themes/custom/gao_uswds/img/gao-logo-rss.gif https://www.gao.gov/rss/topic Feed provided by GAO. https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-107093 What GAO Found In general, ridesourcing (also referred to as ridesharing) and taxi companies can be regulated by states, localities, or both. GAO's review of state statutes and regulations found that 45 states and Washington, D.C., (states) require criminal background checks for prospective ridesourcing drivers, and 11 states require criminal background checks for prospective taxi drivers. Although fewer states have statewide background check requirements for taxi drivers compared with ridesourcing drivers, historically taxis tend to be regulated at the local level, according to a 2016 report by the Transportation Research Board. Selected states and localities GAO reviewed administer and manage background checks in a variety of ways. For example, one selected locality conducts all background checks for ridesourcing drivers, while another locality allows ridesourcing companies the option of having a third party, or the locality, conduct the check. All five ridesourcing and five taxi companies GAO interviewed said they conduct background checks for all prospective drivers, regardless of requirements. Ridesourcing and taxi companies may offer pretrip safety features in digital applications (app), other in-app safety features, and in-vehicle safety features. For example, four selected ridesourcing and four selected taxi companies either require or allow drivers to use a security camera during trips. Examples of Safety Features for Ridesourcing and Taxi Drivers and Passengers Type of safety feature Example of safety feature Description Pretrip in-application (app) License plate number   Passengers match the license plate number in the app to the vehicle to identify the correct vehicle. Other in-app Emergency call button   If drivers or passengers need immediate assistance, this button can connect them with emergency responders. In-vehicle Partition   Partitions provide a physical barrier between the front and back part of a vehicle. Source: GAO analysis of ridesourcing and taxi company documents and interviews with their representatives. | GAO-24-107093 GAO conducted in-person surveys in public places (intercept surveys) in four locations and asked 304 individuals who were likely to have used ridesourcing or taxis about their awareness and use of selected safety features. Of the 267 respondents who were asked about pretrip in-app features, over 95 percent were aware of and had used at least one such feature when arranging a ride in the past year. Respondents were most likely to consider two pretrip in-app features—license plate number and driver name and picture—as very important to their safety. More than 90 percent of respondents were aware of at least one in-vehicle safety feature, such as a vehicle decal. Why GAO Did This Study Ridesourcing and taxi services help meet the transportation needs of many people in the U.S. Advocacy groups and other stakeholders have raised questions about the safety of these services. Sami's Law, enacted in January 2023, provides for GAO to conduct a study on background check requirements for prospective ridesourcing and taxi drivers, and safety steps taken by ridesourcing and taxi companies. This report describes background checks of prospective ridesourcing and taxi drivers and safety features for drivers and passengers, among other objectives. GAO searched state statutes and regulations to identify states with statewide background check requirements for prospective ridesourcing and taxi drivers. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials from five federal agencies, six selected states, and four selected localities. GAO also interviewed representatives from five selected ridesourcing and five taxi companies. GAO selected states and localities based on their oversight of ridesourcing and taxi services, and selected ridesourcing and taxi companies to obtain variation in size and location, among other things. GAO also conducted nongeneralizable intercept surveys to examine if passengers were aware of and used selected safety features. An intercept survey is an in-person data collection method conducted in a public place (such as an airport), where a specific targeted population is asked a series of questions. For more information, contact Elizabeth Repko at (202) 512-2834 or repkoe@gao.gov and Derrick Collins at 202-512-8777 or collinsd@gao.gov. Mon, 09 Sep 2024 08:23:27 -0400 /products/gao-24-107093 Letter Report https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106413 What GAO Found Three major hazards caused most of the injuries and illnesses in general warehousing (which includes e-commerce warehouses) and the companies that deliver these orders to consumers (“last-mile delivery”), according to Bureau of Statistics (BLS) data. Overexertion and bodily reaction, the most common hazard (see figure), can cause musculoskeletal disorders, such as tendonitis or back pain. The transportation and warehousing sector (which includes e-commerce warehouses and last-mile delivery) had the highest serious injury and illness rate of all 19 sectors in 2022, with an estimated 3.8 cases per 100 workers, according to BLS data. Estimated Serious Injuries and Illnesses by Cause, 2021 and 2022 Although the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) cited warehouse and last-mile delivery employers for more than 2,500 workplace violations from fiscal years 2018 through 2023, 11 included ergonomic hazards, according to OSHA data. Because OSHA does not have an ergonomic standard it must use the general duty clause of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 to cite these hazards. General duty clause citations require a high level of evidence that can make issuing them a challenge, according to OSHA officials. OSHA staff described other challenges to identifying, assessing, and addressing ergonomic hazards, including compliance officers (1) having difficulty determining if ergonomic hazards caused injuries reported on forms, (2) receiving little training on ergonomic hazards, and (3) relying on unclear ergonomic guidance. By addressing these issues OSHA may be better able to identify and address ergonomic hazards and more fully protect workers from harm. In fiscal year 2024, OSHA implemented an inspection program to better protect workers from hazards at warehouses and other worksites, including general warehouses and last-mile delivery companies. The program requires compliance officers to determine if ergonomic hazards exist and, if so, to take appropriate enforcement action. According to officials, OSHA will review this program annually, focusing on quantitative outcomes like the number of establishments inspected and hazards identified. Once OSHA has taken steps to improve how it identifies and addresses ergonomic hazards, it should evaluate if this program is more fully protecting workers from such hazards. Such an evaluation will allow OSHA to assess: (1) the efficacy of its efforts in identifying and addressing ergonomic hazards and (2) if and how it may improve these efforts to better protect warehouse and delivery workers from ergonomic hazards. Why GAO Did This Study To quickly fill orders, e-commerce warehouses and companies that deliver these orders to consumers (last-mile delivery), use technology to increase productivity and monitor worker performance. Worker safety advocates, employees, and researchers have raised questions about whether employers' use of technology, along with performance expectations, may increase the risk of injuries in this rapidly growing sector. GAO was asked to review how technology affects worker safety at e-commerce warehouses and last-mile delivery companies. This report examines the types and causes of injuries at these workplaces, and the extent to which OSHA identifies and addresses ergonomic hazards, among other objectives. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and guidance. GAO analyzed BLS data from 2018 through 2022 on injuries (the most recent available). GAO also analyzed OSHA inspection data and interviewed headquarters officials and staff (compliance officers and managers) at six area offices. GAO conducted nongeneralizable surveys of workers and interviewed 15 stakeholder groups and five employers knowledgeable about safety issues and technology in these industries. Tue, 08 Oct 2024 12:00:36 -0400 /products/gao-24-106413 Letter Report https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106847 What GAO Found Seven Federal Transit Administration (FTA) grant programs provide funding for general public transportation that may be used to support nonemergency medical transportation (NEMT) services. These funds may be used to purchase vehicles that provide transportation to medical appointments or fund call centers that schedules rides for health care, among other activities. Examples of Nonemergency Medical Transportation (NEMT) Activities Established in 2015, the Pilot Program for Innovative Coordinated Access and Mobility (ICAM) is the only FTA program that specifically mentions NEMT as part of its primary objectives. FTA established objectives for ICAM and ensured stakeholder communication but did not follow the other three leading practices for the effective design of pilot programs. FTA did not develop an assessment methodology, establish an evaluation plan, or develop criteria to assess whether ICAM is scalable, such as whether and how the pilot could be expanded. A comprehensive evaluation plan that includes an assessment methodology and criteria to assess scalability would help FTA determine whether ICAM is achieving its goals of increasing health care access and improving health outcomes. Such efforts could also provide Congress with information in making decisions about the future of ICAM, which is funded through fiscal year 2026. Publicly available FTA information does not provide a holistic, readily accessible picture of how FTA funds can be used to support NEMT. While ICAM materials discuss NEMT, materials for the other six FTA grant programs that are eligible to support NEMT provide little to no information related to NEMT. Information that is provided is dispersed across multiple sources. Many of the 25 FTA grant recipients GAO interviewed thought it would be helpful to have consolidated or simplified information about using FTA programs for NEMT. In July 2024, FTA published a notice that it is establishing a national center that will promote NEMT coordination as part of its portfolio. However, since the center has not been established, whether it will provide resources about using FTA funding for NEMT services is unclear. Consolidating and publishing information on the potential uses of FTA funding to support NEMT could help potential applicants, recipients, and other stakeholders interested in initiating or expanding this key transportation service. Why GAO Did This Study Millions of Americans, particularly those requiring regular access to medical services, such as older adults or people with disabilities, rely on NEMT. A lack of access to NEMT can result in delayed care and poorer health outcomes. The Department of Transportation's FTA administers several programs that provide funding for public transportation, some of which may be used to support NEMT. House Report 117-402 included a provision for GAO to study FTA grant programs that could support NEMT. This report evaluates (1) FTA's design and implementation of the ICAM program against leading practices for pilot programs and (2) how FTA communicates the availability and use of its funding for NEMT, among other objectives. GAO reviewed FTA documentation on ICAM and compared FTA's efforts to leading practices for the effective design of pilot programs. GAO also reviewed the information FTA publicly shares about its funding programs. GAO interviewed FTA officials on ICAM and selected FTA grant recipients. Wed, 25 Sep 2024 07:50:32 -0400 /products/gao-24-106847 Letter Report https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106681 What GAO Found From 2018 to 2023, small communities in the contiguous U.S. generally experienced a decrease in departing flights, with a steep drop at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, but an increase in the average number of seats per departure. About half of the 218 small communities saw modest change in the number of passengers on departures, while others saw more dramatic changes; 8 percent of small communities had a decline of more than 50 percent in passengers on departures, while 14 percent of small communities had an increase of 50 percent or more. Small communities that received air service through the Essential Air Service (EAS) program, which provides subsidies to airlines to serve eligible communities, lost less air service and gained more seats per departure, on average, than non-EAS small communities. On average, small communities' connectivity—a measure of access to the aviation system—decreased slightly, remaining much lower than in large communities. Mean Total Departures and Mean Number of Seats Per Departure from 218 Small Communities, 2018–2023 Stakeholders cited pilot and maintenance workforce supply challenges, increased airline operating costs, and travelers choosing to drive to their destination or a larger airport as factors contributing to changes in air service to small communities. Some of these factors also contributed to higher EAS subsidy costs, according to U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) officials, which increased by approximately 31 percent from 2018 through 2023. Higher airline operating costs (e.g., fuel and labor) also limited the impact of Small Community Air Service Development Program (SCASDP) grants that communities used to incentivize airlines to initiate air service, according to stakeholders. Options that selected stakeholders and recent studies identified to improve air service to small communities include increasing pilot supply, and addressing higher airline operating costs through electric aircraft or bus service. Stakeholders also identified a range of options to change EAS to support small community air service—such as focusing EAS eligibility on more remote communities or expanding EAS to better ensure small airports do not lose air service—and to modify SCASDP in response to rising airline operating costs. Why GAO Did This Study Access to air service provides a vital connection to the national transportation system and can be an important driver of economic growth, especially for small communities. Since Congress deregulated the airline industry in 1978, small communities have found it difficult to retain and enhance their air