Reports News from the GAO https://www.gao.gov/rss/topic Tue, 17 Sep 2024 15:02:33 -0400 GAO https://www.gao.gov/themes/custom/gao_uswds/img/gao-logo-rss.gif https://www.gao.gov/rss/topic Feed provided by GAO. https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106878 What GAO Found The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) plans to build a sustained human lunar presence and ultimately travel to Mars through a series of missions known as Artemis. For Artemis IV, the agency is developing the Gateway—the first space station planned to orbit the moon. NASA committed to launching the Gateway initial capability by December 2027 at a cost of $5.3 billion. The launch will include the first components of the Gateway—the Power and Propulsion Element (PPE) and the Habitation and Logistics Outpost (HALO). The Gateway program plans to update the analysis it used to inform its cost and schedule commitments at a fall 2024 program-level review. This will help determine the feasibility of the Artemis IV mission date. To reach lunar orbit and ensure all systems work as planned, the PPE and HALO need to launch at least 12 months before the Artemis IV mission, or 3 months earlier than Gateway's current committed date. NASA officials said the program plans to work to an accelerated, to-be-determined date that would provide more schedule flexibility. Gateway Program Launch Date Options for Artemis IV Mission The Gateway program's projects—including PPE and HALO—made varying degrees of progress over the last year. However, the PPE and HALO projects face several significant challenges. For example, their combined mass is greater than their mass target. Mass is one of many factors that the program considers in its overall design. If they cannot meet their mass target, it may affect their ability to reach the correct lunar orbit. The program has not yet documented an overall mass management plan, which would describe the program's mass reduction approach and priorities for key trade-off decisions. Documenting and communicating this plan will help to ensure that the program and its projects agree on how to address the mass challenge. NASA held two reviews in 2023 to break down high-level Artemis exploration objectives and goals into the programs, projects, or systems needed to achieve them. So far, NASA has used these reviews to assign roles to the Gateway that align to goals of the earlier Artemis missions, like returning humans to the moon. NASA plans to use upcoming reviews to make key decisions related to Mars missions, which could inform how NASA might use the Gateway in the future. Why GAO Did This Study NASA plans to return astronauts to the moon to make new scientific discoveries, generate economic benefits, and inspire a new generation. To help support crewed lunar landings, NASA plans to use the Gateway as a habitat and safe work environment for astronauts. NASA plans to first use the Gateway to house crew during the Artemis IV lunar landing mission, which NASA is planning to conduct in September 2028. NASA tracks the Gateway program's progress via cost and schedule commitments. A House Report contains a provision for GAO to continue reviewing NASA's lunar-focused programs. This report focuses on the Gateway program and its NASA-led development projects. It addresses (1) the Gateway program's plans to update the initial capability's cost and schedule analysis; (2) the extent to which the Gateway program made progress with its U.S.-led projects needed for the Artemis IV mission and is addressing project risks; and (3) NASA's process for determining how it will use the Gateway beyond Artemis IV, including for Mars missions. GAO analyzed NASA documentation and interviewed officials on the Gateway program's cost, schedule, risks, and role in the Artemis architecture. Wed, 31 Jul 2024 09:36:48 -0400 /products/gao-24-106878 Letter Report https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-107387 What GAO Found In May 2023, GAO identified nine priority recommendations for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Since then, NASA has implemented four of those recommendations by, among other things, taking actions to establish cost and schedule baselines necessary to track program performance and accurately categorizing positions in its cybersecurity workforce. As of June 2024, five priority recommendations remain open. GAO is not adding any new priority recommendations this year. These open recommendations involve the following areas: monitoring program costs and execution, ensuring cybersecurity and using federal contracting metrics. NASA's continued attention to these issues could lead to significant improvements in government operations. Why GAO Did This Study Priority open recommendations are the GAO recommendations that warrant priority attention from heads of key departments or agencies because their implementation could save large amounts of money; improve congressional and/or executive branch decision-making on major issues; eliminate mismanagement, fraud, and abuse; or ensure that programs comply with laws and funds are legally spent, among other benefits. Since 2015 GAO has sent letters to selected agencies to highlight the importance of implementing such recommendations. For more information, contact Timothy DiNapoli at (202) 512-4841 or dinapoli@gao.gov. Mon, 24 Jun 2024 09:18:31 -0400 /products/gao-24-107387 Letter Report https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106767 What GAO Found Since 2023, NASA's cumulative cost and schedule performance has improved. Cost overruns decreased from $7.6 billion in 2023 to $4.4 billion in 2024. Schedule overruns decreased from a total of 20.9 years in 2023 to 14.5 years in 2024. These decreases are primarily because two projects, the Space Launch System and Exploration Ground Systems, demonstrated their initial capability and left the portfolio. Previously, these projects accounted for $3.6 billion in cost overruns and each experienced delays of 4 years. NASA's Cumulative Development Cost Overruns by Project, 2023-2024 Note: Due to rounding, the numbers in the figure do not sum to the total cumulative cost overruns of $4.4 billion for 2024. Category 1 projects—NASA's highest priority and most costly—continue to drive NASA's cumulative cost performance. While the departure of the Space Launch System and Exploration Ground Systems from the portfolio improved cumulative performance, the remaining category 1 projects accounted for 81 percent of the portfolio's total cumulative baseline overrun in 2024. One of these category 1 projects, the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (Orion), accounted for 65 percent ($2.9 billion) of the portfolio's total cumulative baseline cost overrun. NASA's Artemis-related category 1 projects are positioned to shape the agency's cumulative cost performance in the coming years. The Artemis enterprise aims to return U.S. astronauts to the surface of the moon, establish a sustained lunar presence, and ultimately achieve human exploration of Mars. Currently, eight of the 14 category 1 major projects are Artemis-related. In December 2023, NASA set development cost baselines—estimates against which performance on a project is measured—totaling $9.6 billion for three Artemis projects: the Space Launch System Block 1B, Gateway Initial Capability, and Human Landing System Initial Capability. These three projects and Orion, which also supports the Artemis missions, now account for nearly 60 percent, or $19.2 billion, of the portfolio's $32.1 billion development costs. Because these projects' development cost baselines are so large, any overruns could have cascading effects on NASA's broader portfolio of major projects. Regardless of their category, most of the projects in development did not experience annual cost growth or schedule delays since 2023. Specifically, 11 out of the 16 major projects in development did not experience cost growth in 2024, and 13 out of the 16 reported no schedule delays this year. Below are the five projects that experienced cost growth totaling $477 million since 2023. Annual Development Cost Growth for Major NASA Projects since GAO's 2023 Assessment Note: Data are as of January 2024. This figure reflects cost increases against what was reported in GAO's May 2023 annual assessment of major projects. This figure does not include projects that reported cost underruns since GAO's last report. aThe cost estimates for the Orion and VIPER projects are under review. NASA has taken steps to improve the performance of its major projects, including those supporting the Artemis missions. In 2023, in response to statute, NASA established the Moon to Mars program office to manage the Artemis programs. It also completed several initiatives to strengthen its cost and schedule estimating capacity. NASA officials reported that they have also established a Chief Program Management Officer who works to strengthen NASA's program and project management policies and best practices in support of increasing performance and enabling long-term mission success for NASA. GAO previously made recommendations to help NASA demonstrate progress in improving portfolio performance, including for those major projects supporting the Artemis missions. GAO will continue to monitor NASA's efforts in this area. In addition to its efforts to improve portfolio performance, NASA has also taken steps to mature its critical technologies in its major projects. Of the 11 projects that reported critical technologies in 2024, the projects assessed that nine matured their technologies to technology readiness level 6 by their preliminary design review. Achieving this level involves demonstrating a representative prototype of the technology in a relevant environment. GAO's past work shows that maturing technologies prior to product development can help reduce technology-related cost increases and schedule delays. Why GAO Did This Study NASA plans to invest more than $81 billion in its portfolio of major projects (i.e., projects over $250 million). A House explanatory statement includes a provision for GAO to prepare status reports on NASA's major projects. This is GAO's 16th annual assessment. This report describes GAO's assessment of the cost and schedule performance of NASA's major projects, and NASA's assessment of the projects' technology development. GAO also assessed the status of each major project. GAO collected and analyzed data; reviewed project status reports; and interviewed officials. GAO reviewed projects in the formulation phase (which takes a project through its preliminary design), and those in the development phase (which includes building and launching the system). Thu, 20 Jun 2024 08:05:33 -0400 /products/gao-24-106767 Letter Report https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106193 What GAO Found As part of its oversight of the commercial space transportation industry, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) assesses the potential effects that launch or reentry activities would have on the environment. These environmental reviews are required by the National Environmental Policy Act and conducted before FAA issues a commercial space license. FAA policy requires these reviews to assess 14 categories, such as noise, coastal resources, and land use, for potentially significant impacts on the environment. To assess significance, FAA may conduct new reviews or reevaluate and use reviews that were previously completed for launch sites or other activities. GAO found that 19 of the 22 reviews FAA prepared for current launch and reentry license applications were based on previous environmental reviews for the original licensing effort. FAA concluded that the potential environmental impacts of these launch and reentry activities were either below significant levels or were mitigated to be below significant levels overall. For example, in one review, FAA found that emissions from fuel burn during takeoff could produce short-term air-quality impacts, but these impacts would be indistinguishable from the impacts of ongoing flight operations in the area. According to FAA officials, approving or denying a license application based on the effects on other airspace users is not within FAA's statutory authority. However, during the licensing process, FAA begins to identify and plan for these effects while still ensuring operations meet safety criteria. These planning efforts include establishing procedures for communicating closures. Also, before granting a licensed operator's request for a specific launch time, FAA estimates the impact on other airspace users by using historical air traffic data to identify affected routes and the number of affected aircraft. In addition, FAA has reported decreasing the amount of time airspace is closed by using time-based management procedures. These procedures attempt to more efficiently identify aircraft projected to enter a hazard area when space operations occur to reduce re-routing. Example of Airspace Closure for Commercial Space Launch Why GAO Did This Study Commercial space transportation enables essential activities such as digital communications, navigation, and weather forecasting. Since the first U.S.