service. Congress created EAS in 1978 and SCASDP in 2000—both under DOT—to help small communities maintain air service. GAO was asked to review the current state of air service to small communities. This report addresses (1) changes in air service to small communities from 2018 through 2023; (2) factors contributing to changes in air service to small communities, and their effects on federal air service programs; and (3) options to improve air service to small communities. GAO used U.S. Census Bureau data on statistical areas and population to define small communities—in this analysis, the 218 least populous communities in the contiguous U.S. with a commercial airport. GAO also used flight data reported to DOT by airlines to analyze air service to these communities. GAO conducted semi-structured interviews with a non-generalizable sample of 33 aviation stakeholders, including 16 small airports and five airlines with a range of experiences with EAS and SCASDP, as well as industry associations and academic researchers. GAO also interviewed DOT officials to obtain perspectives on EAS, SCASDP, and other federal policies. For more information, contact Heather Krause at (202) 512-2834 or krauseh@gao.gov. Wed, 25 Sep 2024 07:32:37 -0400 /products/gao-24-106681 Letter Report https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-107824 What GAO Found The Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) is a component within the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Transportation Security Administration (TSA). In prior work, GAO identified various challenges affecting FAMS. These generally fall into two areas: (1) organizational performance and (2) workforce management. As of August 2024, FAMS and TSA have largely implemented GAO's 20 recommendations. Summary Status of GAO Recommendations to the Federal Air Marshal Service from Calendar Years 2016-2021, by Type of Challenge and Status, as of August 2024 One example of a closed recommendation to address organizational performance relates to the effectiveness of TSA's aviation security countermeasures. In 2017, GAO reported on the costs and effectiveness of TSA's passenger aviation security countermeasures, including FAMS. GAO found that TSA did not have methods to assess its effectiveness in deterring attacks on the U.S. aviation system. As a result, GAO recommended that TSA explore and pursue methods to do so. TSA addressed this by commissioning several studies and using them to inform leadership decisions about new or revised countermeasures. As a result, TSA should now be better positioned to understand and improve its efforts to deter attacks on the U.S. aviation system. The open, partially addressed, recommendation to address workforce management challenges focuses on FAMS's tracking of the time its air marshals spent on and off their shifts. In 2020, GAO found that FAMS did not monitor air marshals' work hours against its guidelines for shift lengths and rest periods. GAO recommended that FAMS monitor the extent to which air marshals' actual shifts and rest hours are consistent with scheduling guidelines. As of August 2024, FAMS developed reports with this information, but it had not used them to help manage its workforce. Why GAO Did This Study Twenty-three years after 9/11, the threat of terrorist attacks to civil aviation and the need for effective security measures remains of significant concern. FAMS deploys air marshals on selected flights to deter and address such threats. In June 2023, FAMS issued a roadmap that describes the mission, vision, and priorities of the agency. This statement discusses GAO's portfolio of work on FAMS and its progress addressing prior GAO recommendations. This statement is based on prior GAO reports published from May 2016 through June 2021, along with updates on FAMS's efforts to address previous GAO recommendations. For these reports, GAO reviewed TSA and FAMS documentation, analyzed data, and interviewed agency officials. For recommendation updates, GAO reviewed FAMS and TSA documentation and met with officials. Tue, 24 Sep 2024 09:55:07 -0400 /products/gao-24-107824 Letter Report https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-107001 What GAO Found After a shutdown of the national airspace in 2023 due to an aging air traffic control (ATC) system outage, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) conducted an operational risk assessment to evaluate the sustainability of all ATC systems. The assessment determined that of its 138 systems, 51 (37 percent) were unsustainable and 54 (39 percent) were potentially unsustainable (see figure 1). Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Air Traffic Control (ATC) System Sustainment Ratings Of the 105 unsustainable and potentially unsustainable systems, 58 (29 unsustainable and 29 potentially unsustainable systems) have critical operational impacts on the safety and efficiency of the national airspace (see figure 2). Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Air Traffic Control (ATC) System Safety and Efficiency Operational Impact Categories by Sustainment Rating FAA has 64 ongoing investments aimed at modernizing 90 of the 105 unsustainable and potentially unsustainable systems; however, the agency has been slow to modernize the most critical and at-risk systems. Specifically, when considering age, sustainability ratings, operational impact level, and expected date of modernization for each system, as of May 2024, FAA had 17 systems that were especially concerning. The investments intended to modernize these systems are not planned to be completed for at least 6 years, and in some cases, they will not be completed for 10 to 13 years. In addition, FAA does not have ongoing investments associated with four of these critical systems and thus it is unknown when the associated systems will be modernized (see table 1). Table 1: Key Factors of the Most Critical and At-Risk FAA Air Traffic Control (ATC) Systems Systema Age of system Sustainability ratingb Safety and efficiency operational impact Completion date for associated investment System A 30 A: unsustainable Critical 2035 System B 21 B: unsustainable Critical 2034 System C 6 B: unsustainable Critical 2034 System D 30 B: unsustainable Critical 2031 System E 50 B: unsustainable Critical 2031 System F 36 B: unsustainable Critical 2031 System G 25 B: unsustainable Critical 2031 System H 46 A: unsustainable Critical 2031 System I 21 A: unsustainable Critical 2031 System J 28 A: unsustainable Critical 2031 System K 30 B: unsustainable Critical 2030 System L 20 B: unsustainable Critical 2030 System M 7 B: unsustainable Critical 2030 System N 33 A: unsustainable Critical No investment System O 30 B: unsustainable Critical No investment System P 2 A: unsustainable Critical No investmentc System Q 30 B: unsustainable Critical No investment Source: GAO analysis of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) data. | GAO-24-107001 aThis table omits the official names of the 17 systems due to sensitivity concerns. bIn 2023 FAA officials conducted an operational risk assessment to evaluate the sustainability of all ATC systems. The officials rated each system by their sustainability levels on a scale of A through E (rating A represented the least sustainable and rating E represented no sustainment issues). cAccording to FAA officials, the agency is taking steps to mitigate priority deficiencies for this system. The results of the 2023 operational risk assessment were intended to prioritize investment decisions. However, FAA did not prioritize or establish near-term plans to modernize unsustainable and critical systems based on its operational assessment. Until FAA reports to the Congress on how it is addressing all critical systems, Congress will not be fully informed on how FAA is mitigating the risks of these systems. Moreover, while FAA policy indicates that pre-baselined investments receive limited oversight, many of the 20 selected investments that were required to establish a cost, schedule, and performance baseline have been slow to accomplish this. Specifically, the 11 applicable investments took an average of 4 years and 7 months to establish their baselines. In addition, one investment took 6 years and 8 months, and, as of May 2024, two others that were initiated over 6 years ago had not established their baselines. FAA officials acknowledged the gaps in accountability and stated that they were in the initial phase of planning to establish greater accountability. Until FAA establishes a time frame for developing and implementing guidance to increase oversight of pre-baselined investments that require additional resources or time, the agency will continue to experience protracted lengths of time in establishing investment baselines. In addition, until investments establish baselines in an expeditious manner, the agency will be unable to diligently track the execution of plans or mitigate risks. Lastly, FAA has not consistently provided oversight of ATC modernization investments. Specifically, FAA’s acquisition oversight council had not ensured that investments deliver functionality in segments. In addition, while the council held quarterly reviews for investments, it did not consistently monitor high risks. Moreover, for three selected investments, GAO found that the council reviewed some, but not all, required documentation prior to approving investments to proceed to the next lifecycle phase. Lastly, FAA oversight officials did not annually approve the business cases for the three investments, before submitting them to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the federal IT investment transparency website (IT Dashboard). This limits FAA’s ability to mitigate cost and schedule overruns, increases the risk of system failures, and reduces informed decision making. Why GAO Did This Study The FAA, within the Department of Transportation, safely manages over 50,000 flights daily. Air traffic controllers use a myriad of systems to, among other things, monitor weather, conduct navigation and surveillance, and manage communications. However, over the past several decades, FAA has been experiencing challenges with aging ATC systems. These challenges are due to, among other things, availability of parts, growing airspace demand, and expanding mission needs. FAA anticipates continued growth and forecasts that air travel will increase, on average, by 6.2 percent annually. Due to concerns about growing air traffic demands and aging systems, GAO was asked to review FAA’s modernization of outdated systems that support air traffic controller operations. The specific objectives in this report were to (1) identify unsustainable and potentially unsustainable ATC systems, (2) determine the extent to which FAA has ongoing investments to modernize unsustainable and potentially unsustainable systems, (3) determine the progress FAA has made in baselining and implementing selected modernization investments, and (4) assess the extent to which FAA is effectively overseeing the implementation of selected ATC modernization investments. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed FAA’s inventory of ATC systems and the results of an FAA 2023 assessment of system sustainability. Additionally, GAO reviewed a list of ATC modernization investments and compared the actions FAA took in response to the 2023 assessment. GAO also selected 20 modernization investments to determine the progress made in baselining and implementing the investments. GAO selected the investments based on, among other things, the operational impact on the safety and/or efficiency of the national airspace, acquisition type, and lifecycle cost. Finally, GAO selected three investments for closer review based on their sustainability ratings and lifecycle cost estimates. GAO then assessed each of the three investments’ oversight documentation. GAO also assessed documentation of general practices of FAA’s acquisition oversight council. GAO compared this documentation to requirements from FAA and OMB. Mon, 23 Sep 2024 07:12:27 -0400 /products/gao-24-107001 Letter Report https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106983 What GAO Found The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) offers several transportation options to veterans seeking medical care. These options include the Volunteer Transportation Network program that relies on volunteers and on vehicle donations from organizations like Disabled American Veterans to transport veterans. From 2018 through 2023, the annual number of rides provided through the program decreased by more than 50 percent, according to data from Disabled American Veterans. Similarly, VA data show that the total number of program volunteers—primarily drivers—decreased by nearly 50 percent during this period. Officials from the 90 VA medical facilities that responded to GAO's survey and reported offering the program attributed the decrease in rides and program volunteers partly to COVID-19-related disruptions. Although the numbers of program rides and volunteers decreased, survey respondents reported that the number of program vehicles in VA facility fleets remained relatively unchanged from fiscal years 2018 through 2023. Estimated Total Annual Number of Volunteer Transportation Network Program Rides, 2018-2023 More than half of survey respondents reported that the two biggest challenges in administering the Volunteer Transportation Network program were recruiting and onboarding program volunteers. Specifically, 91 percent of survey respondents reported that the aging pool of volunteers was a challenge to recruiting and retaining volunteer drivers. In addition, 56 percent of survey respondents reported that onboarding requirements for volunteers—such as obtaining a VA medical examination or a personal identity verification card—were a challenge. GAO was told that onboarding requirements were time consuming and may necessitate multiple trips to the VA facility for potential volunteers. About 70 percent of survey respondents indicated these requirements result in some volunteers not completing the onboarding process. Although facility officials reported challenges administering the Volunteer Transportation Network program, some facility officials also noted efforts to mitigate them, including streamlining the onboarding process. Furthermore, despite various reported challenges, survey respondents largely agreed that the program plays a critical role in helping them meet the needs of veterans. Sixty-eight percent of survey respondents reported that the veterans they serve would lose access to medical care without the transportation provided by this program. Why GAO Did This Study GAO and others have identified travel to medical appointments as a major barrier to health care for veterans. To help address this barrier, VA administers the Volunteer Transportation Network program. Unlike other VA transportation options, this program does not have veteran eligibility requirements (e.g., they do not need to have a service-connected disability or a low-income level), making it unique in serving a broader veteran population. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023, includes a provision for GAO to review the Volunteer Transportation Network program. This report provides information on (1) trends in the number of rides provided through the program, (2) trends in the number of vehicles and volunteers associated with the program, and (3) challenges administering the program. GAO reviewed VA Volunteer Transportation Network program policies and data for fiscal years 2018 through 2023. GAO interviewed VA officials who oversee the program; and officials from eight VA medical facilities, selected to represent variation in geographic area, among other criteria. GAO also obtained data and interviewed representatives from Disabled American Veterans, a veterans service organization that is the primary source of donated vehicles for the program. Finally, GAO administered a survey to VA medical facility officials and received a response rate of 73 percent, with 90 survey responses from facilities that offer the program. These responses may not be generalizable to facilities that offer the program but did not respond to the survey. For more information, contact Sharon Silas at (202) 512-7114 or SilasS@gao.gov. Thu, 15 Aug 2024 09:39:28 -0400 /products/gao-24-106983 Letter Report https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106882 What GAO Found In March 2022, the Department of Transportation (DOT) announced up to $300 million available for award under the Rural Surface Transportation Grants Program (Rural). DOT advanced 243 of the 317 applications to its Senior Review Team—a team of senior DOT officials that is responsible for reviewing applications and advancing applications to the Secretary of Transportation for award consideration. Local governments submitted most of these applications, which generally requested funding for roadway projects in areas with a population of less than 50,000. Demand for funding was high as these applications requested a total of over $9.3 billion in funding—about 30 times the maximum amount available—with most applications requesting less than $25 million. Selected Characteristics of Applications That Advanced to the Rural Surface Transportation Grant Program's Senior Review Team, Fiscal Year 2022 DOT's selection process generally aligned with federal guidance and regulations for grants management, but DOT did not fully document its rationale for key decisions during that process, as required by DOT guidance. For example, in response to a DOT requirement, DOT developed an evaluation plan that specified the actions the Senior Review Team must take, as well as the criteria for taking those actions. GAO found that in advancing and selecting Rural applications for award, DOT documented the outcomes of key decisions but did not fully document their rationale, as required by DOT guidance. Specifically, DOT did not fully document its rationale for requesting additional information from some applicants that did not initially meet the Rural program statutory project requirements, but not from others. In addition, DOT did not document its rationale for rating certain applications more highly than others that were similarly situated. As a result, DOT's documentation provided limited insight into its rationale for decisions that could have affected the outcome for an application. By fully documenting its rationale for key decisions, DOT can better ensure that its process for selecting applications for award is consistent and transparent. Why GAO Did This Study Over 70 percent of the nation's 4 million miles of public access roads are estimated to be in rural areas. Rural—a DOT discretionary grant program—funds eligible projects to improve and expand surface transportation infrastructure in rural areas (i.e., areas outside an urbanized area that has a population of over 200,000). DOT awarded $274 million in fiscal year 2022 funding for 12 Rural applications. The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act includes a provision for GAO to examine DOT's Rural awards selection process. This report (1) describes the characteristics of Rural applications that DOT advanced to the Senior Review Team; and (2) assesses the extent to which DOT's selection assesses process aligned with guidance and federal regulations. GAO reviewed statutory requirements, DOT's notice of funding opportunity, evaluation plan, and other documentation on the Rural fiscal year 2022 selection process; analyzed application and award data; and interviewed DOT officials. GAO also compared DOT's selection process with federal regulations for discretionary grant programs, DOT guidance, and standards for internal control in the federal government. Mon, 12 Aug 2024 07:40:20 -0400 /products/gao-24-106882 Letter Report https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-107059 What GAO Found Autonomous ships are developing domestically and abroad and have the potential to transform the maritime environment. These ships use various sensors and other technologies to control speed and direction, avoid collisions, and navigate with or without human input, whether onboard or from a remote operations center (see figure). Examples of Commercial Autonomous Ship Technologies in Use as of June 2024 Current commercial uses are fairly narrow and involve a human that is either in direct control of the ship, or can take control, if needed. U.S and international industry stakeholders GAO interviewed described improved safety, efficiency, and workforce diversity, among other potential benefits. However, some expressed concerns and noted challenges involved in developing and proving these technologies for safe commercial use. Additionally, uncrewed or fully autonomous technologies may pose new safety risks in the maritime environment and could present challenges to a U.S. legal framework that requires (or is written with a presumption that) crew be aboard and in control of every ship. The International Maritime Organization—a specialized agency of the United Nations responsible for the safety, security, and environmental performance of international shipping—is developing a regulatory framework for commercial autonomous ships that addresses issues such as safety, training, and legal liabilities. It is generally expected to be adopted by member countries on a non-mandatory basis in 2025 and in force on a mandatory basis for member countries in 2032 by amending an existing International Maritime Organization convention. The Coast Guard is the lead agency for the U.S. delegation to the International Maritime Organization and is helping to develop this framework. Selected countries have taken various approaches to addressing autonomous ships. According to regulators from Canada, Norway, and the United Kingdom, these approaches include providing guidance to stakeholders on how to comply with existing laws and regulations, modifying regulations, and creating new regulations. According to U.S. Coast Guard officials, the Coast Guard regulates the design, construction, and operation of autonomous ships through existing laws and regulations, which are sufficient for it to execute its safety mission. However, officials identified several factors that could constrain or complicate its ability as a regulator to enable the development and adoption of autonomous ship technologies. These factors include limited statutory authority to allow for reduced crewing on ships, a lack of domestic examples demonstrating autonomous ship technologies, and challenges in harmonizing international and domestic regulations. Various statutes establish the minimum number of crew required per vessel, and Coast Guard officials told GAO that they do not have the authority to waive these requirements outside of the limited scope of the at-sea rocket recovery pilot program. However, officials said they have heard concerns from industry stakeholders that the inability to reduce crew below the minimum statutory requirements could make the capital cost of developing technologies that would take the place of crew—and thus save labor costs—impractical. Coast Guard officials said they monitor developments that could prompt a need for new or revised laws and regulations, and brief Congress periodically. Why GAO Did This Study Such ships range from crewed ships with automated processes and decision support to ships that can make decisions and determine actions without human involvement. These include crewed or uncrewed ships that are controlled and operated from remote locations. While autonomous ships offer a range of potential benefits, these new technologies also pose new safety risks that could present challenges to a U.S. legal framework that requires crews to be onboard. As autonomous ship technologies develop, countries are pursuing various approaches to regulating them. In the U.S., the Coast Guard is the federal agency responsible for regulating U.S. waterways to ensure that they are safe and secure. These responsibilities include promulgating regulations and guidance pertaining to the design, construction, and operation of commercial ships, certifying their compliance with applicable laws and Coast Guard regulations, and issuing and administering the credentials of seafarers. The Coast Guard is currently conducting a statutorily-directed pilot program for autonomous at-sea rocket recovery that began in 2023. The fiscal year 2023 National Defense Authorization Act includes a provision for GAO to submit a report on, among other things, how commercial autonomous ships are used, how they may affect safety and the maritime workforce, and how these ships are regulated internationally and domestically. (Pub. L. No. 117-263, § 11504(j), 136 Stat. 2395, 4133-34 (2022)). This report describes commercial autonomous maritime ship usage globally and the associated benefits and challenges, how the IMO and selected countries are regulating these technologies, and how the Coast Guard is regulating autonomous ships and the challenges it may face in the future. For more information, contact Andrew Von Ah at (213) 830-1011 or vonaha@gao.gov. Thu, 08 Aug 2024 08:27:50 -0400 /products/gao-24-107059 Letter Report https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-105652 What GAO Found The Department of Transportation (DOT) added a new strategic goal in its fiscal year 2022-2026 strategic plan that aims to reduce inequities across the transportation system. DOT also established 14 performance goals to assess progress toward this equity strategic goal. DOT defines equity as the consistent and fair treatment of all individuals, including those who belong to underserved communities, among other things. These equity performance goals relate to a variety of DOT's activities, such as its discretionary grant programs, contract awards, and community outreach efforts. GAO found that DOT's equity performance goals are mostly consistent with six selected performance management practices (see figure). For example, each of the performance goals is consistent with the practices of describing linkage; identifying a goal leader; and being objective, quantifiable, and measurable. Number of DOT's 14 Equity Performance Goals Consistent with Selected Performance Management Practices However, some performance goals are inconsistent with the practices of identifying near-term targets; demonstrating clarity; and describing accuracy and reliability. For example, with regard to the practice of accuracy and reliability, DOT did not describe how it verified and validated data used to measure progress toward eight of its equity performance goals. Performance goals that are consistent with performance management practices could better position DOT, external stakeholders, and other decision-makers to assess progress toward DOT's equity strategic goal. DOT is taking steps to assess and use information to manage its equity efforts. These steps, which are ongoing, include assessing the sufficiency of its current performance information and using early information from its performance reviews to guide some programmatic decision-making. For example, one of DOT's equity performance goals is to increase transit grants for rural or tribal areas. DOT officials stated that they are using information related to this performance goal to help improve outreach to those areas. Why GAO Did This Study DOT's mission is to deliver a transportation system that serves the American people. The Biden administration has issued a series of executive orders to help advance equity, and DOT added equity as a department-wide strategic goal in response. House Report 117-99 includes a provision for GAO to examine DOT's equity-related efforts. This report examines (1) to what extent DOT's equity performance goals are consistent with selected federal performance management practices, and (2) how DOT assesses and uses information to manage its equity efforts. GAO analyzed DOT performance management documents, such as its fiscal year 2025 annual performance plan, fiscal year 2023 performance report, fiscal year 2022-2026 strategic plan, and 2023 equity action plan update, and interviewed DOT officials. GAO compared information in these documents to performance management practices GAO selected from relevant federal statutes and guidance, and prior GAO work. Tue, 23 Jul 2024 09:30:44 -0400 /products/gao-24-105652 Letter Report https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-107347 What GAO Found In May 2023, GAO identified 20 priority recommendations for the Department of Transportation (DOT). Since then, DOT implemented 2 of those recommendations. Specifically, DOT has taken actions to understand the implementation of a cybersecurity framework by entities across the transportation sector, which provides opportunities to focus resources for risk mitigation efforts. DOT has also taken actions to enhance the climate resilience of federally funded roads through grants, guidance, and training opportunities. In addition to the 2 priority recommendations DOT implemented, GAO removed the priority status from one recommendation related to motor carrier performance due to actions taken by Congress and DOT. In June 2024, GAO identified 3 new priority recommendations for DOT, bringing the total number to 20. These recommendations involve the following areas: improving transparency and communication, addressing safety risks, developing comprehensive plans, managing cybersecurity risks and information