-licensed commercial space launch in 1989, the industry has expanded into a multibillion-dollar enterprise. U.S.-licensed launches and reentries have grown from 9 in 2012 to 124 in 2023. There are many benefits of commercial space transportation; however, its growth has implications for how FAA manages airspace around launches and reentries, and affects other airspace users, such as commercial airlines. Further, rocket launches emit gases and particles into the air, which can affect the environment. GAO was asked to review the factors FAA considers as part of its licensing of commercial space launch and reentry operations. This report describes how FAA: (1) conducts environmental reviews for commercial space operations and what those reviews have found, and (2) considers the impacts on airspace users of airspace closures during licensing and launch and reentry operations. GAO reviewed statutes, regulations, FAA guidance, and documentation from environmental reviews associated with each domestic commercial space vehicle launch and reentry license as of July 2023. GAO also interviewed FAA officials and commercial space stakeholders, including the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Department of Defense, and five associations representing the aviation and commercial space industries. For more information, contact Heather Krause at (202) 512-2834 or KrauseH@gao.gov. Tue, 28 May 2024 08:28:02 -0400 /products/gao-24-106193 Letter Report https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106624 What GAO Found Spacecraft developed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) depend on software and IT, which, in turn, rely on cybersecurity to prevent, detect, and respond to potential cyber incidents. A cyber incident could result in loss of mission data, decreased lifespan or capability of space systems, or the loss of control of space vehicles. Cyber threats and technology change rapidly. In response, the federal government issues government-wide cybersecurity guidelines, such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology's Risk Management Framework. Contracts for the selected NASA projects GAO reviewed required contractors to address cybersecurity, consistent with NASA standards. In 2019, NASA identified a set of cybersecurity requirements for spacecraft to address. For example, NASA requires spacecraft to protect positioning, navigation, and timing systems. The three spacecraft projects GAO reviewed—Gateway Power and Propulsion Element; Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle; and Spectro-Photometer for the History of the Universe, Epoch of Re-ionization and Ices Explorer—started development before 2019. Nevertheless, GAO found these contracts include requirements related to NASA's spacecraft cybersecurity standards. Contracts also required contractors to demonstrate requirements are met through testing. Since the issuance of its 2019 cybersecurity requirements, NASA has considered, but not yet implemented, updates to its spacecraft acquisition policies and standards. In 2023, NASA issued a space best practices guide containing information on cybersecurity principles and controls, threat actor capabilities, and potential mitigation strategies, among other things. However, this guidance is optional for spacecraft programs. NASA officials explained that one key reason they have not yet incorporated this guidance into required acquisition policies and standards is because of the length of time it takes to do so. GAO acknowledges that the standards-setting process can take time, but it is essential that NASA do so for practices that should be required. However, officials stated that they did not have an implementation plan and time frame to incorporate additional security controls into acquisition policies and standards. As a result, NASA risks inconsistent implementation of cybersecurity controls and lacks assurance that spacecraft have a layered and comprehensive defense against attacks. Why GAO Did This Study NASA's space development project portfolio includes 34 major projects, in which NASA plans to invest more than $83 billion. Spacecraft are operating in a heightened cyber threat environment with increased risks of attack and mission disruption. NASA has identified civil space events that demonstrate the need to better protect spacecraft against cyber threats. GAO was asked to examine the cybersecurity requirements in NASA contracts for its spacecraft projects. This report assesses the extent to which NASA (1) incorporated cybersecurity in selected spacecraft contracts and (2) determined whether additional cybersecurity updates, if any, are needed to its acquisition policies and standards for spacecraft. GAO reviewed NASA policies and standards regarding spacecraft cybersecurity. GAO selected a nongeneralizable sample of three spacecraft projects, chosen because they represent different NASA centers and development stages, and include at least one robotic and one human spaceflight project. For these three, GAO analyzed contracts and project documents. GAO also interviewed project and cybersecurity officials. Wed, 01 May 2024 08:00:17 -0400 /products/gao-24-106624 Letter Report https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106984 What GAO Found The Department of Defense (DOD) makes significant investments in space capabilities to meet the nation’s security, economic, and logistical needs. DOD’s space programs—now led by the U.S. Space Force—continue to face many development challenges, which GAO has reported on for several decades. DOD has made various changes to policies that govern its acquisitions. In one such change in January 2020, DOD reissued its foundational acquisition policy, establishing the Adaptive Acquisition Framework, which emphasizes speed and agility in the acquisition process. In response to statutory mandates, the Department of the Air Force (DAF), under which the Space Force is organized, and DOD each released a report that addressed elements to improve DOD space acquisition programs. In May 2020, the DAF transmitted its report on an alternative acquisition system for the Space Force to congressional committees. The report described nine features of the DAF’s proposed space-specific acquisition system, several of which DOD subsequently implemented. In September 2022, DOD published its final report on applying the Adaptive Acquisition Framework to space systems acquisitions and addressed eight required areas of focus. A Falcon 9 Rocket Launches a Satellite from the Space Cape Canaveral Space Force Station Collectively, the acquisition system elements addressed in the reports were aimed at improving the acquisition process for space programs and fell into three categories: acquisitions, budgeting, and requirements. Summary of Proposed Acquisition System Elements in Department of the Air Force Report and DOD Report, by Category Acquisitions Budgeting Requirements Milestone decision authority delegation Separate Space Force budget Modified joint capabilities integration and development system approach New start letter notification proposals Line-Item restructure — List of programs for alternative space acquisition pathways Codification of efficient space procurement — New space acquisition pathway — — Useable end item determination — — Space Force Head of Contracting Activity — — Legend:  — = not applicable Source: GAO analysis of Department of the Air Force and Department of Defense (DOD) information. | GAO-24-106984 GAO found that some of the elements discussed in the two reports align with GAO’s prior findings and recommendations, although the DAF and DOD are no longer pursuing other elements. For example, both reports proposed a new space acquisition pathway to help better manage space acquisition efforts. While GAO has not commented specifically on a space pathway under the Adaptive Acquisition Framework, GAO has noted challenges with developing and acquiring space systems. For instance, in GAO-21-520T, GAO noted that specific characteristics of space programs, such as the cost and complexity of space systems, can cause complications in the acquisition process and have posed challenges to DOD, including schedule delays and cost increases, among others. However, according to DOD officials, the department is no longer pursuing such a pathway because it is not needed due to changes in the way DOD is planning to acquire future space capabilities. As DOD develops the Space Force, it has the opportunity to leverage prior GAO recommendations to strengthen Space Force acquisitions. Why GAO Did This Study The DAF and DOD each produced a report on space acquisition processes. House Report 116-442 and the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 include provisions for GAO to review those reports. GAO assessed how elements included in the DAF and DOD reports align with GAO’s prior work and address identified challenges to acquiring space systems. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed and analyzed the reports and compared them to its relevant work on leading practices in acquisitions, weapon system acquisitions, and other related topics. GAO reviewed supporting documentation and interviewed DOD officials. GAO also summarized and updated work previously briefed to congressional committees in 2020 and 2021. For more information, contact Jon Ludwigson at (202) 512-4841 or ludwigsonj@gao.gov. Tue, 26 Mar 2024 09:21:43 -0400 /products/gao-24-106984 Letter Report https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106184 What GAO Found The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) oversees commercial space operations with humans onboard under its broader licensing framework. FAA requires commercial launch operators to obtain a license before conducting any operation within U.S. borders—whether they carry humans or payloads, such as satellites. To obtain a license, operators must demonstrate that they can conduct the operation without jeopardizing the safety of the people and property not involved in the operation. FAA has additional licensing requirements for operations with humans onboard, such as crew training and the ability to suppress cabin fire. These requirements are intended to address risk to the uninvolved public. FAA is currently prohibited from issuing regulations directed at protecting the safety of humans onboard, with some exceptions, due to a moratorium that Congress established in 2004 to limit certain regulatory burdens on an emerging industry. This moratorium is set to expire on March 8, 2024. Number of U.S. Commercial Space Operations, 2018 – 2023 FAA is preparing for expanded oversight of human spaceflight—if the moratorium were to expire—by working with industry to develop future regulations and building FAA's workforce capacity. For example, FAA: chartered a rulemaking committee in April 2023 to solicit industry's input on a future regulatory framework aimed at protecting the safety of humans onboard, and is leveraging the expertise of current staff and recruiting new staff to support human spaceflight safety efforts. However, FAA has ongoing hiring challenges and workforce constraints, which have affected these efforts. For example, FAA reported it did not receive an adequate candidate pool for four of the 10 human spaceflight-related positions for which it has been actively recruiting. To help address this challenge, officials said in February 2024 that they are devising a new recruitment strategy for these positions. Why GAO Did This Study The number of commercial launch and reentry operations carrying humans is a small proportion of the overall number of commercial space operations—about 10 percent in 2023—but it is growing. This growth has been driven both by space tourism and by government missions conducted by commercial launch and reentry operators. This includes transporting National Aeronautics and Space Administration astronauts to and from the International Space Station. FAA forecasts that the number of commercial operations with humans onboard will continue to increase over the next several years. GAO was asked to review issues related to FAA's oversight of commercial launch and reentry operations with humans. This report describes how FAA (1) oversees the safety of commercial operations with humans onboard, and (2) is preparing for expanded oversight of human spaceflight, which may include regulations directed at protecting the health and safety of humans onboard. GAO reviewed relevant statutes, regulations, and FAA and industry documentation. GAO interviewed FAA officials and conducted semi-structured interviews with all seven launch operators that, as of December 2022 (during GAO's review), had conducted or planned to conduct operations with humans before 2026. For more information, contact Heather Krause at (202) 512-2834 or KrauseH@gao.gov. Wed, 21 Feb 2024 09:41:01 -0500 /products/gao-24-106184 Letter Report https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-107249 What GAO Found NASA has made progress demonstrating key capabilities needed to support its Artemis missions: Artemis I, an uncrewed test flight, successfully launched in November 2022, which demonstrated the initial capability of the Space Launch System and Exploration Ground Systems. For Artemis II, the first flight with crew, NASA is currently conducting integration and testing of the crew capsule and the launch pad. NASA and its contractors continue to make progress on technologies supporting Artemis III, the first crewed lunar landing mission. For example, the human landing system contractor has conducted two test flights of its human landing system. Notional Depiction of the Human Landing System Despite this progress, NASA still faces several challenges: Ambitious schedules. In November 2023 (GAO-24-106256), GAO found that the Artemis III lunar landing was unlikely to occur in December 2025, as planned, given delays and remaining technical work. In January 2024, NASA adjusted the launch date to September 2026 to allow contractors time to complete a significant amount of remaining complex work. Artemis III mission cost. In December 2019 (GAO-20-68), GAO found that NASA did not plan to establish an official cost estimate for this mission. NASA concurred with a GAO recommendation to establish one but has not yet done so. While NASA requested $6.8 billion to support Artemis III programs in its fiscal year 2024 budget request, decision-makers have limited knowledge into the full scope of Artemis III mission costs. Acquisition management. NASA's largest, most complex projects, including those that support the Artemis missions, continue to shape the agency's portfolio. When these projects exceed their cost baselines and require cost reserves to meet their funding needs, it has a cascading effect on other projects. NASA officials are exploring ways to better manage this project cost and schedule growth. Why GAO Did This Study The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is committing billions of dollars to return humans to the lunar surface and initiate human exploration of Mars. The missions, known collectively as Artemis, involve the development and integration of multiple systems and programs. This testimony focuses on NASA's progress toward achieving the Artemis missions, as well as the challenges the agency faces in conducting them. This statement is based on past GAO reports on the Artemis enterprise and our annual assessment of NASA's major projects. Wed, 17 Jan 2024 10:05:04 -0500 /products/gao-24-107249 Letter Report https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-105561 What GAO Found Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) data show that 50 commercial space launches from 2000 through mid-January 2023 resulted in “mishaps”—the industry term for incidents such as catastrophic explosions and other failures. This represents about 12 percent of 433 launches during the period and caused no fatalities, serious injuries, or significant property damage to the public. FAA is generally the lead agency for mishap investigations, according to FAA data, while coordinating with other agencies through various arrangements. Both FAA and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) have authority to investigate FAA-licensed commercial space mishaps, and they recently signed a new agreement to aid in managing their authorities. These agencies, plus the Department of the Air Force and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, also have other collaborative mechanisms to address mishaps. When mishaps occur, FAA can conduct an investigation itself or instead authorize launch operators to lead investigations of their own mishaps under FAA oversight, according to FAA. In practice, however, FAA has authorized operator-led investigations for all mishaps where it had lead investigative authority, GAO found. Agency procedures cite individual circumstances of a mishap as the basis for authorizing an operator-led investigation. However, FAA has not developed criteria to ensure it is appropriately making such determinations. FAA has taken some steps to improve mishap investigations, such as contracting for independent reviews of some operator-led investigations. However, GAO found that FAA has not evaluated the effectiveness of its operator-reliant process. Although stakeholders generally told GAO they support FAA's investigation process, some expressed concerns whether operators can credibly investigate their own mishaps. Without a comprehensive evaluation of its mishap investigation process, FAA cannot be assured its process is effective, especially given the expansion of commercial space operations in recent years. There is currently no formal mechanism for sharing safety lessons learned, but informal channels have developed among federal agencies and the industry. Previous efforts by FAA to create a formal system were unsuccessful, but FAA officials said they are making a new attempt, including by consulting an advisory committee. NTSB has previously recommended establishing such a system. Commercial Space Launches, 2000-2022 Why GAO Did This Study The U.S. commercial space transportation industry, which provides launch and other services for government and private customers, has grown rapidly in recent years. Growth is expected to continue, as commercial space activities expand into new areas. FAA's focus, among other things, is protecting the “uninvolved public”—members of the public not involved in commercial space operations but at risk if something goes awry. GAO was asked to review safety oversight of the industry. This report examines 1) commercial space mishaps from 2000 to mid-January 2023, 2) roles and responsibilities of federal agencies in investigating commercial space transportation mishaps, 3) FAA's mishap investigation process and areas for improvement, and 4) efforts by FAA and others to share safety lessons learned. GAO examined data on commercial space flights and mishaps; examined documentation from FAA and other relevant federal agencies; and interviewed federal agency officials, executives of launch operators, and other stakeholders. Thu, 07 Dec 2023 09:35:13 -0500 /products/gao-24-105561 Letter Report https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106256 What GAO Found The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is preparing to land humans on the moon for the first time since 1972 in a mission known as Artemis III. Since GAO's September 2022 report (GAO-22-105323), NASA and its contractors have made progress, including completing several important milestones, but they still face multiple challenges with development of the human landing system and the space suits. As a result, GAO found that the Artemis III crewed lunar landing is unlikely to occur in 2025. In July 2023, NASA stated that it is reviewing the Human Landing System schedule. The current challenges that GAO identified include: An ambitious schedule: The Human Landing System program is aiming to complete its development—from project start to launch—in 79 months, which is 13 months shorter than the average for NASA major projects. The complexity of human spaceflight suggests that it is unrealistic to expect the program to complete development more than a year faster than the average for NASA major projects, the majority of which are not human spaceflight projects. GAO found that if development took as long as the average for NASA major projects, the Artemis III mission would likely occur in early 2027. Delays to key events: As of September 2023, the Human Landing System program had delayed eight of 13 key events by at least 6 months. Two of these events have been delayed to 2025—the year the lander is planned to launch. The delays were caused in part by the Orbital Flight Test, which was intended to demonstrate certain features of the launch vehicle and lander configuration in flight. The test was delayed by 7 months to April 2023. It was then terminated early when the vehicle deviated from its expected trajectory and began to tumble. Subsequent tests rely on successful completion of a second Orbital Flight Test. Notional Depiction of the Human Landing System A large volume of remaining work: SpaceX must complete a significant amount of complex technical work to support the Artemis III lunar landing mission, including developing the ability to store and transfer propellant while in orbit. A critical aspect of SpaceX's plan for landing astronauts on the moon for Artemis III is launching multiple tankers that will transfer propellant to a depot in space before transferring that propellant to the human landing system. NASA documentation states that SpaceX has made limited progress maturing the technologies needed to support this aspect of its plan. Design challenges: Axiom is leveraging many aspects of NASA's prior work to develop modernized space suits, but significant work remains to resolve design challenges. For example, NASA's original design did not provide the minimum amount of emergency life support needed for the Artemis III mission. As a result, Axiom representatives said they may redesign certain aspects of the space suit, which could delay its delivery for the mission. Illustration of Axiom's Space Suit and Major System Components NASA plans to take multiple steps to determine whether SpaceX's and Axiom's systems meet its mission needs and are safe for crew. For example, NASA developed a supplemental process—one not required by its policies—to determine whether the contractors' systems meet requirements before the mission. Also, NASA's contracting approach to acquire the human landing system and space suits as services included insight clauses in the SpaceX and Axiom contracts. Program officials stated these clauses ensure that NASA has visibility into broad aspects of the contractors' development work, including anything that could affect the Artemis III mission or crew safety. Officials stated that this visibility extends to certain aspects of work SpaceX and Axiom are doing for their commercial endeavors. For example, this included SpaceX's activities leading up to the Orbital Flight Test, which flew a commercial variant of the human landing system. Why GAO Did This Study NASA is returning humans to the moon to maintain U.S. leadership in space exploration and prepare for future missions to Mars. NASA is implementing the Artemis missions to meet these goals. To accomplish the Artemis III mission as planned by December 2025, NASA needs to develop, acquire, and integrate several new systems. These include a system to transport crew to and from the lunar surface, and space suits for lunar surface operations. NASA is using a relatively new approach to acquire the human landing system and space suits that is intended to increase innovation and improve affordability. To develop the lunar lander, NASA awarded a contract option to SpaceX in 2021. To develop Artemis space suits, it awarded a contract to Axiom Space in 2022. A House report includes a provision for GAO to review NASA's lunar programs. This is GAO's fourth report examining the Artemis enterprise. This report describes the extent to which NASA has made progress in developing key systems needed to land humans on the moon in 2025, and has processes in place to ensure that those systems will meet NASA's needs and be safe. GAO assessed NASA data, documentation, and policy; analyzed contract documentation, contractor risk charts, and technology maturation plans; and interviewed NASA officials and industry representatives. For more information, contact William Russell at (202) 512-4841 or russellw@gao.gov. Thu, 30 Nov 2023 10:18:25 -0500 /products/gao-24-106256 Letter Report https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-23-105609 What GAO Found The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) does not plan to measure production costs to monitor the affordability of its most powerful rocket, the Space Launch System (SLS). After SLS's first launch, Artemis I in November 2022, NASA plans to spend billions of dollars to continue producing multiple SLS components, such as core stages and rocket engines, needed for future Artemis missions. The program is also concurrently producing hardware for more capable versions of the SLS, the Block 1B and Block 2, for use on later missions. Space Launch System Planned Block Upgrades Because the original SLS version's cost and schedule commitments, or baselines, were tied to the launch of Artemis I, ongoing production and other costs needed to sustain the program going forward are not monitored. Instead, NASA created a rolling 5-year estimate of production and operations costs to ensure that the costs fit within NASA's overall budget. However, neither the