technology, and reducing fraud and abuse risks. DOT's continued attention to these issues could lead to significant improvements in government operations. Why GAO Did This Study Priority open recommendations are the GAO recommendations that warrant priority attention from heads of key departments or agencies because their implementation could save large amounts of money; improve congressional and/or executive branch decision-making on major issues; eliminate mismanagement, fraud, and abuse; or ensure that programs comply with laws and funds are legally spent, among other benefits. Since 2015 GAO has sent letters to selected agencies to highlight the importance of implementing such recommendations. For more information, contact Heather Krause at (202) 512-2834 or KrauseH@gao.gov. Mon, 17 Jun 2024 08:57:53 -0400 /products/gao-24-107347 Letter Report https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106158 What GAO Found The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) generally requires drones to be equipped with Remote ID technology, which FAA describes as a “digital license plate.” Law enforcement can use Remote ID to identify and investigate unauthorized drone activity, in line with FAA's goal for Remote ID to help law enforcement. However, GAO found that FAA has limited resources to support tribal, state, and local law enforcement on using the technology. Tribal, state, and local law enforcement agencies GAO contacted had little knowledge of Remote ID or how it could be used in their investigations. Developing such resources could help FAA better support law enforcement's ability to use Remote ID. Further, FAA is developing an interface to provide drone registration information from Remote ID to law enforcement but does not have a plan or timeline for releasing it. At the same time, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is developing an application for law enforcement that would link to FAA's interface, but DHS similarly does not have a plan or timeline for the effort. As a result, law enforcement may continue to experience delays with accessing real-time information needed to track and investigate unauthorized drone activity. Examples of Drone Uses within the National Airspace System FAA officials and stakeholders identified limitations with using current Remote ID technology to enable advanced drone operations, such as traffic management. FAA regulations call for drones to use broadcast-based Remote ID technologies, such as Wi-Fi and Bluetooth to transmit their location. However, commercial drone stakeholders told GAO that a broadcast-based signal is not sufficient for providing real-time, networked data about drone location and status as needed for advanced operations. FAA has stated it expects industry will pursue network technologies for Remote ID, such as cellular, while continuing to transmit the required broadcast-based Remote ID signal. However, stakeholders representing a commercial drone group said that there is a general lack of willingness by industry to develop network-based Remote ID alongside the required broadcast-based approach due to practical limitations, such as signal interference. FAA officials said that in the future, FAA may begin assessing what additional technology can be developed. FAA's progress toward integrating drones into the national airspace may be at risk if the agency does not assess these issues and identify a path forward. Why GAO Did This Study Drones are the fastest-growing segment of aviation in the U.S., according to FAA. Remote ID is intended to help FAA, law enforcement, and others locate drone operators flying in an unsafe manner or where prohibited. FAA is responsible for safely integrating drones into the national airspace and notes that Remote ID could help enable advanced drone operations. GAO was asked to review issues related to Remote ID. This report assesses (1) potential law enforcement uses for Remote ID, and related federal support, and (2) any limitations FAA and stakeholders may face using Remote ID for advanced operations. GAO reviewed FAA guidance and resources for Remote ID. GAO also reviewed FAA's plans for integrating drones into the national airspace. GAO interviewed FAA and DHS officials, and law enforcement and industry stakeholders that GAO identified based on their participation on FAA committees and input from other stakeholders. GAO also reviewed DHS efforts to develop a Remote ID application. Thu, 06 Jun 2024 08:54:22 -0400 /products/gao-24-106158 Letter Report https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106881 What GAO Found The Protecting our Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing Safety Act of 2020 (PIPES Act of 2020) included requirements for operators of pipeline systems to update their plans and procedures to address minimizing releases of natural gas. The act also required the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) or the appropriate state authority to review these updated plans. To carry out this requirement, PHMSA notified pipeline operators of the requirement, developed guidance and training for federal and state pipeline inspectors, conducted outreach to the public, and reviewed operators' updated plans. The primary challenge for pipeline operators updating their plans was the uncertainty of how to address the PIPES Act of 2020 requirements, according to selected operators and industry associations. PHMSA issued a proposed rule on leak detection and repair that includes more prescriptive and detailed requirements for addressing leaks. PHMSA officials said six states had not completed their reviews, as of May 2024. PHMSA officials and state inspectors we spoke with most frequently cited challenges related to completing the reviews with existing resources in the allotted time, and potential gaps in states' abilities to enforce the requirements in the act. PHMSA officials said inspectors can incorporate future reviews of the plans into other scheduled inspections. They also noted that PHMSA's proposed rule on leak detection and repair will help fill the gap in enforcement authority for states. Stakeholders GAO spoke with—including representatives from selected pipeline industry and safety groups, state regulatory officials, and gas pipeline operators—identified actions that could further reduce leaks from pipelines without compromising safety. These actions include improving "Call Before You Dig" programs that locate and mark underground utilities to help reduce excavation damage, updating certain operating procedures, adopting advanced technology, and replacing aging portions of certain pipelines. PHMSA has various efforts underway related to these areas. Why GAO Did This Study A 3-million-mile nationwide network of pipelines carries gas from producing wells to processing plants, and eventually to end users, such as manufacturers, businesses, and homes. Methane, the primary component of natural gas and a potent greenhouse gas, can be emitted from pipelines through unintentional leaks or through intentional releases of gas associated with maintenance and emergency response activities. According to PHMSA, emissions from gas pipeline systems are a risk to public safety and contribute to climate change. The act also includes a provision for GAO to examine PHMSA's and states' reviews of pipeline operators' updated plans. This report includes information on the process PHMSA and states used to review operators' updated plans, operator and inspector challenges associated with updating and reviewing these plans, and selected stakeholders' views on ways to further minimize natural gas emissions from pipelines without compromising safety. GAO reviewed applicable statutes, regulations, and agency documentation; interviewed PHMSA officials, selected state pipeline safety authorities, selected gas pipeline operators; and relevant stakeholders, such as industry associations, pipeline safety and environmental groups. For more information, contact Elizabeth Repko, Director, Physical Infrastructure at (202) 512-2834 or RepkoE@gao.gov. Mon, 03 Jun 2024 12:01:21 -0400 /products/gao-24-106881 Letter Report https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-107489 Why This Matters Hydrogen has potential uses in many industries, including steel production, vehicle fuel cells, aviation fuel, and power generation. If produced with low-carbon methods, it could play a significant role in reducing greenhouse gas emissions and air pollution. However, there is disagreement about the viability of hydrogen as an energy solution in some uses. Key Takeaways Hydrogen uses vary in maturity. For example, hydrogen-fueled vehicles are available in a few markets, while hydrogen’s use in long-range aircraft is not mature. Obstacles to using hydrogen more widely include high costs and the need to significantly modify infrastructure for many applications. Additional research and development (R&D) may help address these challenges, and hydrogen “hubs” have been funded to accelerate commercialization. The Technology What is it? Hydrogen is a versatile fuel and a useful ingredient in certain industries. Its use produces no carbon dioxide, making it potentially useful for decarbonization in some applications. Today, hydrogen is mostly used in certain mature industrial processes, including production of ammonia for fertilizer and removal of sulfur in oil refining. Hydrogen has many potential uses, such as: Steel production. Hydrogen can replace coke (used to remove oxygen) or natural gas in the production of iron and steel. It has been successfully used in some pilot programs but has not been used at scale in this application. This is due to the cost of hydrogen and the need to design new plants or retrofit existing plants. Vehicle fuel cells. Several manufacturers have begun making cars powered by hydrogen fuel cells, which are primarily available in California because of its tailpipe emissions standards. Refueling infrastructure is limited, with around 60 stations in California as of 2024. Hydrogen fuel is also costly. It can cost around $200 to refuel a car (with a range of about 400 miles). Hydrogen fuel cells may be more advantageous for decarbonizing heavy-duty trucks. Once commercially available, these vehicles might weigh less and have a longer range than electric trucks. Figure 1. Examples of Potential Changes to Facilitate Hydrogen Use Aviation fuels. Some companies have conducted successful test flights of small, short-range aircraft using hydrogen fuel cells and are aiming for commercial operations in 2025. Larger and longer-range aircraft are more likely to use liquid hydrogen as it is more efficient than fuel cells but is a less mature technology, requiring new propulsion systems, new onboard fuel storage systems, and changes to the fuel supply chain. Power generation and heating. Hydrogen can be used to generate electricity or heat. In industrial heating, hydrogen could help decarbonize certain processes that require high temperatures, such as steel, glass, and cement production. However, because hydrogen burns hotter than natural gas, using it could require new burner designs or retrofits for existing equipment. Neither option is commercially available. And burning hydrogen can result in emissions of unhealthy nitrogen oxides. Opportunities Decarbonization. Today, hydrogen is mostly produced using fossil fuels because it is the least costly method. Hydrogen can also be produced using renewable energy. It is defined as “clean” hydrogen if production generates 2 kilograms of carbon dioxide or less per kilogram of hydrogen. (Fossil-based production, without carbon capture, generates about 9-20 kilograms.) Research and development. While the processes used to produce hydrogen are mature, further R&D is needed to improve efficiency and reduce costs. Hydrogen hubs. The federal government supports clean hydrogen through R&D, grants, loans, and tax credit programs. For example, the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act authorized up to $8 billion to establish regional clean hydrogen hubs and promote commercialization. The aim is to create networks of clean hydrogen producers, consumers, and infrastructure in close proximity that could accelerate large-scale production and use. In 2023, the Department of Energy (DOE) selected seven hubs for award negotiation. Challenges Challenges specific to each hydrogen use vary (see “The Technology”). The following may impede further adoption: Cost. Methods for producing, transporting, and storing hydrogen are generally mature but expensive. Excluding subsidies, the cost of clean hydrogen may be 2 to 4 times that of fossil-based hydrogen. DOE projects costs may decline 50 percent by 2030. Competing technologies. While hydrogen could be used in many applications, it may not always be the best technology choice because of high costs, availability of alternatives, and a limited hydrogen supply chain. Policy Context and Questions How effective are hydrogen hubs in promoting use and commercialization? What additional efforts, if any, could help reduce costs so that clean hydrogen use is more viable? What are the trade-offs of using hydrogen fuel cells versus electric battery vehicles for decarbonizing transportation? Selected GAO Works Sustainable Aviation Fuel: Agencies Should Track Progress Toward Ambitious Federal Goals, GAO-23-105300. Technology Assessment: Decarbonization, GAO-22-105274. Selected References Department of Energy, “Pathways to Commercial Liftoff: Clean Hydrogen”, March 2023. For more information, contact Brian Bothwell at (202) 512-6888 or bothwellb@gao.gov. Thu, 30 May 2024 08:48:31 -0400 /products/gao-24-107489 Letter Report https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106497 What GAO Found The U.S. Postal Inspection Service (Inspection Service) is the law enforcement arm of the U.S. Postal Service (USPS). The Inspection Service is charged with, among other things, protecting USPS employees and property against serious crime—which include robbery, burglary, assault, and homicide. According to GAO's review of Inspection Service data, cases of serious crime have increased almost every year from fiscal years 2017 through 2023. This is largely due to an increase in robbery cases, which increased nearly sevenfold from fiscal years 2019 through 2023 (see figure). GAO's review found that these robberies have generally targeted letter carriers, increasingly involved firearms, and targeted the universal keys which USPS employees use to access mailboxes. U.S. Postal Inspection Service Serious Crime Cases, Fiscal Years 2017 - 2023 Postal inspectors and postal police are responsible for responding to serious crime. Specifically, in fiscal year 2023, more than 1,200 postal inspectors were responsible for