estimate nor the annual budget request track costs by Artemis mission or for recurring production items. As a result, the 5-year estimate and the budget requests are poor measures of cost performance over time. In 2014, GAO recommended that NASA develop a cost baseline that captures production costs for the missions beyond Artemis I that fly SLS Block I. NASA intends to fly SLS Block I for Artemis II, planned for 2024, and Artemis III, planned for 2025. NASA partially concurred, but has not yet implemented this recommendation. A cost baseline would increase the transparency of ongoing costs associated with SLS production and provide necessary insights to monitor program affordability. Senior NASA officials told GAO that at current cost levels, the SLS program is unaffordable. The SLS program developed a roadmap outlining short-term and long-term cost-saving strategies for future missions. For example, NASA plans to use contract types that shift cost risk from the government to the contractors and that achieve manufacturing efficiencies, but it is too early to determine the effects of such strategies. NASA is also considering long-term options, including purchasing future SLS launches and payload capabilities from a contractor who would own, operate, and integrate the SLS rocket. Why GAO Did This Study The SLS is the world's most powerful rocket and will enable NASA to return humans to the moon. NASA requested $11.2 billion in the fiscal year 2024 president's budget request to fund the program through fiscal year 2028, in addition to the $11.8 billion spent developing the initial capability. In November 2022, NASA successfully demonstrated SLS Block 1 during its Artemis I flight test. NASA intends to fly a series of increasingly difficult missions, including Artemis II—a crewed test flight—and Artemis III—a crewed lunar landing. GAO's April 2023 high-risk report noted that NASA needed to improve transparency into the long-term costs and affordability of human spaceflight programs, including by establishing cost and schedule baselines for additional SLS capabilities. A House report to an appropriations bill included a provision for GAO to review NASA's human exploration programs, including the SLS program. GAO assessed the extent to which (1) NASA has established plans to measure the SLS program costs post-Artemis I, and (2) the program has made progress with its plans to reduce projected SLS costs. GAO reviewed NASA documents and plans and interviewed agency officials. Thu, 07 Sep 2023 08:29:34 -0400 /products/gao-23-105609 Letter Report https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-23-105920 What GAO Found Space systems—such as satellites—are vital to the military's ability to project combat power, collect intelligence, navigate, and communicate across the globe. In an increasingly crowded space domain, threats to military space systems are also growing. Space command and control is the ability for military commanders to make timely, strategic decisions, take tactical actions to meet mission goals, and counter threats to U.S. space assets. This decision-making depends on underlying data collection and analysis. The Space Command and Control (Space C2) program is the Department of Defense's (DOD) latest software-intensive system intended to provide this capability. Space Capabilities Support Other Warfighting Domains The Space C2 program is making changes to address persistent management challenges, but it is too soon to tell if changes will lead to improvement. For example, in 2021, the program shifted additional resources to meet critical, complex requirements after years of focus on less critical requirements. However, to deliver some of these critical requirements sooner, Space C2 scaled back planned development efforts. Users will still rely on older, outdated systems until Space C2 can complete these development efforts. The 2022 Space C2 annual report addressed statutory requirements. However, Space C2's program documentation and reporting—both in its annual report and internal reports—do not give a clear picture of progress. Reporting. Space C2's 2022 annual report does not provide context or performance results data necessary to understand overall progress. Similarly, internal reporting does not provide consistent results based on metrics that would enable comparison across reports. Requirements tracking. Program documents do not show how Space C2 will ensure it is on track to meet requirements. Historically, Space C2 did not complete all planned development efforts as scheduled, and the lack of documentation obscures a useful picture of progress. With its persistent delays in delivering key capabilities, improved tracking and consistent metrics would help demonstrate the extent to which the Space C2 program is making progress. Why GAO Did This Study Between 2000 and 2022, the Department of the Air Force spent over $1.7 billion to replace its systems that track and control satellites. These systems are well beyond their expected service lives. DOD began the Space C2 program in 2018 to improve space command and control activities. Congress included a provision in statute for GAO to review annual Air Force Reports on Space C2. This report addresses (1) challenges to Space C2's development efforts and how the program is addressing them; and (2) the extent to which the Air Force's 2022 annual report included required elements and, with additional program reporting, provided information for oversight. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed Space C2 program documentation of requirements, Agile software development practices, and its cost estimate. GAO then compared this documentation against leading practices in GAO's Agile and Cost Estimating Guides. GAO also assessed the 2022 Space C2 annual report against statutory requirements and, with other program reporting, against leading practices in GAO's Agile Guide. GAO also interviewed officials from the DOD, Air Force, and Space Force. Thu, 08 Jun 2023 09:37:01 -0400 /products/gao-23-105920 Letter Report https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-23-106018 What GAO Found GPS is the principal source of positioning, navigation, and timing information for the U.S. military and its partners. The Department of Defense (DOD) has worked for more than 2 decades to modernize GPS with a more jam-resistant, military-specific signal known as M-code. Space Force, part of the Department of the Air Force, is responsible for GPS modernization. The GPS system consists of three segments that cooperate to provide M-code: a ground control segment, a space segment, and user equipment. Ground. In 2022, Space Force further delayed delivery of the ground control segment due to development challenges. This delay pushes delivery until December 2023 at a minimum. Space Force officials have not finalized a new schedule and acknowledged that remaining risks could lead to additional delays. GAO will continue to monitor Space Force's progress in adhering to its new schedule. Space. Space Force met its approved requirement for 24 M-code-capable satellites on orbit, but determined that it needs at least three more to meet certain user requirements for accuracy. Building and maintaining this larger constellation presents a challenge. GAO's analysis indicates it is not likely that 27 satellites will be available on a consistent basis over the next decade. Unless the Air Force assesses its operational need for satellites to establish a firm requirement for a 27-satellite constellation, other DOD efforts could take priority, leaving the warfighter with GPS user equipment performing below the required capability levels. User equipment. MGUE Increment 1 development progressed to the point where the military departments are ready to commence activities in support of testing and fielding it on the lead weapon systems. Delays and unexpected challenges could affect the fielding of capability for some systems. The figure below illustrates the integration process. GPS User Equipment Integration Space Force seeks to expand the use of M-code technology by developing a second increment consisting of an improved M-code chip and card, as well as a handheld receiver. Space Force lacks a major committed customer for the handheld receiver. The Army, the largest potential user of such a device, has its own plans for handheld receivers, and Marine Corps officials say the service is still considering its options. Without a sound business case for its proposed handheld product, Space Force risks expending significant resources without providing a benefit to military users. Why GAO Did This Study The Air Force launched the first GPS satellite capable of broadcasting the jam-resistant M-code signal in 2005. However, continued delays to the ground and user equipment segments prevent widespread use of the technology. Congress included a provision for GAO to assess the cost, schedule and performance of GPS acquisition programs. This report assesses (1) risks and challenges to transitioning to a planned next-generation ground control system and how Space Force is mitigating them; (2) the extent to which Space Force identified and addressed risks affecting the space segment and delivery of M-Code capability; and (3) the progress DOD made in developing and integrating the M-code user equipment. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed DOD's plans for GPS, its data on satellite reliability and launch schedules, and interviewed DOD officials. Mon, 05 Jun 2023 08:48:46 -0400 /products/gao-23-106018 Letter Report https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-23-106021 What GAO Found Total cumulative cost performance for NASA's current portfolio of 16 major projects in development improved since 2022, with cost overruns significantly decreasing from $12 to $7.6 billion. Cumulative Development Cost Overruns by Project in 2022 and 2023 Category 1 projects in development—NASA's highest priority and most costly, such as James Webb Space Telescope—drive NASA's cumulative cost performance. Cost overruns were smaller in 2023 than last year because the James Webb Space Telescope launched, and its $4.5 billion in overruns from prior years are no longer part of the portfolio. In addition, compared to 2022 performance, some of the largest category 1 projects—the Space Launch System, Orion, and Exploration Ground Systems—had little to no new cost growth. Overall, since 2022, eight of the 16 major projects experienced some cost or schedule growth, with cost overruns totaling $637.3 million and schedule delays ranging from 5 months to over a year. As the portfolio of major projects evolves, NASA has identified opportunities to improve cost and schedule performance. For example, NASA plans to have earlier discussions on acquisition strategies. This and other initiatives are important as NASA plans to make cost commitments—estimated at nearly $16 billion—for eight new category 1 projects in 2023. Why GAO Did This Study NASA plans to invest more than $83 billion in its portfolio of major projects to continue exploring Earth, the moon, and the solar system. GAO defines these major projects as those with costs over $250 million. A House explanatory statement includes a provision for GAO to prepare status reports on NASA's major projects. This is GAO's 15th annual assessment. This report describes the cost and schedule performance of NASA's major projects and includes assessments of their technology development. It also includes individual assessments of the major projects. GAO collected and analyzed data; reviewed project status reports; and interviewed NASA officials. GAO reviewed projects in the formulation phase (which takes a project through its preliminary design), and those in the subsequent development phase (which includes building and launching the system). Tue, 30 May 2023 12:36:48 -0400 /products/gao-23-106021 Letter Report https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-23-106496 What GAO Found In July 2022, GAO identified nine priority recommendations for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Since then, NASA has implemented one of those recommendations by documenting management practices and tools that it will apply to the Artemis III and later missions. In April 2023, GAO identified one additional priority recommendation for NASA, bringing the total number again to nine. These recommendations involve the following areas: monitoring program costs and execution, ensuring cybersecurity, and using federal contracting metrics. NASA's continued attention to these issues could lead to significant improvements in government operations. Why GAO Did This Study Priority open recommendations are the GAO recommendations that warrant priority attention from heads of key departments or agencies because their implementation could save large amounts of money; improve congressional and/or executive branch decision-making on major issues; eliminate mismanagement, fraud, and abuse; or ensure that programs comply with laws and funds are legally spent, among other benefits. Since 2015 GAO has sent letters to selected agencies to highlight the importance of implementing such recommendations. For more information, contact Timothy J. DiNapoli at (202) 512-4841 or dinapolit@gao.gov. Wed, 10 May 2023 09:35:29 -0400 /products/gao-23-106496 Letter Report https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-23-105565 What GAO Found Department of Defense (DOD) strategies emphasize that space is a contested environment with increasing threats to satellites. Thus, space situational awareness (SSA)—the foundational knowledge and characterization of objects in space and the environment—is critical. DOD conducts SSA as shown in the figure below. Space Situational Awareness Steps The growth in the number of objects in space has created challenges for the Space Force. These include gaps in the geographical distribution of global sensors that collect data and limited sensor capability for objects in deep space. The Space Force is working to mitigate these challenges by adding other kinds of sensors for SSA and exploring ways to leverage commercial SSA data. Specifically, there is a growing commercial SSA sector that may provide benefits to DOD, including expanding geographic sensor coverage and providing unclassified, shareable SSA data. Space Force has some efforts underway to use commercial SSA data. However, it has not comprehensively evaluated the range of data available to help meet SSA mission needs. DOD strategy emphasizes using commercial options when possible. However, the Space Force's evaluation and acquisition of licenses to access, use, and potentially share commercial SSA data have been limited to a few studies and training events. Establishing a process to regularly identify and evaluate commercial SSA data would better position the Space Force to meet its growing need to identify and characterize space objects. The Space Force's Unified Data Library (UDL) is a cloud-based data repository designed to consolidate commercial and U.S. government SSA data, as well as data from other countries. In January 2021, the Space Force's Chief of Space Operations declared the UDL the single source for accessing and managing all data in support of Space Force operational systems. The Space Force has deployed an initial operational version of the UDL and plans to further develop it; however, staff who monitor objects in space are not using it in daily SSA operations because it is not integrated into their operational systems. A plan on how to use the UDL with SSA operational systems would facilitate the Space Force's ability to benefit from the amount of data in the UDL. Why GAO Did This Study As the number of threats and objects in space grows, SSA data about these objects are essential to managing commercial and military activities in space. A growing number of commercial companies are using ground-based sensors, such as radar and optical telescopes, to collect SSA data. These companies plan to sell the data, and licenses to use the data, to other companies and government agencies. A House Armed Services Committee report included a provision for GAO to review planned procurement of commercial SSA data and provide an overview of the UDL. This report (1) describes the challenges DOD faces in identifying and characterizing objects in space, (2) assesses the extent to which DOD uses commercial SSA data, and (3) assesses the status of the UDL. To do this work, GAO reviewed and analyzed DOD and Space Force documents. GAO also interviewed DOD and Space Force officials and a non-generalizable sample of 10 out of about 50 SSA companies. We selected these companies based on what type of SSA products they provided and whether they had a contract with DOD. Mon, 24 Apr 2023 09:54:45 -0400 /products/gao-23-105565 Letter Report https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-23-105505 What GAO Found The Satellite Control Network (SCN) is a system of 19 globally distributed antennas that supports launch and day-to-day control of U.S. government satellites, including defense and intelligence satellites. The U.S. Space Force is responsible for managing, sustaining and upgrading the network. User demand for SCN support runs high and is expected to increase. The utilization rate for the SCN has averaged 75 percent over the last decade. This rate exceeds the 70 percent level that Space Force officials cite as the threshold the commercial industry uses to indicate the need for more capacity. Annual SCN-supported satellite launches have also tripled since 2012. Satellite users who rely on the SCN and whom GAO interviewed said that this increased demand, and resulting limits on system availability, could compromise their missions in the future. Satellite Control Network's Average Utilization Rate from Fiscal Year 2012 to 2021 Space Force is developing approaches to address SCN demand and other challenges, but Space Force lacks an updated long-term sustainment plan. For example, it has requested SCN users to reduce-non critical contacts. This step has helped reduce utilization rates in recent years. Space Force is also managing two improvement efforts to update ground control electronics and antennas intended to sustain the SCN. However, the SCN lifecycle sustainment plan, issued in 2017, does not include these efforts or reflect the transition of SCN's responsibility to Space Force. Updating or issuing a new plan would help Space Force better plan for future SCN sustainment. Space Force is seeking additional SCN capacity by exploring the use of commercial antennas and those operated by other federal agencies. Both could provide some capacity to SCN-supported satellites. Space Force is also working to develop and acquire 12 new, higher-capacity antennas, an effort known as Satellite Communication Augmentation Resource. The first prototype is expected in 2025. Why GAO Did This Study Space Force's SCN provides critical launch and operations support for satellites worth billions of dollars with a broad range of missions. The SCN makes over 450 daily contacts with satellites. The network is facing sustainment and obsolescence issues while demands on the system are increasing. A Senate report included a provision for GAO to review the SCN program. This report assesses Space Force's (1) current and future needs for the SCN; (2) efforts to address challenges in sustaining the SCN; and (3) acquisition efforts to support SCN needs. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed SCN utilization and launch data; and reviewed Department of Defense, Space Force, and Air Force reports and briefings, SCN sustainment documents and data, and contracting and acquisition documents. GAO used a non-generalizable sample to select four SCN users from different federal agencies and interviewed representative officials. GAO also interviewed Space Force agency and SCN program officials. Mon, 10 Apr 2023 09:42:43 -0400 /products/gao-23-105505 Letter Report https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-23-106042 What GAO Found Based on the information collected by GAO on contracts for the purchase and use of commercial satellite imagery by ten federal civilian departments and agencies, GAO observed: Five of 10 federal civilian departments and agencies—Agriculture, Commerce, Energy, Interior, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)—reported current commercial satellite imagery contracts. The Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, State, Transportation, and Treasury did not report current commercial satellite imagery contracts. Officials from the five departments and agencies with contracts cited specific needs for procuring commercial satellite imagery, including needed revisit rates, rapid tasking, resolution, or wavelengths outside of the visible spectrum. NASA reported the largest amount of commercial satellite imagery spending on current contracts for federal civilian departments and agencies with its officials reporting a total of $75,657,508 since 2018. Eight of 10 departments and agencies reported that they use commercial satellite imagery acquired by the National Reconnaissance Office and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) through their participation in the National System for Geospatial Intelligence or through their access to commercial imagery in NGA's web-hosted service. In a separate classified enclosure that will be provided to those entities with the proper clearance and need to know, GAO also reports on contracts for the purchase and use of commercial satellite imagery by DOD, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Why GAO Did This Study Commercial remote sensing satellites and the data they produce have transformed the way the U.S. approaches critical national security issues. Based on recent trends, the commercial space industry is expected to grow significantly in the coming years and therefore may be able to address more of the Intelligence Community's (IC) and Department of Defense's (DOD) imagery needs. As a starting point, the federal government should have good visibility into its current spending and contracts for commercial satellite imagery. The House Appropriations Committee report that accompanied a bill for the Fiscal Year 2022 DOD appropriations act included a provision for us to report on contracts related to commercial satellite imagery across the national security community. In July 2022, GAO issued a classified report on how the DOD and IC acquire commercial satellite imagery and analytic services that use remote sensing data, and, in September 2022, GAO issued an unclassified version of this report. The classified and unclassified versions of the report address most of the reporting provisions for us in House Report 117-88. The purpose of this correspondence is to provide supplemental information to address the provision in House Report 117-88 not covered in our July 2022 (GAO-22-105072C) or September 2022 (GAO-22-106106) reports. Specifically, this product provides an inventory of contracts across the national security community for commercial satellite imagery. GAO collected information on commercial satellite imagery contracts, including the title, type, maximum annual value, period of performance, and mission purpose, that 10 civilian federal departments and agencies, DOD, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the Central Intelligence Agency identified. These entities had initiated these contracts in fiscal year 2022 or previous years and were still within their period of performance at some point in fiscal year 2022. For more information, contact Brian Mazanec at (202) 512-5130 or mazanecb@gao.gov. Thu, 08 Dec 2022 08:18:34 -0500 /products/gao-23-106042 Letter Report https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-22-105166 What GAO Found There are almost 5,500 active satellites in orbit as of spring 2022, and one estimate predicts the launch of an additional 58,000 by 2030. Large constellations of satellites in low Earth orbit are the primary drivers of the increase. Satellites provide important services, but there are potential environmental and other effects that this trend could produce (see figure). Potential effects from the launch, operation, and disposal of satellites GAO assessed technologies and approaches to evaluate and mitigate the following potential effects: Increase in orbital debris. Debris in space can damage or destroy satellites, affecting commercial services, scientific observation, and national security. Better characterizing debris, increasing adherence to operational guidelines, and removing debris are among the possible mitigations, but achieving these is challenging. Emissions into the upper atmosphere. Rocket launches and satellite reentries produce particles and gases that can affect atmospheric temperatures and deplete the ozone layer. Limiting use of rocket engines that produce certain harmful emissions could mitigate the effects. However, the size and significance of these effects are poorly understood due to a lack of observational data, and it is not yet clear if mitigation is warranted. Disruption of astronomy. Satellites can reflect sunlight and transmit radio signals that obstruct observations of natural phenomena. Satellite operators and astronomers are beginning to explore ways of mitigating these effects with technologies to darken satellites, and with tools to help astronomers avoid or filter out light reflections or radio transmissions. However, the efficacy of these techniques remains in question, and astronomers need more data about the satellites to improve mitigations. GAO developed the following policy options to help address challenges with evaluating and mitigating the effects of large constellations of satellites. GAO developed the options by reviewing literature and documents, conducting interviews, and convening a 2-day meeting with 15 experts from government, industry, and