investigating these crimes, among other responsibilities. About 370 postal police provided facility and perimeter security at 33 USPS properties—generally mail processing and distribution centers. GAO found that the Inspection Service has not fully documented its processes for determining the size and location of its postal inspector and postal police workforce. For postal inspectors, Inspection Service officials described processes including regular reviews by division officials, but the processes were not documented. GAO also found that the Inspection Service partially documented such processes for its postal police workforce. Documenting workforce decision-making processes could help the Inspection Service ensure it allocates law enforcement resources according to mission needs. Further, the Inspection Service has not assessed the size and location of its postal police workforce since 2011. Officials said they are planning to conduct a new security force assessment, but they could not provide GAO the time frames for doing so. As such, it is unclear how long the Inspection Service will rely on outdated information to determine how to align its postal police workforce with current security needs. Why GAO Did This Study In recent years, letter carriers have been robbed, including at gunpoint, threatening their safety and the security of the mail they carry. GAO was asked to review issues related to postal crime and law enforcement. This report addresses: (1) recent trends in cases of serious crime against USPS employees and property, (2) the responsibilities of postal inspectors and postal police in responding to serious crime, and (3) the extent to which the Inspection Service has processes for determining the size and location of its postal inspector and postal police workforce. GAO analyzed data from the Inspection Service on serious crime cases from fiscal years 2017 through 2023, the most recent data. GAO determined the data were reliable for the purposes of this report. GAO also reviewed federal laws, workforce policies and procedures, and interviewed Inspection Service officials. GAO assessed the Inspection Service's workforce processes against internal control principles related to decision-making. Wed, 29 May 2024 09:04:38 -0400 /products/gao-24-106497 Letter Report https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106193 What GAO Found As part of its oversight of the commercial space transportation industry, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) assesses the potential effects that launch or reentry activities would have on the environment. These environmental reviews are required by the National Environmental Policy Act and conducted before FAA issues a commercial space license. FAA policy requires these reviews to assess 14 categories, such as noise, coastal resources, and land use, for potentially significant impacts on the environment. To assess significance, FAA may conduct new reviews or reevaluate and use reviews that were previously completed for launch sites or other activities. GAO found that 19 of the 22 reviews FAA prepared for current launch and reentry license applications were based on previous environmental reviews for the original licensing effort. FAA concluded that the potential environmental impacts of these launch and reentry activities were either below significant levels or were mitigated to be below significant levels overall. For example, in one review, FAA found that emissions from fuel burn during takeoff could produce short-term air-quality impacts, but these impacts would be indistinguishable from the impacts of ongoing flight operations in the area. According to FAA officials, approving or denying a license application based on the effects on other airspace users is not within FAA's statutory authority. However, during the licensing process, FAA begins to identify and plan for these effects while still ensuring operations meet safety criteria. These planning efforts include establishing procedures for communicating closures. Also, before granting a licensed operator's request for a specific launch time, FAA estimates the impact on other airspace users by using historical air traffic data to identify affected routes and the number of affected aircraft. In addition, FAA has reported decreasing the amount of time airspace is closed by using time-based management procedures. These procedures attempt to more efficiently identify aircraft projected to enter a hazard area when space operations occur to reduce re-routing. Example of Airspace Closure for Commercial Space Launch Why GAO Did This Study Commercial space transportation enables essential activities such as digital communications, navigation, and weather forecasting. Since the first U.S.-licensed commercial space launch in 1989, the industry has expanded into a multibillion-dollar enterprise. U.S.-licensed launches and reentries have grown from 9 in 2012 to 124 in 2023. There are many benefits of commercial space transportation; however, its growth has implications for how FAA manages airspace around launches and reentries, and affects other airspace users, such as commercial airlines. Further, rocket launches emit gases and particles into the air, which can affect the environment. GAO was asked to review the factors FAA considers as part of its licensing of commercial space launch and reentry operations. This report describes how FAA: (1) conducts environmental reviews for commercial space operations and what those reviews have found, and (2) considers the impacts on airspace users of airspace closures during licensing and launch and reentry operations. GAO reviewed statutes, regulations, FAA guidance, and documentation from environmental reviews associated with each domestic commercial space vehicle launch and reentry license as of July 2023. GAO also interviewed FAA officials and commercial space stakeholders, including the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Department of Defense, and five associations representing the aviation and commercial space industries. For more information, contact Heather Krause at (202) 512-2834 or KrauseH@gao.gov. Tue, 28 May 2024 08:28:02 -0400 /products/gao-24-106193 Letter Report https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-107488 What GAO Found The U.S. Coast Guard manages its major shipbuilding programs—generally those with cost estimates of $1 billion or greater—using the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) acquisition framework. GAO's prior work found that the Coast Guard continues to face challenges in its highest priority shipbuilding acquisition programs—the Offshore Patrol Cutter and the Polar Security Cutter. Design instability. The shipbuilders have yet to stabilize their designs, which has contributed to schedule delays and cost growth for both programs. For example, the Offshore Patrol Cutter program began ship construction without a matured critical technology, which led to redesign of portions of the ship and contributed to delays of the lead ship by almost 4 years. GAO recommended in June 2023 that the program mature this same critical technology before moving forward through design on the next set of ships. DHS did not concur. GAO closed this recommendation in April 2024 after the Coast Guard approved a design review without maturing the critical technology. However, GAO stands by the intent of the recommendation to minimize risk to the program. Program oversight. Both programs lack key milestones in their acquisition program baselines—a document that sets the program's cost, schedule, and performance goals—to ensure adequate program oversight and accountability. For example, the Coast Guard did not include the delivery date of the last Polar Security Cutter in its acquisition program baseline. If included as a key event, failure to meet this date would trigger a formal assessment by DHS. In July 2023, GAO recommended that DHS and the Coast Guard include this delivery date in the acquisition program baseline, and the department concurred. Coast Guard officials told GAO they plan to include ship delivery dates in its revised baseline. The Coast Guard's Offshore Patrol Cutter and Polar Security Cutter In May 2024, GAO identified leading practices in ship design, such as using iterative design to accelerate design maturity and employing robust in-house ship design capabilities and tools. These practices build on previous leading practices that GAO identified in product development and shipbuilding. Over the past decade, GAO has recommended numerous actions to the Coast Guard and DHS reflecting those practices—such as attaining design stability and developing solid business cases—to achieve successful shipbuilding outcomes. Why GAO Did This Study The Coast Guard, a component of DHS, employs a variety of ships that conduct many missions, including drug interdiction, migrant interdiction, search and rescue, and ice operations. The Coast Guard plans to invest billions of dollars in two of its highest priority programs—acquiring three heavy icebreakers, known as Polar Security Cutters, and a fleet of 25 Offshore Patrol Cutters, to replace its older ships. This statement addresses (1) how the Coast Guard acquires and oversees its shipbuilding programs, including its highest priority ones, (2) the primary challenges the Coast Guard has faced in acquiring and overseeing its highest priority shipbuilding programs and the resulting outcomes, and (3) recent GAO work on leading practices for acquiring new ships. This statement is based on information from GAO-24-106573, GAO-23-105805, GAO-23-105949, and GAO-24-105503 , among other work. Information about the scope and methodology of prior work on which this statement is based can be found in those products. Tue, 07 May 2024 10:18:46 -0400 /products/gao-24-107488 Letter Report https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106828 What GAO Found The National Mediation Board (NMB), which facilitates labor relations for railroads and airlines, has implemented two of GAO's four remaining recommendations from past reports. Specifically, NMB has updated its privacy policy and developed a process to track issues raised by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) Inspector General's (IG) office, which operates a hotline on NMB's behalf. However, NMB has not yet fully implemented the other two recommendations. NMB has not updated its continuity of operations plan, a key component of an information security program. The agency also continues to use two cloud services that are not federally approved. By not fully implementing these recommendations, NMB is increasingly vulnerable to information security risks to its data and systems. Status of GAO Recommendations to the National Mediation Board In addition, NMB faces challenges related to its workforce planning, training, and personnel policies. NMB has no procedures for regularly reviewing and updating its workforce and succession plan. NMB has had difficulty filling its many vacant positions, and more than half of NMB's current staff are eligible for retirement within the next 5 years. NMB has initiated efforts to update the plan, but without procedures for keeping it up to date, NMB will not be positioned to effectively manage its workforce needs. NMB lacks procedures for regularly updating its training policy. Moreover, some officials have been assigned essential duties outside of their primary expertise but received little training related to these roles. Without procedures to keep NMB's training policy up to date, and sufficient training for officials with essential additional roles, NMB cannot ensure all officials have the knowledge and skills required to meet the agency's mission. NMB also lacks procedures for ensuring its personnel policies are complete and updated. Without such procedures, NMB risks operating without needed policies or being out of compliance with federal regulations. Why GAO Did This Study NMB was created by a 1934 amendment to the Railway Labor Act. It plays a critical role in helping airline and railway carriers resolve labor disputes to avoid work stoppages and prevent disruptions to interstate commerce. The FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 includes a provision for GAO to evaluate NMB programs and activities every 2 years. Between 2013 and 2022, GAO issued five reports that included a total of 18 recommendations. As of the start of this review in May 2023, NMB had implemented 14 of those recommendations. This sixth report examines (1) the extent to which NMB has taken actions to implement the four remaining recommendations from GAO's prior reports; and (2) any other challenges NMB faces in key management areas and in overseeing its operations. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws and regulations and examined NMB documents, plans, policies, and practices. GAO also interviewed officials from NMB, an NMB advisory group, the NLRB IG, and NMB's independent financial auditor. Fri, 26 Apr 2024 08:13:11 -0400 /products/gao-24-106828 Letter Report https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106368 What GAO Found The COVID-19 pandemic disrupted the maritime shipping industry, causing congested ports, high demand for cargo space on ships, and volatile shipping rates. Selected shippers of hazardous materials (hazmat), which include chemicals and other types of cargo critical to the U.S. economy, told GAO they were particularly affected during the peak of the pandemic (2020 through 2022). All six hazmat shippers GAO interviewed said they had difficulty securing space on ships, and five said they experienced long delays. Shippers attributed these challenges to safety risks and additional requirements associated with hazmat, which made it less desirable for carriers to accommodate on their ships. GAO found that while hazmat imports and exports increased from 2018 through 2020, hazmat imports stagnated and exports decreased from 2020 through 2022. Hazmat imports increased almost 32 percent from 2018 through 2020, but grew less than 1 percent afterward. Hazmat exports increased 19 percent from 2018 through 2020 and declined by 7 percent afterward. Conversely, non-hazmat imports and exports grew at a higher rate during the pandemic, which carriers attributed to non-hazmat shippers paying higher shipping rates. Hazardous Materials Imports and Exports Transported on Cargo Ships in Twenty-Foot Equivalent Units, 2018–2022 The Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) is responsible for ensuring a competitive and reliable ocean transportation system for all U.S. shippers. Its oversight efforts include receiving complaints from shippers about carriers. FMC can use this information to respond to shippers' concerns and initiate investigations of carriers. However, GAO found several shortcomings in how FMC collects, manages, and uses complaint data: (1) FMC does not consistently capture certain details—such as type of cargo, whether cargo is hazmat, and incident location—which limits FMC's ability to analyze complaint trends; and (2) key FMC procedures for managing the data are out of date and incomplete. GAO also found that while FMC plans to modernize how it collects, manages, and uses information from complaints, it lacks a strategy to guide these efforts. Such a strategy could include key information on planned updates, such as goals, required investments, and expected outcomes. Taking steps to address these shortcomings and developing a data strategy could help FMC more effectively use data to oversee the maritime shipping industry. Why GAO Did This Study The maritime shipping industry is vital to the global economy and accounted for $2.3 trillion in U.S. trade in 2022. FMC is responsible for overseeing this industry, including protecting U.S. shippers from unfair or unjustly discriminatory practices related to securing vessel space. The Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 2022 includes a provision for GAO to examine whether carriers disadvantaged shippers of hazmat during the pandemic through the systemic and unreasonable denial of vessel space or other means. This report examines, among other things: (1) shippers' experiences transporting hazmat during the pandemic; (2) how the amount of hazmat imports and exports changed from 2018 through 2022 (the most recent data available at the time of GAO's review); and (3) actions FMC has taken to collect, manage, and use its complaint data. For these objectives, GAO reviewed pertinent FMC regulations and policies; analyzed trade data; visited two ports; and interviewed FMC officials as well as representatives of six shippers and five carriers. GAO selected these shippers and carriers based on a review of recent FMC rulemakings and on stakeholders' recommendations. Tue, 23 Apr 2024 08:47:03 -0400 /products/gao-24-106368 Letter Report https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-107264 DOT administers billions of dollars in discretionary grants to improve transportation in the United States. To help ensure that DOT awards these grants to projects that best support needed improvements, the agency should implement our recommendations to enhance the clarity and transparency of its award processes. The Big Picture The nation's surface transportation system that moves both people and freight is aging and faces increasing demands on its use. Due to its potential impacts on public safety and economic growth, funding the nation's surface transportation system has been on GAO's High Risk list since 2007. The cost of repairing and upgrading the system continues to exceed the revenues available for improvements. As such, we have highlighted the importance of spending surface transportation funding wisely and efficiently. This is particularly true for the Department of Transportation (DOT), which provides funding to states and other eligible entities. DOT awards some of this funding through competitive (discretionary) grants. Typical DOT Discretionary Grant Application and Review Process The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) provided about $540 billion in funding for surface transportation for fiscal years 2022 through 2026. According to DOT, this included over $110 billion for DOT discretionary grant programs. We have recently reported on four of these programs. They received, in total, $24.5 billion in IIJA funding for fiscal years 2022 through 2026. These programs are: Rebuilding American Infrastructure with Sustainability and Equity (RAISE) ($7.5 billion), Infrastructure for Rebuilding America (INFRA) ($8 billion), Reconnecting Communities and Neighborhoods ($1 billion), and Capital Investment Grants (CIG) ($8 billion).  What GAO's Work Shows We reported that in fiscal year 2022 (the first year of IIJA funding), DOT awarded about $3.75 billion through the RAISE and INFRA programs. Award Totals for RAISE and INFRA Programs, by State and Territory, Fiscal Year 2022 Note: The total award amount shown on this map is about $3.75 billion. For fiscal year 2022, the INFRA program received funding from the IIJA and the RAISE program received funding from the IIJA and the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022. The map includes awards to all recipients within a state. As of April 2024, DOT announced an additional $5.2 billion (rounded to the nearest ten million) in awards in the next funding rounds for these two programs. $2.3 billion in awards for 162 projects throughthe RAISE program for fiscal year 2023. $2.9 billion in awards for 28 projects throughthe INFRA program for fiscal years 2023 and 2024. In work issued both before and after the passage of the IIJA, we found that DOT’s administration of discretionary grant programs did not always align with requirements set by the Office of Management and Budget and DOT, respectively, raising concerns over their consistency and transparency. For example: Inconsistent documentation. We found that while DOT generally followed the processes outlined in the notice of funding opportunity (NOFO) and its own internal guidance when evaluating INFRA applications, DOT did not consistently provide complete and accurate documentation on its evaluation process. This documentation would better ensure DOT’s consistent implementation of its policies as designed. Insufficient transparency. We found that DOT’s process for evaluating RAISE applications did not fully align with federal regulations and DOT guidance for ensuring the fairness and transparency of discretionary grant programs. For example, DOT did not publicly disclose two selection factors used to make award decisions in its NOFO. In addition, the Federal Transit Administration (FTA), which administers the CIG program, did not always provide project sponsors with clear information on its methods or the factors it considered when reviewing projects. Challenges and Opportunities From July 2020 through January 2024, we made 17 recommendations to improve the management of these four programs. As of February 2024, 16 of these recommendations remain open or partially open. Open recommendations include that: DOT identify all selection factors in its RAISE NOFO and document its specific rationale for not selecting certain projects; DOT establish quality control procedures to verify that its documentation is complete and clearly define its “exemplary project” criteria for advancing INFRA applications for potential selection; DOT establish performance measures for, and evaluate the results of, its Reconnecting Communities Pilot program; and FTA take steps to clarify the methods it uses and factors it considers when reviewing projects for CIG grants, and to communicate information to sponsors in a timely manner. Additionally, in 2016 we recommended that DOT issue department-wide requirements for discretionary grant programs. We made this recommendation based on finding similar documentation and transparency challenges in the administration of discretionary grant programs DOT awarded to improve the resilience of transit systems following Hurricane Sandy. We recommended requirements to document key decisions and to develop a plan for evaluating project proposals, including how the process will ensure a consistent review of applications. We subsequently designated this as a priority recommendation. In February 2024, DOT officials said that they are targeting the end of the calendar year to implement the recommendation. For more information, contact: Elizabeth Repko, RepkoE@gao.gov, (202) 512-2834. Wed, 17 Apr 2024 12:55:55 -0400 /products/gao-24-107264 Letter Report https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-107195 What GAO Found Tactical and airport response plans and a federal interagency agreement describe the roles for responding to errant or malicious drone operations near airports. As described in these plans, local law enforcement authorities are expected to be the first to respond to a drone sighting. The federal government can assist in responding to an incident at an airport as outlined in the federal interagency agreement. The Departments of Homeland Security (DHS), Justice (DOJ), Defense, and Energy have express statutory authority to use counter-drone technologies if certain statutory criteria are met. They also have federal statutory exemptions from specified federal criminal laws that are potentially applicable to the use of such technologies. These technologies can be used at an airport by DHS and DOJ if the drone poses, for example, a credible threat to safety or security and the DHS Secretary or the Attorney General designates the airport for an emergency response. GAO concluded that modifications to statutory authorities for drone detection and counter-drone operations could better protect airports against an active drone threat. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is testing drone detection and counter-drone technologies and is required to develop a plan for their use at airports. FAA is also pursuing several efforts to allow increased and routine drone operations. In various documents, FAA acknowledges the effects counter-drone technologies may have on other integration efforts but does not address how it will assess those effects. Including steps for this assessment in the agency's forthcoming drone integration strategy could help ensure that such technologies will work in harmony with FAA's other efforts, such as developing a drone traffic management system and rules for operating drones beyond operators' visual line of sight. Unauthorized Drone Flights Near Airports Present Safety and Security Threats This is a public version of a sensitive report that was issued in October 2023 and omits some information that DHS deemed sensitive. In some cases, the omitted information was, in part, the basis for GAO conclusions presented in this report. Why GAO Did This Study In recent years, FAA has reported a significant number of drone sightings at or near airports. FAA prohibits drone operations that interfere with airport operations. Whether errant or malicious, unauthorized drone flights around airports present safety and security threats and can result in flight delays. GAO was asked to review drone detection and mitigation issues at airports. This report examines (1) federal and local roles for responding to a drone incident at an airport, (2) federal legal authorities related to using drone detection and counter-drone technology at airports, and (3) FAA actions to plan for using the technology at airports and its effects on drone integration efforts. GAO reviewed relevant federal statutes, regulations, agency documents, and reports. GAO interviewed FAA and DHS, and 18 aviation, law enforcement, and other entities to obtain a range of perspectives. GAO also reviewed FAA planning documents to determine how counter-drone technologies were incorporated into FAA's drone integration efforts. Wed, 17 Apr 2024 09:43:22 -0400 /products/gao-24-107195 Letter Report https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-107495 What GAO Found To register civil aircraft with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), applicants can provide opaque information on beneficial owners—persons who ultimately own and control the aircraft—resulting in criminal and national security risks through aircraft registry fraud and abuse. Additionally, FAA generally relies on self-certification of registrants' eligibility and does not verify key information. In a March 2020 report, GAO identified several ways that beneficial ownership in aircraft registrations could be hidden. Specifically, beneficial ownership could be hidden usin opaque ownership structures, such as shell companies and noncitizen trusts, which are aircraft trusts registered to U.S.-citizen owner trustees with noncitizen trustors; intermediaries, which are individuals and entities that facilitate aircraft registration for a fee; addresses of registered agents, which are individuals or entities authorized to accept important legal and tax documents on behalf of a business; and nominees, which are individuals or entities listed as the owners but in fact acting on behalf of beneficial owners. The following example illustrates the use of such approaches to obscure the beneficial owner of an aircraft involved in a Malaysian money laundering case. The aircraft, among other assets, was ultimately forfeited to the U.S. government. Example of Aircraft Registration Using Opaque Ownership Structures and Multiple Intermediaries and Jurisdictions FAA took steps to mitigate registry fraud and abuse by implementing three GAO recommendations. Specifically, FAA assessed its fraud and abuse risks; determined the impact and likelihood of those risks and established its risk tolerance; and developed an antifraud strategy. However, 12 recommendations remain open, including key recommendations related to collecting data on individuals and entities to verify identity and eligibility. Without further action by FAA, the aircraft registry remains vulnerable to continued fraud and abuse. Why GAO Did This Study The U.S. aircraft registry, managed by FAA, maintains information on civil aircraft to facilitate aviation safety, security, and commerce. FAA issues aircraft registrations to individuals and entities that meet eligibility requirements, such as U.S. citizenship or permanent legal residence. Registry fraud and abuse hinders national security and criminal investigations when law-enforcement officials try to identify aircraft and their owners who might be involved in illicit operations. This testimony discusses (1) how beneficial ownership information can be obscured in aircraft registrations and (2) FAA efforts to implement GAO recommendations to mitigate registry fraud and abuse. This testimony is based primarily on GAO's March 2020 report on FAA's efforts to prevent, detect, and respond to fraud and abuse risks in aircraft registrations (GAO-20-164). For that report, GAO reviewed relevant laws, regulations, and FAA policies; reviewed reports, press releases, and court cases that illustrated risks associated with the registry; analyzed aircraft registry data from fiscal years 2010 through 2018 to identify registrations with risk indicators; and interviewed FAA and federal law enforcement officials. Tue, 09 Apr 2024 14:07:43 -0400 /products/gao-24-107495 Letter Report https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106633 What GAO Found Right-to-repair is the ability of consumers to decide who repairs their products. For vehicles, this means consumers deciding whether to make their own repairs or take their vehicle to repair facilities at independent repair shops or dealerships franchised with automakers. Most automakers have been operating under a 2014 voluntary nationwide right-to-repair agreement. This agreement has generally resulted in independent repair shops not associated with vehicle manufacturers having access to the information, data, and tools needed for vehicle repairs. However, stakeholders GAO interviewed and a nongeneralizable review of complaints suggest that independent repair shops may face some limitations in that access. Advanced vehicle technologies, such as electric vehicles, may make repairs more expensive and complex because they require additional knowledge, equipment, and other investments. Such issues could particularly affect some independent repair shops, that are unable to make such commitments. In addition, according to some independent repair stakeholders GAO interviewed, the use of telematics systems to wirelessly transfer data between vehicles and automakers could give dealerships a competitive advantage over independent repair shops in conducting some repairs. However, industry and independent repair stakeholders GAO interviewed agreed that telematics data are not currently needed to conduct repairs. The Department of Transportation's National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is focused on vehicle safety and its role in vehicle right-to-repair issues is limited to cybersecurity issues that could affect vehicle safety. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is involved in protecting consumers and promoting competition, including in the vehicle repair market. FTC is taking steps to better understand potential vehicle repair limitations by considering new ways to categorize and analyze potentially relevant consumer complaints. If independent repair shops face limitations in access to the information, data, and tools needed for repair or are otherwise disadvantaged compared to dealerships, consumers may have fewer repair choices, which may reduce competition and make repairs more expensive and inconvenient. Why GAO Did This Study GAO was asked to review the effects of changing vehicle technologies on vehicle right-to-repair. This report examines how changes in vehicle technologies are affecting competition and consumer choice in the vehicle repair market and NHTSA's and FTC's actions related to this issue. To conduct this work, GAO conducted a literature search and reviewed relevant publications, conducted a non-generalizable review of vehicle and vehicle repair complaints, and interviewed over 50 industry and consumer-focused stakeholders, including vehicle manufacturers, independent repair shops, and others. For more information, contact Elizabeth Repko at (202) 512-2834 or repkoe@gao.gov. Thu, 21 Mar 2024 08:36:20 -0400 /products/gao-24-106633 Letter Report https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106216 What GAO Found All states and the District of Columbia (states) have “Move Over or Slow Down” (Move Over) laws, which generally require drivers to change lanes, slow down, or both when approaching certain vehicles stopped on the roadside with their warning lights activated. These laws can protect vulnerable roadside workers. Move Over law requirements vary, such as in the specific actions required of drivers, potential penalties for a violation, and types of vehicles covered. All states have laws covering first responder vehicles, such as police cars, fire trucks, and ambulances. Move Over laws in all states also cover certain other types of vehicles, which may include highway construction, utility, trash, or disabled vehicles. There is no federal Move Over law. States have promoted their Move Over laws in various ways, including through road signs and social media; targeted law enforcement; and annual public awareness events. When planning these efforts, states consider factors such as available resources and staff expertise. Example of Move Over or Slow Down Road Sign Within the Department of Transportation (DOT), the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) supports states' efforts to promote Move Over laws through funding, research, and public awareness materials (e.g., sample social media posts, press releases, graphics, banners, and videos). However, NHTSA's public awareness materials generally focus on first responders and do not fully reflect states' Move Over laws, all of which now cover a wider range of vehicles. Officials GAO interviewed from two of the seven selected states said they use NHTSA's materials. State officials also described having limited resources and expertise to develop such materials themselves. Updating NHTSA's materials to more fully reflect the types of vehicles covered by states' laws, such as highway construction, utility, trash, and disabled vehicles, would enable NHTSA to help states better promote their Move Over laws and could ultimately improve safety for all motorists on the side of the road. Why GAO Did This Study First responders, highway construction workers, and others risk being killed or injured when working on the side of the road. Reducing transportation-related fatalities and injuries is one of DOT's top priorities. NHTSA plays a key role in working toward that priority, including by supporting states' efforts to promote their Move Over laws. The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act includes a provision for GAO to review issues related to states' Move Over laws. This report (1) identifies the key characteristics of states' Move Over laws, (2) describes how states have promoted these laws, and (3) assesses the extent to which DOT has supported states' efforts to promote these laws. GAO reviewed Move Over laws and certain related legal provisions for all states, as well as online information about states' promotion efforts. GAO compared DOT's public awareness materials related to Move Over laws with DOT strategic plans and federal internal control standards. GAO also interviewed officials in seven states selected for specific characteristics of their Move Over laws, as well as DOT officials and stakeholders from law enforcement, trash and recycling, and other associations. Thu, 04 Apr 2024 09:03:18 -0400 /products/gao-24-106216 Letter Report https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106690 What GAO Found The Department of Transportation's Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) sets the federal minimum safety standards for all gas transmission pipelines, including regulations for the risk-based integrity management program. Under integrity management regulations, pipeline operators must establish programs to assess, identify, and mitigate risks to pipelines in "high consequence areas," which may include areas with homes or schools, and other highly populated areas. Operators can use two methods to identify high consequence areas. One of these methods calculates the potential impact radius of a pipeline incident. PHMSA officials told GAO the agency is considering regulatory changes to improve the accuracy of this method. However, GAO's analysis found that PHMSA lacks complete information from actual pipeline incidents that would help it determine if this method is accurate. Determining what additional data are needed from operators could improve the quality of PHMSA's data on pipeline incidents and assist the agency in evaluating the method's accuracy over time. More broadly, PHMSA issued two final rules in October 2019 and August 2022 that strengthened gas transmission pipeline safety regulations. Among other changes, these rules require operators to assess additional pipeline mileage and improve pipeline characteristic data on their pipeline systems. PHMSA has largely implemented the 2019 final rule by providing training to federal and state pipeline inspectors and guidance to the pipeline industry, among other activities. In addition, PHMSA established Final Rule Implementation web pages to improve access to related resources. Selected stakeholders GAO spoke with—including representatives from selected pipeline industry and safety groups, state regulatory officials, and gas transmission pipeline operators—identified key changes in the final rules that they expect will improve pipeline safety. However, stakeholders also told GAO they experienced challenges with PHMSA's implementation of the 2019 final rule, including the timeliness and clarity of related guidance. PHMSA officials said they are in the process of implementing the 2022 final rule, and the effort is being led by the agency's new rule implementation division. PHMSA officials told GAO the agency does not have or intend to develop an implementation plan to guide its efforts. Instead, officials have completed several activities related to the 2022 final rule and created a task list of the remaining activities; however, GAO found that the document does not contain clear objectives, timelines, or communication strategies for these activities. By creating a plan for the remaining activities, PHMSA could better ensure that officials complete these activities in a timely manner and provide relevant information to the appropriate audiences. In addition, GAO found that PHMSA's Final Rule Implementation web pages do not include complete information and guidance for both rules. With updated web pages, operators and inspectors may find information about the 2019 and 2022 final rules more accessible. Why GAO Did This Study About 300,000 miles of gas transmission pipelines across the United States carry products from processing facilities to communities and other large-volume customers. Pipelines are a relatively safe mode for transporting natural gas and other commodities, but incidents can still occur. The Protecting our Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing Safety Act of 2016 includes a provision for GAO to examine issues related to gas transmission integrity management programs and other pipeline safety topics following completion of a specific pipeline safety rulemaking by PHMSA. This report includes information on potential changes to the methods operators use to identify high consequence areas; how selected stakeholders, including pipeline operators and state inspectors, view the regulatory changes to gas transmission pipeline safety; and how PHMSA is overseeing the implementation of final rules completing this rulemaking. Wed, 03 Apr 2024 09:02:45 -0400 /products/gao-24-106690 Letter Report https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106255 What GAO Found New vehicles are increasingly equipped with driver assistance technologies designed to prevent or mitigate crashes (crash avoidance technologies) and support the driving task (driver support systems). According to interviewed stakeholders and research GAO reviewed, when drivers have a realistic understanding of their vehicles' driver assistance technologies, they are more likely to use them as intended. There is some evidence, however, that consumers do not always have an accurate understanding of technologies' capabilities and limitations. One study found that between 27 and 79 percent of consumers surveyed had misperceptions about the limitations of different crash avoidance technologies in their vehicles. In addition, misuse is a safety concern particular to partial driving automation systems, a type of driver support system, which can take over some of the driving tasks in a vehicle but still requires the full attention of the driver. Vehicle Dashboard Displays Driver Assistance Technology Activation Within the Department of Transportation, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) provides consumers with information on crash avoidance technologies through its New Car Assessment Program (NCAP), additional information on its website, and other means. NHTSA uses checkmarks to indicate whether vehicles come equipped with the four crash avoidance technologies that it recommends and that meet NHTSA's performance criteria. In 2022, NHTSA published a draft roadmap with plans to upgrade NCAP, including recommending four more crash avoidance technologies and developing a rating system for them. These upgrades would provide more comprehensive and comparative information to consumers. However, NHTSA has not finalized its roadmap and has missed time frames even though work on these upgrades started years ago. Developing realistic time frames and publicly communicating its progress could help NHTSA provide consumers with more meaningful information. Aside from NCAP, NHTSA provides consumers with a description on partial driving automation systems, but there is little information about their intended use and operational limitations. Providing this information could assist consumers in developing a more accurate understanding of these systems. Why GAO Did This Study According to NHTSA, almost 42,800 people died in vehicle crashes in 2022. New vehicles are increasingly equipped with driver assistance technologies that could help reduce crashes and fatalities. NHTSA administers NCAP to educate consumers about vehicle safety, including driver assistance technologies, and to assist in consumers' purchasing decisions. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022, included a provision for GAO to review consumer education about driver assistance technologies. Among the issues this report examines are (1) consumers' use and understanding of driver assistance technologies; and (2) the extent to which NHTSA contributes to consumers' understanding and using the technologies as intended. GAO reviewed NHTSA's relevant rulemaking documents, website, and studies; analyzed a nongeneralizable sample of NHTSA consumer complaint data; and interviewed NHTSA and other relevant agency officials and a range of industry stakeholders, including automakers and safety organizations. GAO assessed NHTSA's efforts against key project schedule management practices. Thu, 28 Mar 2024 09:22:13 -0400 /products/gao-24-106255 Letter Report https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-107383 What GAO Found The United States Postal Service's (USPS) international mail volume declined from about 1 billion pieces in fiscal year 2017 to about 355 million pieces in fiscal year 2022 (see figure). USPS officials stated that the drop was caused primarily by the implementation of substantially higher rates in 2020. These rates are called “self-declared” rates because the U.S. and other countries were allowed to set their own rates for certain inbound international mail items. USPS's inbound volume subject to self-declared rates fell substantially from fiscal year 2017 to fiscal year 2022. USPS's revenue from international mail also declined over this period but still covered or exceeded its costs. U.S. Postal Service's (USPS) Inbound, Outbound, and Total International Mail Volume, Fiscal Years 2017-2022 All domestic stakeholders GAO interviewed cited at least one of the following factors as contributing to the decline in USPS's international mail business since 2017. International mail rates increased. COVID-19 restricted options to get mail in and out of the U.S. New customs laws increased costs for sending international mail. Several stakeholders GAO interviewed said increases in international mail rates likely benefited some businesses and hindered others. They said that express companies, such as FedEx and UPS, may have become more competitive as USPS and other national postal carriers raised their prices for their international mail products. USPS's increases were passed along to U.S. businesses that send mail out of the U.S., making them less competitive. These increases may have been passed on to U.S. consumers. However, stakeholders noted that the effect on consumers is difficult to estimate as mailing rates are not transparent to the consumer and are only one input to the cost of the item. Why GAO Did This Study USPS provides postal services to and from other countries through the Universal Postal Union, a specialized agency of the United Nations. This agency established a system for international mailing rates that reimburse postal operators for delivering international mail in their countries. In 2017, GAO reported that USPS lost money on delivering international mail from other countries because mailing rates on small packages did not cover USPS's costs. GAO was asked to review the effects of increased international mail rates on USPS's international mail business. This report describes: (1) how USPS's international mail business has changed in the past 6 years; (2) what factors domestic stakeholders identified that contributed to those changes; and (3) effects those stakeholders identified from increased international mail rates. GAO analyzed USPS data from fiscal years 2017 through 2022 and reviewed reports on international mail from USPS, the Universal Postal Union, and others. GAO visited two USPS mail processing facilities and interviewed USPS officials and 12 industry stakeholders. These stakeholders were selected to represent a range of views, including express companies, U.S. companies that send international mail, U.S. companies that compete with foreign firms that use international mail, and independent experts on international mail. While not generalizable, the interviews provide illustrative examples of stakeholders' views. This is a public version of a sensitive report that was issued in February 2024. Information that USPS deemed sensitive has been omitted. For more information, contact David Marroni at (202) 512-2834 or marronid@gao.gov. Thu, 28 Mar 2024 09:18:29 -0400 /products/gao-24-107383 Letter Report https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106498 What GAO Found Automation technology at ports reduces human involvement in processing and handling cargo. All of the 10 largest U.S. container ports have adopted automation technology to varying degrees. At least one terminal at each of these ports uses process automation technology to optimize, track, or communicate container movements (e.g., automated gate systems). Four also use automated cargo handling equipment to load, unload, and move containers. Selected foreign ports generally adopted more automation technologies than U.S. ports due to factors such as larger container volumes and variations in labor availability. Automated Cargo Handling Equipment at TraPac Los Angeles Terminal U.S. and international port stakeholders agreed that automation technologies can improve worker safety by separating humans from machines and can reduce emissions by improving efficiency. However, they reported mixed effects on the workforce, security, and performance. For example, a few terminal operators said automated equipment could stack containers more densely than conventional equipment, increasing capacity; others said this equipment moved containers more slowly than conventional equipment, reducing performance. Similarly, a few stakeholders said automation can reduce jobs; others said automation can create more comfortable work environments and new, higher-skilled positions. Officials from U.S. ports and terminal operators said operators consider factors such as labor, costs, priorities, and operations when deciding whether to automate. The relative importance of these factors varies based on the unique circumstances of each port and terminal. The Department of Transportation, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Federal Maritime Commission conduct some activities that are related to port automation, though few of these activities are explicitly focused on port automation. For instance, GAO identified eight discretionary grant programs which do not explicitly support port automation, but which ports could use to acquire certain automation technologies. Why GAO Did This Study U.S. ports' ability to efficiently move containers into and out of terminals is crucial for the U.S. economy. In 2020, coastal ports handled cargo that accounted for nearly half of U.S. trade. Faced with increased container volumes and supply chain challenges, some ports in the U.S. and abroad have adopted automation technologies to improve performance and increase capacity. The Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 2022 included a provision for GAO to describe the adoption of technologies at U.S. ports as compared to foreign ports. This report describes: (1) the adoption of automation technologies by selected U.S. container ports and similarities to technologies adopted by selected foreign container ports; (2) the reported effects of port automation technologies; (3) how U.S. terminal operators consider these effects and other factors when deciding whether to adopt automation technologies; and (4) federal activities related to the development or adoption of port automation technologies. GAO analyzed information from equipment manufacturers, ports, and terminal operators. These ports included the 10 largest U.S. container ports by volume and 10 foreign ports selected for factors such as volume and location. GAO visited U.S. and foreign ports and interviewed port and terminal operator officials at these ports, as well as nine other industry stakeholders, including two labor unions. GAO also reviewed federal documents and interviewed officials from six federal entities. For more information, contact Andrew Von Ah at (202) 512-2834 or VonAha@gao.gov. Tue, 19 Mar 2024 08:44:20 -0400 /products/gao-24-106498 Letter Report https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106754 What GAO Found A key lesson from GAO's prior work is that greater federal leadership could benefit both aviation pandemic preparedness and disease mitigation research . The Department of Transportation (DOT) has not developed a national aviation preparedness plan for communicable disease outbreaks as GAO recommended in 2015. Such a plan is needed to avoid the piecemeal response seen early in the COVID-19 pandemic. Stakeholders GAO spoke to in 2020 and 2021 said confidence in air travel could have been restored more quickly with greater federal coordination. At GAO's urging, Congress passed legislation in December 2022 requiring DOT to develop the plan. In July 2022, GAO reported that federal leadership was needed to advance research on disease transmission in air travel, including real-world situations and the effectiveness of mitigation efforts. GAO recommended Congress direct the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to develop a research strategy, which Congress had not done as of March 2024. DOT and FAA officials stated in 2023 and 2024 that they have actions underway to develop the preparedness plan and identify needed research. By implementing GAO's recommendations, DOT and other aviation stakeholders would be better positioned to address a communicable disease threat while minimizing unnecessary aviation disruptions which were significant in the case of COVID-19. Key lessons from GAO's work on four COVID-19 aviation financial assistance programs— the Department of the Treasury's Payroll Support Program (PSP) and CARES Act loan program and DOT's Airport Grants and Aviation Manufacturing Jobs Protection Program—include the following. Financial and other safeguards, when developed before distributing assistance, can help agencies minimize risks associated with emergency funding. DOT and Treasury quickly awarded funds but did not always have safeguards in place in a timely manner. For instance, Treasury did not quickly implement a monitoring plan for PSP. Multiple programs or paths within a program may better accommodate businesses of varying types and sizes. Businesses eligible for the PSP and loan programs ranged from large airlines to ticket agents with a handful of employees. Large airlines viewed the programs favorably, but small businesses reported challenges accessing funds. Clear communication with eligible entities is important for new or expanded funding programs. Some program applicants reported confusion—e.g., small businesses new to applying for federal funding—regarding issues such as eligibility requirements and expected funding time frames. Workforce retention requirements were a part of all four programs, but airlines still struggled with sufficient staffing to handle air traffic when it recovered. The aviation industry credited the funding programs, especially the PSP, in providing critical support. But factors such as early retirements and pauses on employee training also affected airline workforce levels. Why GAO Did This Study The COVID-19 pandemic resulted in catastrophic loss of life and profoundly affected the aviation industry. In April 2020, U.S. commercial airline traffic fell to 3 million passengers, a 96 percent decrease from April 2019. The federal government responded in many ways, including by providing $132 billion in financial assistance to airlines, aviation and other businesses, and airports. GAO was asked to identify lessons from COVID-19. This report examines key lessons GAO identified from the federal government's (1) preparedness and response to disease transmission in air travel and (2) financial assistance to the aviation industry. GAO reviewed its body of work on aviation and the pandemic, which includes over 20 reports, to identify relevant lessons. GAO also reviewed documents from offices of inspector general and aviation stakeholders as well as interviewed officials from DOT and Treasury. Mon, 18 Mar 2024 09:38:11 -0400 /products/gao-24-106754 Letter Report https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106287 What GAO Found The U.S. Department of Transportation's (DOT) operating administrations enter into agreements with DOT's John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center (Volpe Center) for a variety of services, including research. DOT officials told GAO that they consider multiple factors when choosing the Volpe Center to conduct research or perform other services. These factors include: Expertise. DOT officials told GAO that they consider the Volpe Center's expertise and institutional knowledge on a topic. For example, the Federal Highway Administration has leveraged the Volpe Center's technical expertise in noise reduction and air quality to create tools for state and regional officials to demonstrate reduced congestion and improved air quality. Nature of the work. DOT officials told GAO that, because the Volpe Center is a part of the agency, certain issues (e.g., inherently governmental functions) are best addressed by Volpe Center staff. For example, Volpe Center staff have long served as the primary technical resource informing the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's fuel economy standards rulemaking. Response time. DOT officials told GAO that the Volpe Center's ability to rapidly respond to agency needs is also a consideration. Volpe Center officials cited the center's recent work to help form the new Joint Office of Energy and Transportation, which involved performing technical reviews of grant applications, as an example of its ability to respond rapidly. The proportion of research funding committed to the Volpe Center compared to other entities varied across five selected DOT operating administrations in fiscal year 2022 (see figure). Combined, these operating administrations committed a total of $50.5 million—13 percent of their total fiscal year 2022 research funding—to the Volpe Center. The remaining 87 percent went to other entities such as universities, businesses, and non-profit organizations. Research Funding Committed to the Volpe Center and Other Entities by Five Department of Transportation Operating Administrations, Fiscal Year 2022 DOT operating administrations manage their respective research portfolios. According to DOT officials, each operating administration's distribution of research funding is driven by its mission and role, the scope of individual projects, and the factors described above. Why GAO Did This Study DOT's research activities are critical to its mission of making the nation's transportation system safer and more efficient. In 2020, GAO found that this research may be conducted by the agency's operating administrations, nonfederal research entities, or DOT's Volpe Center. DOT established what is now the Volpe Center in 1970. Its mission is to improve the U.S. transportation system by anticipating emerging issues and advancing technical, operational, and institutional innovations for the public good. The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act includes a provision for GAO to review the surface transportation activities at the Volpe Center. This report describes (1) factors that selected DOT operating administrations consider when choosing the Volpe Center for research or other services, and (2) how much research funding selected DOT operating administrations committed to the Volpe Center compared to other entities in fiscal year 2022, among other objectives. GAO selected five DOT operating administrations for analysis that have a surface transportation-focused mission, are responsible for duties and initiatives intended to improve the safety of the traveling public, and entered into agreements with the Volpe Center in fiscal year 2022. GAO also reviewed relevant laws and DOT policies; analyzed DOT data; and interviewed officials from DOT, the Volpe Center, and the five selected operating administrations. For more information, contact Elizabeth Repko at (202) 512-2834 or repkoe@gao.gov. Thu, 14 Mar 2024 08:05:30 -0400 /products/gao-24-106287 Letter Report