academia. These policy options are not recommendations. GAO presents them to help policymakers consider and choose options appropriate to the goals they hope to achieve. Policymakers may include legislative bodies, government agencies, standards-setting organizations, industry, and other groups. Policymakers may be better positioned to take action on this complex issue if they consider interrelationships among these policy options. For example, implementing the fourth option (improving organization and leadership) may improve policymakers’ ability to implement the first and second options (building knowledge, developing technologies, and improving data sharing). Similarly, implementing the first option may help with the third option (establishing standards, regulations, and agreements). More generally, trade-offs between mitigations may emerge, the ongoing increase in new constellations may introduce unexpected changes, and a large and diverse set of interests from the global community may shift over time, all of which present persistent uncertainties. To address these complexities and uncertainties, the full report presents the policy options in a framework, which may help policymakers strategically choose options to both realize the benefits and mitigate the potential effects of large constellations of satellites. Policy options for technologies and approaches to evaluate and mitigate potential effects of large constellations of satellites Policy Option Opportunites Considerations Build knowledge and develop technologies (report p. 57) Policymakers could support research on the extent of potential effects, as well as development of technologies to address them. Improving knowledge about potential effects of satellite constellations could help policymakers decide which mitigations to implement, if any. Research on darkening satellites, removing orbital debris, and other technologies could lead to innovative mitigation. Resources for studying the potential effects of satellite constellations are limited, in both the government and private sectors, which could hamper efforts to build knowledge or develop technologies. Knowledge of some effects, such as the long-term growth of orbital debris, may already be sufficient. Experts told us that in such cases, leadership and standards, regulations, and agreements could prompt action. Improve data sharing (report p. 57) Policymakers could facilitate improved sharing of relevant data about satellite constellations. The ability to more easily share high-quality data could improve mitigation of potential effects. For example, better satellite position data might help astronomers avoid disruptions or help satellite operators avoid collisions. Increased data sharing may create opportunities for increased collaboration and awareness across government, academia, and the satellite industry, which could in turn generate additional mitigation approaches. The ability to effectively share data will depend heavily on the willingness of stakeholders, particularly satellite operators. Some operators are willing to share data with entities that have a demonstrated need but expressed reservations about sharing certain detailed data more openly. Collecting and updating data on satellite positions or other key information in a common format poses technical and logistical hurdles. Establish standards, regulations, and agreements (report p. 58) Policymakers could establish appropriate standards, regulations, and agreements to help mitigate potential effects of satellite constellations. Establishing formalized standards, regulations, and agreements around potential effects of satellite constellations could help institutionalize successful mitigation approaches and make them standard practices for future operators. Formalized regulations could provide enforcement avenues to help protect existing satellite operators and stakeholders and provide direction to new entrants. Regulations on satellite licensing or operation may create incentives for operators to pursue licensing in less-regulated venues. Authors of voluntary standards and agreements might face difficulties incentivizing private operators to adopt new practices. Existing laws and accepted practices vary across domains. For example, international law may only address certain types of effects. Improve organization and leadership (report p. 59) Policymakers could build national and international organizational and leadership structures that facilitate effective mitigation of the potential effects of satellite constellations. Centralized leadership and coordination may improve mitigation. Broader organization and leadership structures could pull together relevant stakeholders to implement mitigations. Unilateral leadership or mitigation action by one nation could cause satellite operators to license in less-regulated nations. International agreements on satellite constellations may take longer to implement and may lag behind the need for timely mitigation. Establishing effective organization and leadership structures may divert resources and personnel from other missions. Source: GAO. | GAO-22-105166 Why GAO Did This Study Enabled by declines in the costs of satellites and rocket launches, commercial enterprises are deploying large constellations of satellites into low Earth orbit. Satellites provide important data and services, such as communications, internet access, Earth observation, and technologies like GPS that provide positioning, navigation, and timing. However, the launch, operation, and disposal of an increasing number of satellites could cause or increase several potential effects. This report discusses (1) the potential environmental or other effects of large constellations of satellites; (2) the current or emerging technologies and approaches to evaluate or mitigate these effects, along with challenges to developing or implementing these technologies and approaches; and (3) policy options that might help address these challenges. To conduct this technology assessment, GAO reviewed technical studies, agency documents, and other key reports; interviewed government officials, industry representatives, and researchers; and convened a 2-day meeting of 15 experts from government, industry, academia, and a federally funded research and development center. GAO is identifying policy options in this report. For more information, contact Karen L. Howard at (202) 512-6888 or HowardK@gao.gov or Andrew Von Ah at (202) 512-2834 or VonAhA@gao.gov. Thu, 29 Sep 2022 09:55:17 -0400 /products/gao-22-105166 Letter Report https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-22-105921 What GAO Found The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022 appropriated $22.7 million to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) for 21 projects at the request of Members of Congress. The act includes specific provisions that designate an amount of funds for a particular recipient to use for a specific project. These provisions are called "Congressionally Directed Spending" in the U.S. Senate and "Community Project Funding" in the House of Representatives. GAO described, among other things, information about the intended uses for these funds, the recipients to whom they were designated, and when NASA expects recipients will have access to the funds: The intended uses of these funds are to expand education capabilities, upgrade exhibits and equipment at science museums and learning centers, and support space-related research projects. The designated recipients of these funds are mostly higher education organizations, including one university receiving funds for two projects. The remaining recipients are other nonprofit organizations and one local government. Funding ranged from $70,000 to $5 million, with half of the projects receiving less than $1 million. NASA officials stated that grant awards were made by August 2022. NASA has until the end of fiscal year 2028 to fully disburse the funds, but may use its discretion to establish shorter periods. Why GAO Did This Study The joint explanatory statement accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022 includes a provision for GAO to review agencies' implementation of Community Project Funding/Congressionally Directed Spending. For more information, contact William Russell (202) 512-4841 or russellw@gao.gov. Tue, 20 Sep 2022 08:47:04 -0400 /products/gao-22-105921 Letter Report https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-22-105323 What GAO Found The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) plans to conduct Artemis missions—a series of missions that will return astronauts to the moon, build a sustainable lunar presence, and ultimately bring humans to Mars—into the 2030s. Artemis Missions and the Number of Programs Needed for Each Mission To do this, NASA will need to develop, acquire, and integrate a number of new systems. NASA has made progress on integration and risk management for the first lunar landing mission, Artemis III. For example, NASA established integration processes, roles, and responsibilities, and recently took additional steps to manage risks for the series of missions. NASA, however, does not yet have guidance for creating or managing Artemis mission schedules that will help integrate the individual programs required for launch. NASA is using existing schedule management guidance developed for individual programs, not multi-program missions. Without guidance specifically for multi-program missions, NASA lacks reasonable assurance it has consistent schedule management practices in place for the Artemis schedules. Schedule management guidance would also assist coordination, which will be increasingly necessary as the Artemis missions will involve more programs over time and therefore become more complex. NASA conducts workforce planning through the programs that comprise the Artemis missions across the next 5 budget years. NASA faces uncertainties beyond that horizon that have hindered longer-term planning. However, NASA is committing billions of dollars in development and production contracts for future Artemis missions that extend into the 2030s. This will require an extensive workforce to execute. Prior GAO work found that other agencies facing uncertainty assessed a range of future options, known as scenario planning, which provided flexibility to determine future workforce needs. In May 2022, NASA officials said they were examining the use of scenario planning to help future workforce planning efforts. But they have not yet completed or implemented guidance to do so. As NASA begins to execute the first of many Artemis missions, it has the opportunity to use scenario planning to inform future workforce environments it may face and address broader workforce challenges. Why GAO Did This Study In May 2021, GAO found that NASA faced many challenges to its ambitious goal of returning astronauts to the moon by 2024. Subsequently, NASA delayed the planned lunar landing, known as Artemis III, to no earlier than 2025. Artemis III is one in a planned series of missions to eventually establish a sustainable lunar presence and a path to Mars over the next decade-plus. Successfully executing these missions requires extensive coordination across several NASA programs and with a wide range of contractors to ensure systems operate together seamlessly and safely. A House report to an appropriations bill included a provision for GAO to review NASA's proposed lunar-focused programs. This report assesses the extent to which NASA (1) is managing mission integration risks; (2) developed Artemis mission-level schedules; and (3) assessed the ability of the Artemis workforce to manage and oversee lunar landing missions. GAO reviewed relevant NASA documents, schedules, and plans and interviewed NASA headquarters and center officials. Thu, 08 Sep 2022 09:24:22 -0400 /products/gao-22-105323 Letter Report https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-22-105726 What GAO Found In June 2021, GAO identified 11 priority recommendations for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Since then, NASA has implemented four of those recommendations by, among other things, establishing a process for aggregating and assessing cyber risk information from across NASA, and approving an updated cost and schedule baseline for the second test flight of the Orion crew vehicle for the Artemis II mission. In June 2022, GAO identified two additional priority recommendations for NASA, bringing the total number to nine. These recommendations involve the following areas: monitoring program costs and execution, ensuring cybersecurity, and federal contracting metrics. NASA's continued attention to these issues could lead to significant improvements in government operations. Why GAO Did This Study Priority open recommendations are the GAO recommendations that warrant priority attention from heads of key departments or agencies because their implementation could save large amounts of money; improve congressional and/or executive branch decision-making on major issues; eliminate mismanagement, fraud, and abuse; or ensure that programs comply with laws and funds are legally spent, among other benefits. Since 2015 GAO has sent letters to selected agencies to highlight the importance of implementing such recommendations. For more information, contact Timothy J. DiNapoli at (202) 512-4841 or DiNapoliT@gao.gov. Wed, 27 Jul 2022 13:19:42 -0400 /products/gao-22-105726 Letter Report https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-22-105212 What GAO Found Continuing a recent trend, NASA's portfolio of major projects experienced significant cost and schedule overruns and more projects were added (see figure). Of the 21 major projects in the development phase of NASA's acquisition process (which includes building and launching the system), 15 were responsible for cumulative cost overruns of about $12 billion and cumulative schedule delays of 28 years. But just three projects—the James Webb Space Telescope, Space Launch System, and Orion—are responsible for more than three-quarters of the cost growth and almost half of the delays. Cumulative Cost and Schedule Overruns for NASA's Major Projects in Development In the past year, the majority of NASA's projects in development increased their cost estimates, schedule estimates, or both. Technical issues and new scope were the primary causes of overruns. However, COVID-19 exacerbated these challenges with government and contractor facility shutdowns and remote work. Current overruns and the risk of future COVID-19 issues could have a cascading effect on NASA's ability to manage its portfolio. NASA designates cost reserves to help projects address risks. However, when projects exhaust these reserves and need additional funding, it can limit the agency's ability to fund existing missions or start new ones. For example, NASA officials said some new projects are preparing for later launch dates due in part to funding limitations caused by other projects' cost overruns. NASA is taking steps to improve its portfolio management, but it is too soon to determine the results of these efforts. Why GAO Did This Study NASA plans to invest at least $80 billion in its major projects to continue exploring Earth, the moon, and the solar system. Major projects are those with costs of over $250 million. An explanatory statement included a provision for GAO to prepare status reports on NASA's major projects. This is GAO's 14th annual assessment. This report describes the cost and schedule performance of NASA's major projects and GAO's assessment of these projects' technology development and design stability. The report also includes individual assessments of the major projects. GAO collected and analyzed data; reviewed project status reports; and interviewed NASA officials. GAO reviewed projects in the formulation phase (which takes a project through its preliminary design), and those in the subsequent development phase. Tue, 21 Jun 2022 09:36:42 -0400 /products/gao-22-105212 Letter Report https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-22-105147 What GAO Found The Center for the Advancement of Science in Space (CASIS) manages the International Space Station National Laboratory through a cooperative agreement with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). NASA is responsible for providing performance feedback to CASIS. In November 2020, CASIS formed and staffed an advisory committee of laboratory users, such as academic researchers, with prior experience working with the space station to inform planning for and use of laboratory resources (see figure). Types of International Space Station National Laboratory (ISSNL) Resources CASIS officials have not obtained input from the advisory committee on how to allocate laboratory resources, even though the committee is chartered to advise CASIS on resource utilization. CASIS officials stated they have not obtained this input for several reasons, including that the committee is unlikely to provide a consensus perspective. However, a lack of consensus does not preclude communication. Diverse input could enhance CASIS's understanding of risks and opportunities across the laboratory portfolio. Additionally, CASIS has not routinely provided the advisory committee information about past and planned resource allocations, including visibility into the flight queue for projects waiting to travel to the International Space Station. The chairs of the advisory committee and its five subcommittees told GAO they could more effectively advise CASIS if they had more information about past resource allocations. These members also stated that greater transparency into planned allocations would be valuable for users conducting time-sensitive research—such as biological science research involving cell and tissue samples. CASIS officials said they have not routinely provided the committee this information because the resource allocation process is complex and fluid. However, NASA and CASIS officials acknowledged laboratory users would benefit from improved visibility into the resource allocation process. Why GAO Did This Study Statute generally requires that a portion of the U.S. allocated research capacity be guaranteed to experiments on the national laboratory for non-NASA users like commercial entities. CASIS is responsible for selecting which non-NASA users can use the laboratory. In 2019, NASA commissioned an independent review that identified various challenges at CASIS, including poor communication with the user community. GAO was asked to review CASIS and NASA activities related to the laboratory. Among other objectives, this report assesses the extent to which CASIS obtains input from and provides information to laboratory users. GAO reviewed documents such as the cooperative agreement between NASA and CASIS and their operating principles. GAO also interviewed the chairs of CASIS's user advisory committee and its five subcommittees, and officials from NASA and CASIS. Tue, 07 Jun 2022 08:40:52 -0400 /products/gao-22-105147 Letter Report https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-22-106055 What GAO Found From December 2018 through early March 2020, the Air Force largely followed its established strategic basing process to determine the preferred location for U.S. Space Command headquarters. From early March 2020 through January 2021, the Air Force implemented a revised, three-phased process at the direction of the then Secretary of Defense, culminating in the selection of Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, Alabama as the preferred location. The revised process followed some elements of the established basing process, but included different steps. For example, in its revised process, the Air Force solicited nominations from all 50 states instead of beginning with a set of candidates based on their respective ability to meet defined functional requirements. GAO found that the Air Force's revised process fully or substantially met 7 of 21 Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) best practices it assessed. These best practices are grouped into four characteristics of a high-quality AOA process. GAO found that the revised process did not fully or substantially meet 3 of 4 characteristics. Assessment of the Air Force's Revised Process for U.S. Space Command Basing against GAO's Four Characteristics of an Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) Process Note: Characteristic ratings are the average of individual best practice scores. For best practices, Not Met = 1, Minimally Met = 2, Partially Met =3, Substantially Met = 4, and Fully Met = 5. For characteristics, Not Met = 1.0 to 1.4, Minimally Met = 1.5 to 2.4, Partially Met = 2.5 to 3.4, Substantially Met = 3.5 to 4.4, and Fully Met = 4.5 to 5.0. Air Force officials told GAO they did not use the AOA best practices as a guide during the revised process because the practices were not required or relevant to basing decisions. However, GAO believes that the AOA best practices are relevant and, if effectively implemented, can help ensure such basing decisions are transparent and deliberate. Developing basing guidance consistent with these best practices, and determining the basing actions to which it should apply, would better position the Air Force to substantiate future basing decisions and help prevent bias, or the appearance of bias, from undermining their credibility. Why GAO Did This Study The then President directed the establishment of U.S. Space Command in December 2018. The Department of Defense (DOD) views the advent of U.S. Space Command as a critical step to accelerate the nation's ability to defend its vital interests and deter adversaries in space. U.S. Space Command is responsible for planning and executing offensive and defensive space operations with the military services, other combatant commands, DOD agencies, and other partners. GAO was asked to review the Air Force's process and methodology to select the permanent location for U.S. Space Command headquarters. This report (1) examines how the U.S. Space Command basing process compared with the established Air Force basing process and describes the steps the Air Force took to identify a headquarters location, and (2) evaluates the extent to which the Air Force's revised selection process for determining the U.S. Space Command headquarters conformed to GAO best practices for analyzing alternatives. GAO reviewed documentation, interviewed knowledgeable officials, and assessed related information using GAO's best practices for a high-quality AOA process. This is a public version of a sensitive report issued in May 2022. Information that DOD has deemed sensitive has been omitted. Thu, 02 Jun 2022 07:10:48 -0400 /products/gao-22-106055 Letter Report https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-22-105900 What GAO Found Space-based capabilities—such as GPS—are fundamental to U.S. defense, national security, and civilian activities. GAO has reported that the Department of Defense (DOD) has faced long-standing challenges in acquiring the space systems that support these capabilities. This has led to significant cost increases and delays. In part to speed the acquisition process, DOD added more flexible acquisition pathways, including one known as the middle tier of acquisition. However, this pathway has trade-offs in reporting, monitoring, and oversight. For example, GAO found in 2021 that DOD had not developed an overarching data collection and reporting strategy for its middle tier of acquisition pathway, limiting DOD's visibility into programs and hindering the quality of its congressional reporting. DOD has undertaken several initiatives to update its processes and systems for reporting acquisition data to Congress and other stakeholders. GAO has issued reports and made several recommendations on programs managed under this pathway, including the Next Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared satellite system. In September 2021, GAO reported that the program had taken steps aimed at accelerating development, but identified challenges for this system that made its aggressive schedule difficult to achieve. GAO also found that the program had not acknowledged these risks to the schedule in its reports to Congress. Accordingly, GAO recommended that DOD enhance schedule and cost transparency to facilitate congressional decision making. The new acquisition process, the stand-up of the Space Force, the growth of the commercial space industry, and evolving threats in the space domain present challenges and opportunities for space acquisition efforts. DOD has reported making progress establishing the Space Force, but it remains to be seen if this organizational change can address GAO's 2016 concern that space acquisition leadership was fragmented. As DOD has reported, a new ecosystem of private companies offering capabilities such as space launch and satellite monitoring could create challenges in monitoring space objects, among other things, but could allow DOD to contract for data or services to meet some of its needs. For decades, space was largely a low-threat environment, but DOD has acknowledged that today, potential adversaries continue to develop offensive space capabilities, including weapons intended to target U.S. and allied capabilities. GAO has reviews in progress that will cover several of the key topics noted above, such as DOD's efforts to tailor the acquisition process, leverage commercial capabilities, and address new threats. Why GAO Did This Study DOD space systems provide critical capabilities that support military and national security operations. Such systems are expensive to acquire and field, costing billions of dollars each year. The recently established U.S. Space Force will consolidate leadership, planning, and management for selected DOD space programs, as appropriate and authorized. This statement (1) provides a description of key space system development efforts and summarizes the results of GAO's recent related reports, and (2) addresses challenges and opportunities facing acquisitions of new space systems. This statement is based on GAO reports issued since 2020 on DOD space programs. It also draws on work supporting GAO's annual reports on major defense acquisition programs and other reports on acquisition reforms. Wed, 06 Apr 2022 14:05:18 -0400 /products/gao-22-105900 Letter Report https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-22-105533 What GAO Found The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) effort to return U.S. astronauts to the Moon and then travel to Mars—known as Artemis—has made progress. Since GAO's May 2021 report, NASA conducted integration and test events for the Artemis I mission (an uncrewed test flight) and manufactured some hardware for the Artemis II mission (a test flight that will carry crew). NASA also made progress on completing planning activities for the Artemis III moon landing mission, such as reviewing integration efforts across lunar programs. Artist's Rendition of Artemis Lunar Landing Mission NASA now plans to conduct the Artemis III moon landing mission no earlier than 2025, a year later than originally planned. While this delay will allow more time for NASA to acquire a lunar lander and new space suit (shown above), Artemis III schedule and costs remain challenging for several reasons, including: Delays to the lunar lander contract. NASA officials stated they estimated a 7-month delay in working on the lander, subsequent to a bid protest and federal court complaint regarding the award of the lander's contract. The schedule to develop the landing system is ambitious; the program plans to develop and launch the system months faster than other spaceflight programs and needs to mature critical technologies. Change to spacesuit acquisition strategy. In July 2021, NASA approved a change from developing its new spacesuits in-house to using a contractor, which may affect planned development time frames. Under this strategy, NASA officials stated they will not have the contract awardee's proposed schedule until after the contract is awarded. Officials told GAO the award is planned for spring 2022. Increasing costs. Key Artemis III programs have experienced cost growth. For example, costs for the Space Launch System and ground systems grew by more than $1 billion in 2020. Why GAO Did This Study NASA is developing multiple highly complex and interdependent programs to achieve the lunar landing mission, known as Artemis III, as well as longer-term goals to create a sustained lunar presence. In the fiscal year 2022 president's budget request, NASA requested at least $32 billion over the next 5 years to support these efforts. To land astronauts on the Moon, NASA will need to develop a lunar lander and new space suits. It will also need to execute uncrewed and crewed test flights, planned for spring 2022 and 2024, respectively, of the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle and the Space Launch System. NASA has delayed the first test flight multiple times, which places pressure on the schedule for subsequent missions. In prior reports, GAO highlighted progress NASA has made toward these missions, as well challenges the agency faces in managing and integrating these systems and missions. This statement updates NASA's progress and challenges in working towards the first three Artemis missions. This statement is primarily based on GAO's previously issued work on NASA's lunar programs, as well as its ongoing annual assessment of NASA major projects. GAO updated some areas by following up with NASA through other ongoing work. Tue, 01 Mar 2022 11:02:32 -0500 /products/gao-22-105533 Letter Report https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-22-105709 What GAO Found The complexity of NASA's major projects means they will always carry inherent risk—but prior GAO work found that management and oversight problems contribute to cost and schedule growth. As NASA works to execute new missions, including those that rely on commercial partners, GAO's past work provides lessons that, if applied, could strengthen NASA's management and improve outcomes of its major projects. For example, NASA could: Better manage cost and schedule. Increases associated with NASA's most costly and complex missions can have cascading effects on the rest of the portfolio. For example, in April 2013, GAO found that cost growth for the now $10 billion James Webb Space Telescope would have reverberating effects on the NASA acquisition portfolio for years to come. Minimize risky decisions. NASA leadership has approved decisions that compound technical challenges. For example, in May 2021, GAO found that NASA's planned pace to develop a human landing system (illustrated below) was months faster than other spaceflight programs. The initial proposals also included unproven technologies, which adds technical and schedule risk to the program. Artist's Rendition of Artemis Lunar Landing Mission Establish a governance structure. While it has made some progress, NASA has not yet finished establishing its governance structure to oversee and manage its Artemis effort—a series of missions to return astronauts to the lunar surface. In December 2019, GAO recommended that NASA determine a schedule for integration reviews to help ensure that requirements between mission and program levels are reconciled. NASA held the first review in fall 2021. However, in September 2021, NASA announced a reorganization of its human exploration mission directorate. It is too soon to know how these changes will affect NASA's governance of Artemis missions or programs. Why GAO Did This Study Acquisition management has been a long-standing challenge at NASA. GAO first designated NASA's acquisition management as a high-risk area in 1990 in view of NASA's history of persistent cost growth and schedule slippage in the majority of its largest systems. While NASA's major projects are complex, specialized, and often groundbreaking, GAO has identified management weaknesses that have exacerbated the inherent technical and engineering risks the projects face. In 2005, NASA expanded its effort to partner with commercial companies by forming the Commercial Crew and Cargo Program Office. The public-private partnerships established by this program office represented a new way of doing business in the realm of human spaceflight. This statement reflects GAO's observations on lessons that NASA can apply to its management of its major projects as it seeks to leverage resources between the public and private sector to maximize federal return on program investments. This statement is based primarily on prior work GAO issued between 2019 and 2021. Wed, 09 Feb 2022 14:49:43 -0500 /products/gao-22-105709 Letter Report https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-22-104685 What GAO Found In recent years, the Department of Defense has recognized that potential adversaries may target its space assets during conflicts to diminish U.S. capabilities. The Space Command and Control (C2) program is the Air Force's latest software-intensive effort to develop a system that gathers data from space- and ground-based sensors and transmits these data to a data repository (see figure). Data are processed to enable commanders to make timely decisions, take action, and counter threats. Operational Space Command and Control The Air Force's 2020 and 2021 Space C2 annual reports on program status addressed all eight of the required reporting elements outlined in statute, such as a description of changes to program metrics. However, the usefulness of these annual reports for oversight is limited because they lack information needed to provide a more complete picture of the status of the Space C2 program. For example, some short-term priorities for delivering capabilities differ between the two reports, and there is not enough information to determine the reasons for the changes. Given cost, schedule, and performance challenges faced by previous space command and control efforts, program oversight and knowledge-based decision-making would benefit from additional information, such as an explanation of significant changes from one report to the next. Further, information in the annual reports related to return on investment could be enhanced by documenting user perspectives on the operational benefits associated with program efforts. For example, the 2021 report states that an application that automates radio frequency selection reduced processing time from days to minutes. However, including user perspectives on associated operational benefits of program efforts—such as organizational efficiencies or additional warfighting capabilities—would provide important information for understanding program value, enhance program oversight, and inform future investment decisions. Why GAO Did This Study The Department of the Air Force has worked for decades to develop improved space command and control systems. A number of prior efforts experienced significant delays and cost increases. The current Space C2 program began in 2018. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2020 included a provision for the Department of the Air Force to submit annual status reports on the Space C2 program and for GAO to review them. This report assesses the extent to which (1) the Department of the Air Force's 2020 and 2021 Space C2 annual reports include and address the key elements that Congress outlined; and (2) the annual reports provide effective information for program oversight. GAO analyzed NDAA requirements and the 2020 and 2021 annual reports, reviewed agency policies and guidance as well as leading practices related to software development, and interviewed officials from the Departments of Defense and the Air Force, and the U.S. Space Force. GAO also met with congressional staff regarding information for oversight. Wed, 22 Dec 2021 07:53:36 -0500 /products/gao-22-104685 Letter Report https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-22-105555 What GAO Found The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) relies on complex instruments and spacecraft to accomplish its missions—including to better understand the universe and our place in it. NASA's astrophysics projects currently include three major space telescopes (see figure). James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) continues to make progress toward its planned launch in December 2021, 90 months later than originally planned. Nancy Grace Roman Space Telescope (Roman) set cost and schedule baselines in February 2020, but COVID-19 led to cost and schedule growth. Spectro-Photometer for the History of the Universe, Epoch of Re-ionization and Ices Explorer (SPHEREx) set cost and schedule baselines in January 2021. Technical problems pushed the critical design review to January 2022. National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Major Space Telescope Projects Three lessons learned from GAO's work, some of which NASA has adopted, provide NASA an opportunity to strengthen management of future space telescopes. Manage cost and schedule performance for large projects to limit portfolio implications for portfolio. Increases associated with NASA's most costly and complex missions have cascading effects on the rest of the portfolio, and JWST's cost and schedule increases over the years have had outsized effects. Minimize risk in program decisions to better position projects for successful execution. GAO has found that major projects often underestimate cost and technical risk, contributing to cost overruns and unstable designs. Consistently update cost and schedule estimates to provide realistic information to decision makers. NASA now requires major projects to develop and update a joint cost and schedule confidence level—an integrated analysis of a project's cost, schedule, risk, and uncertainty. Why GAO Did This Study The projects in NASA's current portfolio of major space telescopes—JWST, Roman, and SPHEREx—have roots in past decadal surveys on Astronomy and Astrophysics from the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. NASA is now considering the results of the National Academies' 2020 decadal survey, which may spur new projects in this portfolio. NASA has made improvements in acquisition management in recent years, but it remains a long-standing challenge for the agency. This statement reflects GAO's observations on (1) the current status of NASA's major telescope projects, and (2) lessons learned that can be applied to NASA's management of its future telescope projects as it considers the results of this decadal study. This statement is based on ongoing work on the status of NASA's major projects, which is planned to be published in Spring spring 2022, and past GAO reports on JWST and NASA's acquisitions of major projects. Wed, 01 Dec 2021 11:09:57 -0500 /products/gao-22-105555 Letter Report